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ABSTRACT 
 
Bring your own device (BYOD) has become a trend in the present day, giving employees 
the freedom to bring personal mobile devices to access corporate networks. In Nigeria, 
most banking institutions are increasingly allowing their employees the flexibility to 
utilize mobile devices for work-related activities. However, as they do so, the risk of 
corporate data being exposed to threats increases. Hence, the study considered developing 
a security framework for mitigating BYOD security challenges. The study was guided by 
organizational, socio-technical and mobility theories in developing a conceptual 
framework. 
 
The study was conducted in two phases, the threat identification and the framework 
evaluation, using a mixed-methods approach. The main research strategies used for the 
threat identification were a questionnaire and interviews while closed and open-ended 
questions were used for the framework evaluation. A sample consisted of 380 banking 
employees from four banks were involved in the study. In addition, the study conducted 
in-depth interviews with twelve management officials from the participating banks. As 
for the framework evaluation, the study sampled twelve respondents to assess the 
developed security framework for viability as far as mitigating security threats emanating 
from BYOD in the banking sector is concerned. The sample consisted of eight executive 
managers of the bank and four academic experts in information security.  
 
Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS version 21 while qualitative data was 
thematically analysed. Findings from the threat identification revealed that banking 
institutions must develop security systems that not only identify threats associated with 
technical, social and mobility domains but also provide adequate mitigation of the threats. 
For the framework evaluation, the findings revealed that the security framework is 
appropriate in mitigating BYOD security threats. 
 
Based on the findings of the study, the developed security framework will help banks in 
Nigeria to mitigate against BYOD security threats. Furthermore, this security framework 
will contribute towards the generation of new knowledge in the field of information 
security as far as BYODs are concerned. The study recommends ongoing training for 
banks’ employees as it relates to mitigation of security threats posed by mobile devices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Globally, mobile technologies are a useful tool of communication, which are now 
becoming an integral part of everyday life (Bello, Armarego & Murray, 2015). As these 
technologies become prevalent, they are also becoming popular in workplaces. Most 
employees prefer to use their personal mobile devices for work because of the several 
benefits associated with it. Foremost among the benefits is convenience; with mobile 
devices, employees literally have access to everything they need in their palmtop: 
contacts, schedules, e-mail, search engines, access to corporate data and applications (Uz, 
2014). These mobile devices are also used to make calls, check e-mail, browse the 
internet, perform financial transactions, and for other similar activities that a user would 
perform on a personal computer (Astani, Ready & Tessema, 2013). More importantly, 
mobile devices help the employee to stay connected to their co-workers and customers 
anywhere in the globe. With the help of such devices, employees are also able to respond 
to work-related e-mails away from the office and attend conference meetings via Skype 
or other applications (Nunoo, 2013).  
Conversely, using a personal mobile device for work has given rise to a trend called Bring 
Your Own Device (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
sometimes known as Bring Your Own Technology (BYOT) is gaining popularity among 
the employee in all sectors, including the banking sector (Mark, 2014). BYOD refers to 
a trend whereby employees are given the liberty to bring their mobile devices (e.g. 
smartphone, laptops and tablets) to access organizational network (Disterer & Kleiner, 
2013). In this present age of technology, BYOD trend enables easy communication and 
quick access to information (Nunoo, 2013). There are several benefits associated with the 
BYOD phenomenon: Firstly, it lowers corporate cost whereby organizations do not have 
purchase mobile devices for the employees (Dunnett, 2012). Secondly, employees are 
naturally familiar with their own mobile devices, hence it requires less technical training 
(Bello et al., 2015). Thirdly, employees can now perform work duties outside the 
organizational premises because they are no longer confined to work within the 
organizational premises and this has increased their productivity and efficiency (Garba, 
Armarego, Murray & Kenworthy, 2015). Fourthly, it increases employees’ engagement 
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during working hours as well as after working hours (Bello et al, 2015). Lastly, BYOD 
increases employees’ job satisfaction and happiness (Bello et al, 2015). 
However, despite these enormous benefits, Mphahlele (2016) argues that these benefits 
are not without their risks. These risks come in the form of security concerns for the 
devices.  Foremost among the concerns is how the organizational information on the 
device will be protected (Bello et al., 2015). Protecting such information becomes a major 
challenge as these mobile devices are carried everywhere by the employees. Other 
concerns are the risk of mingling personal and organizational data, sharing devices with 
non-employees, and software licensing issues (Olalere, Abdullah, Mahmod & Abdullah, 
2015).  According to De las Cuevas, Mora, Merelo, Castilo, Garcia-Sanchez and 
Fernandez-Ares (2015), once employees use their personal mobile devices for work 
purpose, it becomes challenging to separate an organization’s data from personal data. 
Furthermore, the issue of data integrity is raised as organization information is transferred 
from the organization’s network to employees’ mobile devices. Similarly, employees are 
concerned with the issue of data privacy and that their personal information is at the 
disposal of their employer (Deasy, Meyer, Newell, Emil, Winsner, Furodet and Strudel, 
2018). Privacy invasion arises when an employer tries to access employees’ devices and 
such action can result in a lawsuit when not handled properly (Lebek, Degirmenci & 
Breitner, 2013).   
 
According to Twinomurinzi and Mawela (2014), the ICT departments are now finding it 
difficult to secure personally owned devices because it is out of their control and also 
impossible to review employees’ mobile devices manually since these are their personal 
devices. Uz (2014) also identifies file-sharing sites as a security concern for an 
organization’s classified data because it allows employees to save and access files from 
the cloud wherever they are. However, such file-sharing services can be compromised 
thus leading to security breach of corporate information. Astani et al. (2013) identified 
other security issues such as data theft or leakage, malware, software bugs and lack of 
control over what is on employee devices.  Olalere  et al. (2015) claim that the major 
security risk that organizations could face by implementing BYOD is lost or stolen mobile 
devices because it leads to data leakage. Thus, it is important to have a well secured and 
scalable BYOD strategy that will manage any security risks introduced by employees’ 
mobile devices (Thielens, 2013). However, Disterer and Kleiner (2013) argue that there 
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is little research into the phenomenon of risks associated with the exposure to 
uncontrolled data sharing through BYODs in the banking sector, especially in developing 
countries, including Nigeria. This represents a gap in the literature, and it gives an 
opportunity for this case study to address.  
 
Hence this study presents an overview of the BYOD trend and pertinent features 
influencing its adoption as a standard. Moreover, it presents the security threats 
confronting individual and organizations practices together with the mitigating strategies 
that are being adopted in curbing the threats. In addition, the study presents the difference 
between cyber threats and BYOD security threats. Furthermore, a security model is 
conceptualised to explain the difference amongst threats that constantly affect individuals 
and the organization as they relate to BYOD. This framework will help prioritize security 
awareness to be able ensure data integrity. 
 
1.2 Background 
In a developing country such as Nigeria with a population of over 150 million people, the 
banking sector is privileged with an opportunity to attract a significant number of diverse 
clienteles in the country (Adeniran, 2008). Despite this enormous population, only 20 per 
cent of Nigerians have bank accounts (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). One of the 
major reasons why most Nigerians do not have bank accounts is unemployment 
(International Labour Organization, 2012). According to the National Bureau of Statistics 
(2012), the unemployment rate was 24 per cent as at 2012 but as at 2017, the 
unemployment rate has increased to 25.2 per cent (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). 
This rate of unemployment poses significant threats to all sectors of the economy, 
including the banking sector. The majority of the unemployed people are well educated 
and technologically knowledgeable, spending much of their time and energy online for a 
range of activities such as buying and selling of goods (Adeniran, 2008). However, some 
of these unemployed people engage in cybercrimes and become conduits of criminal acts 
that threaten banking operations. Presently, Nigeria is a leading target and source of 
malicious Internet activities and this is spreading across the West African sub-region 
(Aribake, 2015). According to Ojeka, Ben-Caleb, and Ekpe (2017), these malicious 
Internet activities are on the increase because of the significant rise of mobile 
communication and the drive from the Central Bank of Nigeria towards a cashless 
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economy. Cybercrimes in the Nigerian banking sector are a major source of threat that 
diminishes the effectiveness of the sector on a large scale (Ehimen & Bola, 2010).  In 
some instances, these crimes are committed by banking employees using their own 
mobile devices because they have adequate knowledge of the banks’ software systems 
and they can manipulate these to their advantage (Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Moore, 
Mundie and Cowley, 2014). In another instance, employees lack adequate security 
awareness of BYOD, leaving businesses vulnerable to online attacks or cyber-crime 
(Ribadu, 2007).  
 
Serianu (2016) asserts that over 34 per cent of Nigerian banks that adopt the BYOD 
phenomenon do not have a best practice policy for BYOD, thus making this device 
vulnerable to security threats and attacks. Likewise in other African countries such as 
Swaziland, Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique there are no policies that have been 
implemented that specifically regulate the use of personal devices in the work 
environment (Madzima, Dube, & Mashwama, 2013). As a result, the banking sector lack 
adequate planning, technical support and inadequate infrastructure to tackle BYOD 
security threats (Madzima et al., 2013). Similarly, Bello et al. (2015) affirm that most 
African banking institutions that allow their employees to bring and use their personally 
owned mobile devices for work purposes do not have policies for data protection issues, 
specifically security and privacy. Conversely, in South Africa, there are policies and a 
regulatory framework that have been incorporated to support the use of technology 
(Gustav & Kabanda, 2016). However, “the continuous changes in government regulation 
regarding the use of data; and the lack of conducive ICT infrastructure were deemed as 
hinderances to BYOD” (Gustav & Kabanda, 2016). 
 
It is worth mentioning that as a result of the type of classified information contained and 
processed in the banking sector, it is essential to consider risk management in the 
development of a BYOD policy (Wang, Wei & Vangury, 2014). However, only minimal 
studies have been carried out to comprehend the phenomenon of risks associated with the 
uncontrolled exposure of data sharing through BYODs in the banking sector in 
developing countries, including Nigeria (Disterer & Kleiner, 2013; Ojeka et al., 2017). 
Thus, this study examines the security concerns being raised through BYODs in the 
Nigerian banking sector, reviews the existing security measures and their drawbacks, 
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analyses the level of security threat awareness and develops a security framework that 
supports BYOD and could assist the banking sector in policy development.  
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Globally, BYOD trend has enabled an increase in information sharing, eliminating 
geographical constraints. However, with this increase in information sharing that 
transcends geographical boundaries, security threats have also increased and have 
become a major concern (Aribake, 2015). While Bello et al. (2015) maintains that there 
is high rate of security threats due to the large number employees bringing their mobile 
devices to access organizational networks,  Lindström and Hanken (2018) emphasize that 
the major concerns associated with these security threats is the extent of vulnerability to 
which they expose the banking institution as far as access to classified organizational 
information is concerned, a phenomenon that can lead to the loss of important clientele 
data. In addition, despite the increased rate of these security threats such as phishing, 
policy violation and lost or stolen devices, a large number of employees are not fully 
aware of the vulnerability and the challenges that BYOD brings to information security 
in their organizations (Ojeka et al., 2017). Furthermore, measures to help curb these 
security threats and vulnerabilities do not respond to same level of increase of the security 
threats. Lindström and Hanken (2018) argue that the implication of enabling a BYOD 
environment implies handling the security concerns that comes with the use of personal 
devices for work purpose. Ojeka et al. (2017) highlight the importance of protecting 
critical information on BYODs which is to improve the organization well-being. 
However, recent empirical research has shown that only minimal studies have been 
carried out to understand the phenomenon of risks associated with the uncontrolled 
exposure of data sharing through BYODs in the Nigeria banking sector (Ojeka et al., 
2017). Thus, this research aims to answer the following main research question:  
 
How can the security threats associated with BYOD practices in the Nigerian banking 
sector be mitigated?  
 
1.4 Research questions 
To clearly understand and address the problem in focus, the main question/problem has 
been further broken down into the following research questions: 
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1. What are the security threats associated with the technical system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
2. What are the security threats associated with the social system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria?  
3. What are the security threats associated with the mobility system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
4. How does the security threat regarding the technical, social and mobility systems 
influence the banking sector of Nigeria? 
5. How do the recommended security measures help to mitigate the security threats? 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
The objectives of this research are the following: 
1. To identify the security threats associated with the technical system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria; 
2. To investigate the security threat associated with the social system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria; 
3. To understand the security threats associated with the mobility system in the 
banking sector of Nigeria; 
4. To examine the influence of the security threats to the technical, social and 
mobility systems in the banking sector of Nigeria; and 
5. To evaluate the recommended security measures that help to mitigate the security 
threat. 
 
1.6 Research rationale 
Nigeria has been regarded as one of the leading countries in Africa in terms of its 
economic contribution to the continent and population (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 
2007). The Ministry of Communication Technology (2012) has also stated that one of its 
goals is to “…sustain socioeconomic development critical to Nigeria’s vision of 
becoming a top 20 economy by the year 2020”. Hence, if sustaining socioeconomic 
development is critical to Nigeria’s vision of being among the world’s top 20 economies 
by the year 2020, then the banking sector is a major sector that must be given ultimate 
priority. This is because the banking sector is a major sector responsible for the growth 
and development of the overall economy as well as for other sectors of the economy 
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(Alade, 2013; Sanusi, 2012; Soludo, 2004). However, cybercrimes in Nigeria are a major 
source of threats that diminish the effectiveness of the sector on a large scale, especially 
in the banking sector (Ehimen & Bola, 2010).  Using personal devices for work purpose 
has given birth to the trend BYOD (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). This implies that 
there are possibilities for an unlimited number of employees to be connected by mobile 
devices (Greitzer et al., 2014). These possibilities will be further multiplied in the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution.  
 
Furthermore, Moavenzadeh (2016) a member of the Management Committee of the 
World Economic Forum and head of mobility industries, raised the following concerns 
about the fourth industrial revolution. Firstly, the fast-paced technology have exerted 
pressure on available security control, leaving most organizations vulnerable to security 
related risks. Secondly, how will the technology world collaborate to build regulatory 
frameworks and standards that promote growth and adoption of new technologies? 
According to Schwab (2016), the fourth industrial revolution profoundly affects the 
nature of security in businesses. Lastly, the regulators have to adapt to the fast-changing 
environment as a result of rapid pace of change in innovation. Hence, regulators have to 
deal with vulnerabilities and security threats arising from a BYOD-enabled environment 
in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.  
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
Several studies have developed various security frameworks such as ISO, NIST, Cobit, 
CISCO and IBM (ISACA, 2011; ISO, 2005; NIST, 2012), but these security frameworks 
are completely inadequate for dealing with the current security threats arising from a 
BYOD-enabled environment because they do not sufficiently consider the influence of 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution in accommodating these security threats. This study 
fulfils the limitations by developing a security framework that addresses the diverse 
technology and also considers the technical, social and mobility aspect for a BYOD-
enabled environment, particularly the Nigerian banking sector in the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. Furthermore, this research is of significance as it provides primary empirical 
information about security threats associated with the uncontrolled exposure of data 
sharing through BYOD devices in the Nigerian banking sector. It also aims to contribute 
to the current theoretical perspectives concerning the use of such devices, therefore 
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contributing to the existing body of knowledge regarding security threats for banks.  
Finally, this study provides a basis through which banks in developing countries can 
enhance their security while supporting their employees in using their personal devices 
in executing their duties as employees of the bank. 
 
1.8 Structure of thesis 
The entire thesis consists of nine chapters as follows: 
 
1.8.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
The chapter introduces the problem statement by introducing the research background, 
research objectives, research questions, research rationale, and the significance of the 
study. This helps to understand the relevance of the research and also to place it in a 
correct perspective. 
 
1.8.2 Chapter Two: Literature review 
This chapter reviews the threats, solutions and identifies the vulnerabilities in a BYOD-
enabled environment. The chapter also reviews the existing security measures and related 
security frameworks.  
 
1.8.3 Chapter Three: Conceptual model 
This chapter models the detailed description of the conceptual framework that forms the 
basis of the research work and shows its relevance to the research. These theories include 
organization theory, social-technical theory and mobilities theory. This forms the 
foundation on which the proposed security framework was built. 
 
1.8.4 Chapter Four: Research methodology  
Chapter four discusses the research methodology adopted for this study. The research 
philosophy, research approach, research strategy, research design, research time horizon, 
research methodology and research instrument are dealt with. This chapter also describes 
the data quality control, ethical considerations as well as limitations of the study’s 
methodology. 
 
 9 
 
1.8.5 Chapter Five: Data analysis and interpretation of results  
Chapter five analyzes the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the field study 
in relation to the security threats associated with the technical, social and mobility system 
of the Nigerian banking sector. These results are represented in bar graphs, tables and 
figures. The quantitative data were analyzed using statistical software packages, namely 
IBM SPSS Amos version 21. The tests used in the analysis are descriptive statistics, chi-
square and binomial tests while the qualitative results were represented using thematic 
analysis. 
 
1.8.6 Chapter Six: Discussion of findings  
Chapter six discusses the findings of the study. The findings are discussed based on the 
empirical evidence presented in chapters five, thus expanding the frontiers of knowledge 
on threats associated with the technical, social and mobility systems of the Nigerian 
banking sector.  
 
1.8.7 Chapter Seven: Three-dimensional (3-D) security framework for BYOD 
enabled banking institutions in Nigeria 
Chapter seven presents a three-dimensional (3-D) security framework for BYOD enabled 
banking institutions in Nigeria based on the results and findings of the data analysis.  
 
1.8.8 Chapter Eight: Evaluation of 3-D security framework for BYOD 
enabled banking institutions in Nigeria 
Chapter eight evaluates the 3-D security framework for BYOD enabled banking 
institutions in Nigeria. These results are represented in bar graphs and tables. The 
quantitative data (closed-ended questions) are analyzed using descriptive analysis while 
the qualitative data (open-ended questions) are represented using thematic analysis. 
 
1.8.9 Chapter Nine: Summary of findings, discussions and recommendations 
Chapter nine summarises the findings from the literature as well as the findings from the 
two phases (threat identification and framework evaluation) of the study. The limitations 
of the study and its contribution to knowledge and research are also presented. Lastly, 
conclusions and recommendations for further studies are made in the chapter.  
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1.9 Summary 
This chapter introduced the trends of BYOD with regard to the banking sector. As more 
financial institutions adopt the BYOD phenomenon, the risk of corporate data being 
exposed increases and becomes a security problem that must be addressed frequently 
(Bello et al., 2015).  
 
The chapter also provided background information on the emergence of cybercrime in 
the Nigerian banking sector and how mobile devices are susceptible to security threats. 
This is in line with the literature that attests that “…cybercriminals take advantage of the 
fact that almost everyone uses a mobile device and as such make it easy to spread threats 
through the pervasive technology” (Wada & Odulaja, 2012). However, Ojeka et al. (2017) 
claim that there have been insufficient studies carried out to understand the phenomenon 
of risks associated with the uncontrolled exposure of data sharing through BYODs, 
especially in the Nigerian banking sector. This forms the basis for the problem statement, 
research questions and objectives.  
 
In addition, the chapter discussed the research rationale and significance of this study 
which includes providing primary empirical information about security threats associated 
with BYOD in Nigerian banking sector. Lastly, the chapter discussed the structure of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Rice (2017) defines literature review as an objective critical survey of scholarly articles, 
books and any other sources relevant to a particular problem, theory or area of study and 
by so doing, provides a critical evaluation and summary of these work in relation to the 
research area or problem being investigated. In other words, it gives an evaluation report 
of information found in the literature that is related to a particular area of research. Thus, 
the literature review for this study focus on the BYOD concept, specifically with regard 
to vulnerabilities and threats against portable mobile devices used by employees for work 
purposes. According to Tung (2017), “…the increase in the use of mobile devices has 
significantly increased the total number of interconnected devices to 13.19 billion in 2017 
and it is expected to grow to 25 billion by the year 2020”. These interconnected devices 
will keep expanding, thus making it easier for cybercriminals to propagate threats on large 
scale. Similarly, harnessing this connectivity for productive use becomes a major 
challenge as this will affect data security, privacy and integrity although Ofusori, Dlamini 
and Prabhakar (2018) assert that “…there are some BYOD security measures, but they 
all have limitations when applied on a BYOD environment”. Hence, this chapter reviews 
the literature to identify the knowledge gap and substantiate the need for the research. To 
begin with, a brief background is given on the evolution of BYOD. 
 
2.2 Evolution of BYOD 
Vignesh and Asha ((2015) as cited in Ofusori et al., 2018) argue that “…the infiltration 
of personally owned mobile devices like smartphones, laptops and tablets gave birth to 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) phenomenon, where personal gadgets started entering 
the workspace”. According to Copeland and Crespi (2012), there is a new 
consumerization paradigm shift in the technological world where individuals do not only 
bring their personal devices but also use web applications for official work. Zahadat, 
Blessner, Blackburn, and Olson (2015) assert that “BYOD is a trend that has been around 
for some time, firstly characterised by individuals bringing their own personal devices to 
the workplace and installing preferred programs to accomplish tasks assigned to them”. 
Broomhead (2013) redefined this trend using statements such as “the rise of mobility and 
marginalization of the PC” and the “move-and–do culture”. The ICT departments made 
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some effort to stop the infiltration of these employee-owned devices from entering the 
organizations, but they were unsuccessful (Zahadat et al., 2015).  
 
Hence, ICT departments had to increase their security measures and adjust their budgets 
to cater for employees’ own devices being brought to the organization (Vignesh & Asha, 
2015). Gartner (as cited in Ofusori et al., 2018), “…considers the use of mobile devices 
in the workplace to be among the ten most important strategic trends”. Broomhead (2013, 
p.207) echoed Gartner by stating that “…BYOD has become disruptive in the sense that 
employees always want to bring personal devices to the organization and want to connect 
to everything”. Copeland and Crespi (2012, p. 187) outline three major steps that have 
been taken by most organizations in the adoption of BYOD. “Firstly, organizations started 
encouraging personal devices and connecting them to corporate internet servers. 
Secondly, organizations started connecting personal devices to corporate applications. 
Lastly, organizations stopped providing laptops and phones to employees, thereby 
adopting the option of BYOD strategy”. According to Bello et al., (2015), BYOD became 
a fascinating trend in most organizations, including the banking sector. The banking 
sector interprets BYOD as a strategy that can contribute to the cost-efficiency of the 
business, create a competitive advantage and increase productivity (Mphahlele, 2016). 
However, owing to the type of classified information and transaction that are processed 
in the bank, risk management is a major aspect that must be tackled. Furthermore, 
individual and organization practices have to be re-defined and policies have to be drawn 
up to provide guidelines that accommodate the BYOD trend in the banking sector in 
developing countries which include Nigeria (Bello et al., 2015). 
 
2.2.1 Risk arising from organizations’ BYOD practices 
The adoption of BYOD in organizations lead to increased productivity, increased job 
satisfaction and lower ICT costs (Astani et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Smith & Forman, 
2014). However, Osterman Research (2012) argues that every organization that allows a 
personal device to be used within its environment must also address the risks that come 
along with it. According to Bello et al (2015), there are some organizations that give out 
smartphones and laptops to employees to be used for work purpose as well as allowing 
them to bring in their personal devices.  However, among the organizations that allow 
employees to bring personal devices, 94 per cent face the challenge of a stolen or lost 
device, 93 per cent raise a concern regarding adopting BYOD policies while 66 per cent 
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admit to having careless employees (Dimensional Research, 2014). In addition, Osterman 
Research (2012) reveals that there are organizations that allow employees to use their 
mobile device from home or public places for work purpose. The implication is that the 
corporate information on the device becomes exposed to unprotected public networks 
(Bello et al., 2015). Furthermore, Olalere et al. (2015) affirm that although some 
organizations have established BYOD policies, they do not ensure that their employees 
comply with this policy. In presenting another view, Shumate and Ketel (2014) argue that 
despite the fact that some organization carry out training to ensure employees’ 
compliance, they do not provide appropriate security information training on ways in 
which employees can use their mobile devices (Tu, Turel, Yuan & Archer, 2015). The 
implication of this is that an organization’s information becomes vulnerable to risks such 
as data leakage, phishing, malware attack and keylogger attack (Tu et al., 2015). Shumate 
and Ketel (2014) opine that an organization requires a well-structured policy for BYOD 
as well as security training for employees. This may include safe device operation 
(establish password, avoid lending the device to third party), public networks restriction 
(access must be restricted), measures to store organizations information (data must be 
encrypted, information must not be stored in the cloud) and lost or stolen device protocols 
to follow (report immediately to the organization).  
 
From the review of organization practices, it appears that most of these practices create 
security risks, but the organization still adopts BYOD practices because of the profound 
benefits (Nunoo, 2013). This has gradually led to individual practices as employees now 
enjoy the benefits of connecting their personal devices to corporate networks. 
 
2.2.2 Risk arising from BYOD individual practices 
Bello et al. (2015) argue that most employees take advantage of BYOD by connecting 
their devices to networks specifically for personal purpose. However, such action makes 
it difficult to distinguish organizational data from personal data (Bello et al., 2015). 
Similarly Gartner (2015) reveals that 75 per cent of employees have their mobile devices 
configured to automatically connect to a wireless network. However, such action can 
make employees’ mobile devices vulnerable to various security threats which can lead to 
data leakage (Bello et al., 2015). Furthermore, Bello et al. (2015) affirm that most 
employees are in the habit of connecting their personal mobile device to unregulated 
public networks. According to Wakefield (2014), public networks such as WiFi hotspots 
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are very attractive to mobile device users because they are unrestricted and are common 
in public places such as hotel, malls and restaurants. Nevertheless, the implication of this 
is that the integrity and confidentiality of information is exposed when employees use 
WiFi hotspots (Arregui, Maynard & Ahmad, 2016).  In addition, Uz (2014) argues that 
most employees are in the habit of using cloud storage services owing to inadequate 
memory storage on the device and also because it enables employees to save, copy and 
access files wherever they are. However, such cloud services may pose a security risk to 
an organization’s information (Uz, 2014).  
 
Dimensional Research (2013) revealed another practice exercised by employees which is 
accessing social media platforms from their mobile device for work-related purposes. The 
exponential growth of social networking sites (e.g. Blogs, LinkedIn, and YouTube) offers 
employees the opportunity to engage in a daily conversation with many customers around 
the world. However, when employees access social media platforms for work-related 
purposes either through their mobile devices or computer, they risk endangering the 
corporate data on their devices by unknowingly acquiring malware, viruses, and spyware 
(Chanda & Zaorski, 2013; Uz, 2014).  Hackers coax unsuspecting employees to click a 
link or download a free application that secretly spread spyware, which in turn penetrates 
the employees’ devices (Dimensional Research, 2013).  Furthermore, an empirical study 
by Bello et al. (2015) demonstrated that employees share passwords with colleagues, 
friends and family without realising how this can cause a security breach. According to 
Notoatmodjo and Thomborson (2009), the highest volume of security breaches come 
from employees’ carelessly misusing data as a result of shared passwords.  Similarly, a 
study conducted by Chris (2016) reveals that employees share mobile devices with friends 
and family. However, when these shared devices are used by colleagues, friends or family 
either to check e-mail, social media or do other personal work, they may come across 
some confidential information (e.g. customers’ details, bank accounts or personal 
identification numbers) which can be retrieved without the knowledge of the device 
owner and then used maliciously (Chris, 2016). In another instance the borrowed mobile 
device can be used to access a malicious WiFi unintentionally and this can open doors for 
hackers to spoof out confidential information (Dimensional Research, 2013). 
 
From the aforementioned security risks encountered, “…this practice would have been 
stopped but most organizations have adopted this practice because of the profound 
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benefits they derived from BYOD” (Bello et al., 2015, p.1279). Hence it is of utmost 
importance to take proactive security measures to avert BYOD associated risks. 
 
2.3 BYOD security threats vs cyber security threats 
According to Olasanmi (2010), a cyber-threat refers to any mischievous way of gaining 
access to a computer network. El-Moussa (2018) describes cyber threats as any type of 
malicious code (e.g. malware) that moves from one network to another, trying to gain 
illegal access to a device without the user’s knowledge with the aim of performing a 
malicious act. The recent security threat called “WannaCry ransomware” is a typical 
example of cyber threats (Ehrenfeld, 2017). WannaCry ransomware is one of the most 
dangerous ransomwares that has the capability to spread across an organization’s network 
by exploiting a critical vulnerability in computers as well as mobile devices (Ehrenfeld, 
2017). It automatically encrypts every file and demands ransom once it gains access to 
the device (El-Moussa, 2018). 
 
On the other hand, Sipior, Bierstaker, Chung and Lee (2017) describe BYOD security 
threats as those threats associated with the movement of mobile devices from one place 
to another. These security threats include lost or stolen devices, sharing of devices and e-
waste. However, El-Moussa (2018) argues that while these devices can be connected to 
the Internet, the malicious code on the network can also be resident in the device. Wada 
and Odulaja (as cited in Ofusori et al., 2018), also claim that “…cybercriminals take 
advantage of the fact that almost everyone uses a mobile device and as such make it easy 
to spread threats through the pervasive technology”. In addition, Sipior et al. (2017, p.10) 
confirm that “…cyberspace is witnessing the advent of a complete range of mobile 
devices and applications that have made it susceptible to security threats from all types 
of miscreants”. From these arguments, it can be inferred that BYOD security threats also 
include cyber threats because once the mobile devices are connected to the Internet, they 
become vulnerable to cyber threats. 
 
2.4 Existing security threats  
Organizations are often confronted with inherent security threats while trying to increase 
production and boost service delivery through the use of information communication 
technology (ICT), hence frustrating the advancement of its progress (Ehimen & Bola, 
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2010). Conversely, the Nigerian banking sector seems to have an endless list of these 
security threats, but this section focuses on threats that have relevance to BYOD. In 
addition, since it has been established in section 2.3 that BYOD security threats also 
encompasses cyber security threats, this study therefore categorized security threats 
resulting from BYOD under the technical, social and mobility domains. 
 
2.4.1 Technical threats 
Ofusori et al. (2018, p. 223) refer to technical threats as “…threats emanating from the 
technical knowledge in the use of mobile device as well as threats emanating from BYOD 
hardware and software technology used for work related purpose”. This technology 
supports the operation of an organization that enables communication and workflow 
(Bello et al., 2015). The following security threats are considered as the major technical 
threats related to BYOD in the Nigerian banking sector.  
 
Phishing 
Phishing can be defined as a fraudulent act against any form of legitimate businesses 
(Wang et al., 2014). Phishing can be used to steal the identity and classified 
information of unsuspicious consumers (Wang et al., 2014). A phishing attack is a form 
of deception from hackers with the aim of collecting confidential information or forcing 
mobile device users to send confidential information about themselves (Ngoqo & 
Flowerday, 2015). It can be used to persuade BYOD users to download malicious 
applications onto their mobile device with the aim of obtaining the location of the device 
as well as the data (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). Other strategic methods of deception can be 
invitations to register personal details on a website or e-mail messages sent from someone 
known by the recipients requesting them to respond with confidential information. This 
is a type of crime that is basically used to steal confidential information such as credit 
card numbers, banking passwords, bank account details, financial status, corporate secrets 
and other valuable information (Goverdhan & Sammulal, 2013).  
 
Keystroke logging 
Keystroke logging can be defined as the use of a software program to record typed 
characters made by a computer user in order to fraudulently gain access to confidential 
information which includes password (Ladakis, Koromilas, Vasiliadis, Polychronakis & 
Ioannidis, 2013). For BYOD users, when a malicious attachment is downloaded or 
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software is installed on the device, it runs a hidden keylogger program on their mobile 
device without the knowledge of the user. This is used to capture information which is 
transmitted to a cyber-criminal website (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). According to Tuli and 
Sahu (2013), keyloggers cannot easily be detected and there is no effective anti-software 
that helps unravel their malicious act. In other words, they can run on mobile devices for 
a long period of time without being detected. 
 
Rogue device 
Golde, Redon and Borgaonkar (as cited in Ofusori et al., 2018) define a rogue device 
“…as an unauthorized connection of mobile devices to the network which pose a security 
threat to the organization”. Rogue device can be used to commit a security breach or 
disrupt network operations in order to steal classified corporate information with the aim 
of harming the organization’s reputation (Ofusori et al., 2018). According to Arregui et 
al. (2016), preventing the illegal connection of a mobile device to the network has been a 
major challenge in allowing BYODs into the organization. BYODs are more susceptible 
to be used as rogue devices if appropriate security measures are not put in place. 
 
Jailbreaking 
Jailbreaking, sometimes called rooting, allows users to install third-party applications that 
are unavailable in official vendor stores, to modify the operating system and to perform 
other operation that would normally be restricted or that the manufacturer would not have 
allowed (Rogers, 2012). As a result of this flexibility, most mobile device users root their 
devices in order to enjoy the freedom of downloading preferred software (e.g. security 
applications or advanced backup). However, the information security of the organization 
may be affected if these devices are used in a BYOD-enabled environment (Arregui et 
al., 2016). According to Nazar, Seeger, and Baier (2011), when users root their mobile 
devices, it opens the device up to security risks that can compromise sensitive data on 
their mobile devices. Hackers have been known to develop applications that look innocent 
but actually steal data (Rogers, 2012). Once a malicious code has root access, it can do 
almost anything from deleting critical files to retrieving account information (Rogers, 
2012).  
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Data interception 
According to Evripidis (as cited in Ofusori et al., 2018, p. 223), “…data interception refers 
to the obstruction of data transmission to and from the device, and remotely altering the 
messages”. With BYOD implementation, data interception may cause a serious threat to 
various networks (Bello et al., 2015). It becomes a serious concern when personal 
information can easily be intercepted while using the mobile device (Wu, 2009). Such 
action can lead to the risk of the data being accessed, edited, or destroyed. Bello et al. 
(2015, p. 1280) affirm that “…attackers will capture and alter data packets between 
devices when mobile devices connect to unsecure WiFi networks; this is referred to as 
man-in-the-middle attack”. 
 
Network exploit 
Mobile systems that operate on local or cellular networks (e.g. Bluetooth or WiFi) usually 
encounter software flaws (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). Network exploits seize the opportunity 
of such flaws to launch spyware attacks on mobile devices because it is easy to propagate 
threats using these ubiquitous devices and they succeed most times without users’ 
interference (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013).  In other instances, the network exploits analyse a 
particular mobile device, and then spread malware on it with the aim of accessing, 
destroying, modifying, and extracting confidential information (Bello et al., 2015). 
According to Needham and Lampson (2008, 385), “…network exploits makes use of 
special tools to find users on a WiFi network and hijack the users’ information which is 
then used to impersonate a user online”. 
 
Unregulated public networks 
Unregulated public networks are networks that can easily be accessed by anyone or the 
general public and through these, can connect to the Internet (Bello et al., 2015). With the 
emergence of BYOD, most mobile device users can update applications or software from 
any network (e.g. public network). However, public networks are most susceptible to 
attacks such as WiFi eavesdropping. According to Needham and Lampson (2008), most 
of the unintentional threat is that of insecure wireless network usage. Unsecured wireless 
networks either at an airport, hotel or coffee shop can easily put sensitive information in 
jeopardy (Du & Zhang, 2006). Hackers can disguise in such untrusted networks to 
infiltrate into any system connected and obtain sensitive information (Balachandran, 
Voelker & Bahl, 2005).    
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2.4.2 Social threats 
According to Ofusori et al., (2018, p. 225), “…social security threats are threats that 
represent users’ attitudes and awareness levels in using mobile devices”. They also refer 
to the act of communication among mobile device users (Bello et al., 2015). It is essential 
that organizations recognize the effect of these threats on their security system because 
Bello et al. (2015) claim that due to the invisibility of these security threats they are 
normally not well addressed. 
 
Malicious insider threat 
Malicious insider threats occur when someone in a trusted position intentionally abuses 
the trust for private gain (Bowen, Salem, Hershkop, Keromytis & Stolfo, 2009). A 
malicious insider can either be a former staff member, consultant, contractor, a trusted 
partner or a current employee of the organization taking advantage of the knowledge they 
have about organization operations to compromise information security (Mathew, 
Upadhyaya, Ha & Ngo, 2008). With BYOD, it is easier to achieve malicious insider 
threats since employees have access to organisational resources anywhere and at any time. 
A BYOD user with malicious intent can possibly carry out malware attacks, phishing, 
and data interception (Bello et al., 2015). Furthermore, malicious insiders can easily steal 
a co-worker’s device without the organisation’s knowledge (Bello et al., 2015).    
 
User policy violations   
User policy violation occurs when a user intentionally or unintentionally goes contrary to 
the stipulated policy of using a mobile device (Chanda & Zaorski, 2013). In a BYOD 
context, individuals can deliberately or ignorantly disable antivirus or firewall 
applications on their mobile devices in order to increase speed and performance. In 
addition, they can access unsecured websites to download documents that might contain 
malware, which in turn exposes the device to vulnerabilities and threats since the firewall 
and antivirus have been disabled. Most organizations are continuously facing challenges 
of ensuring their employees comply with user policies (Vance, Siponen & Pahnila, 2012). 
Bello et al. (2015, p. 1281) noted that “…no matter how well developed and structured 
organizational policies are, they are rendered useless if not used adequately by 
employees”.   
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Data privacy violation 
According to Aula (2010), data privacy violation occurs when the confidential 
information of an individual or an organization is shared with a third party without the 
consent of the owner. Data privacy violation becomes easier with the implementation of 
BYOD in most organization.  Most BYOD employees interact with colleagues or friends 
through social network platforms such as LinkedIn, Facebook and WhatsApp (Aula, 
2010; Chanda & Zaorski, 2013). Unfortunately, some of the organization’s or personal 
information that is disclosed on social networking site can be stolen by an experienced 
hacker who buys and sells it with aim of committing security breaches (Aula, 2010). 
Empirical studies have shown that these hackers use social networking sites to manipulate 
employees into divulging information that leads to more valuable information (such as 
banks’ information, usernames and passwords) or provides access to a bank’s computer 
and mobile device (APWG, 2013; Dimensional Research, 2013). In a similar way, an 
employee’s profile on social media that indicates he/she works in the bank can become a 
focus of hackers who try to reconstruct or hack an e-mail address and send him/her 
hyperlinks so that when the link is clicked, it activates some crime ware that infiltrates 
the e-mail box to extract sensitive information (Balogun & Obe, 2010).  
 
Data ownership violation 
Data ownership violation occurs when organization information is being saved or backed 
up on file-sharing sites such as Google Drive, Dropbox and iCloud, (Uz, 2014). The 
ownership of data has been entrusted to a third-party service. In the BYOD context, most 
mobile device users save personal or work documents on file-sharing sites for easy 
retrieval anywhere and at any time (Mphahlele, 2016). However, Uz (2014) expressed 
concern over the security of corporate data in file-sharing sites. The implication is that 
corporate data are out of the employees’ control and can be accessed by an unauthorized 
third party, thus resulting in data leakage (Uz, 2014).  Furthermore, this information can 
be hijacked while uploading. Studies have also indicated that some employees use these 
services on the organization network without the knowledge of the organization 
(Balachandran et al., 2005; Uz, 2014).  
 
Disgruntled employees 
Disgruntled employees are employees who are not happy with what is happening in the 
organization (CERT insider threat, 2015). They can be unhappy for having been 
 21 
 
dismissed from work, they could be upset for been scolded by their manager or co-
employee, and they could be dissatisfied with their current wages. Whichever way, an 
unhappy employee can be a threat to any organization (CERT insider threat, 2015). In the 
BYOD context, a disgruntled employee can decide to steal a mobile device belonging to 
a co-worker with whom he/she has a conflict and log on with his/her credentials (which 
must have been obtained through a shared password), visiting questionable websites 
(Gregory, 2011). Thereby, a disgruntled employee may intend to implicate the co-
employee by using technology, violating and reporting the person to human resources. 
An employee usually becomes disgruntled if an expectation is not met or owing to an 
unfortunate situation e.g. not been promoted (Gregory, 2011). 
 
2.4.3 Mobility threats 
Mobility threats refer to those threats associated with device location (Ofusori et al., 
2018). “These devices are either connected to secured and unsecured networks where the 
security policies differ” as cited in Ofusori et al. (2018, p. 224). In addition, a mobility 
threat also refers to methods used to prepare and dispose of mobile devices. The following 
security threats are considered for mobility threats as they relate to BYOD, namely lost 
or stolen devices, e-waste, sharing of the mobile device, unauthorized location tracking, 
and WiFi eavesdropping.  
 
Lost/Stolen device 
According to Karen (2015), lost and stolen devices are the primary concern for allowing 
BYOD into an organization. Mobile devices are much more vulnerable to be stolen or 
lost than desktop computers (Tu et al., 2015). Karen (2015) argues that there are over 65 
per cent of cases of data breaches which occur owing to a missing device. However, not 
every device owner understands how and when to remotely wipe off personal or corporate 
information on the lost or stolen device to avoid security breaches. Although Juniper 
Network (2011) affirms that the portability of these devices allows people to stay 
connected while on transit, it can also lead to the incidence of theft or loss.  
 
E-waste 
An improperly disposed of mobile device that contains a wealth of useful information 
such as passwords and customer data can cause a security breach if it falls into the wrong 
hands (UCSC, 2015).  In the context of BYOD, Arregui et al. (2016) assert that mobile 
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devices are much more susceptible to data leakage if the appropriate security precautions 
are not taken before disposal. For example, if an employee sells a laptop that contains 
sensitive information or passes it to someone else without wiping off the information, 
there is a high risk of exposing data.  There are several reports of laptops that contained 
sensitive data where the information has been retrieved despite the fact that this  
information had been deleted before selling it (Keys, 2013).  A study has shown that 
deleting information is not effective as such information can still be retrieved (Walters, 
2012). Further studies have also revealed that if the recycle bin is “empty”, the 
information is still there and can be retrieved (Keys, 2013; Walters, 2012). This has 
caused several security breaches that cause harm to the organization’s system and the 
customer’s information (Gartner, 2014).  
 
Sharing mobile devices 
Most employees lend out their mobile devices that contain sensitive information to 
family, friends or colleagues without realizing the adverse effects (Karen, 2015). 
According to Arregui et al. (2016), BYOD users are ignorant of the security risks that 
may arise from sharing mobile devices with a third party. For instance, when these 
devices are lent out to friends either to check e-mail, social media or do other personal 
work, they may come across some confidential information such as bank accounts or a 
personal identification number (Bunn, 2016). This information can be retrieved and used 
maliciously without the knowledge of the device owner. In another example, the 
borrowed mobile device can be used to access malicious WiFi unintentionally and this 
can open the door for hackers to spoof out confidential information (Mphahlele, 2016). 
 
WiFi eavesdropping 
According to Ojeka et al. (2017, p. 341), eavesdropping is the “…unauthorized real-time 
interception of a private communication such as an instant message, phone call or video 
conference”. With BYOD, employees can access the Internet via WiFi at any location, 
and at any time. However, accessing the Internet on WiFi networks at any locations is not 
secure because cyber-criminals can take advantage of the wireless hotspot to remotely 
modify messages (Du & Zhang, 2006). “The hackers often create a hotspot with a device 
and such device is used to compromise a legitimate WiFi network in order to steal the 
user’s information and in turn hack into the banks’ database or commit online fraud” 
(Balachandran et al., 2005, p. 266).  
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2.5 Existing security measures 
According to Ofusori et al. (2018), “…there are various types of security measures 
available to address BYOD security threats and many more are being developed”. These 
include password authentication (Sree, 2008), encryption (Gharibi, 2012) and firewalls 
(Kahate, 2013), to mention but a few. However, these existing security measures are 
insufficient as mobile devices often create diverse sets of security threats that require 
special or additional control. Hence, it is essential to review some of the existing security 
measures available and their effectiveness. 
 
2.5.1 Mitigating technical threats 
Mitigating technical threats on BYODs requires some technical security measures. 
Supporting this claim, Shumate and Ketel (2014) argue that before granting mobile device 
access to an organization’s network, certain security characteristics must be established 
on the device.  Shazmeen and Prasad (2012) also affirm that some security measures must 
be adopted to reduce the possibility of a security incident. Hence, the following existing 
security measures for mitigating technical threats on BYODs are discussed. 
 
Password authentication 
The use of a password has been instrumental towards protecting confidential information 
on mobile devices (Acar, Belenkiy & Küpçü, 2013). The user ID, together with 
passwords, provides essential protection of information (Ometov, Bezzateev, Mäkitalo, 
Andreev, Mikkonen, & Koucheryavy, 2018). This helps to identify the rogue device in a 
BYOD-enabled environment. According to Ometov et al. (2018), a well-structured 
multifactor authentication method (e.g. the combination of username/password with 
personal biometric characteristics or smart card) is more dependable and robust against 
any external intrusion. However, their usefulness is highly reliant on the enforcement of 
passwords (Acar et al., 2013). 
 
Encryption   
Data encryption helps to prevent data loss in case of phishing, WiFi eavesdropping, data 
interception and stolen or lost devices in a BYOD-enabled environment (Gharibi, 2012). 
There are two major categories of cryptographic techniques used for data encryption, 
namely symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption (Gui-Hong, Hua & 
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Gui-Zhi, 2010). Symmetric key cryptography, also known as secret key cryptography, is 
a kind of encryption in which both sender and receiver of a message share a single 
common key that is used to encrypt and decrypt the message (Gui-Hong et al., 2010; 
Yadav, 2010). On the other hand, asymmetric key cryptography, also known as public 
key cryptography, is a method that requires the use of a pair of different keys: a public 
key and a private key (Gui-Hong et al., 2010). These two keys are complementary to each 
other but are not interchangeable (Gharibi, 2012). The public key is kept secret and the 
private key is only known to the owner.   The private key remains on the user’s personal 
device and cannot be transferred via the Internet (Yadav, 2010). Hence, a message can be 
encrypted using either of the keys but can only be decrypted using the other key in the 
pair. This technique is easy to do one-way but difficult to reverse because of the 
mathematical function and its algorithm (Gharibi, 2012).  
 
Firewall 
A firewall is a software program utilized to protect business resources from external 
intrusion meant to destroy any electronic devices (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). 
According to Clark (2013, p. 59), a “…firewall can be referred to as a security system 
that controls access to a protected network”. It assesses all messages passing through the 
Internet with the aim of blocking unwanted messages (Kahate, 2013). Thus, for mobile 
devices firewalls block unauthorized access to mobile communication. However, 
“…while firewalls can play an important role in detecting the malware, it can, however, 
be compromised by an unauthorized intruder” (Kahate, 2013, p. 440). 
 
Anti-virus/malware 
Anti-virus/malware software is a signature-based software utilized to detect, protect and 
act against external intrusion into computer devices (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). 
Srinivasan (2007) contends that documents must be verified by antivirus software or 
malware before downloading them. Moreover, their sources must be established to ensure 
they come from a reliable or trusted source and this necessitates an enterprise to install 
strong antivirus software to guarantee the security of their systems. However, Friedman 
and Hoffman (2008, p. 165) identified the following challenges associated with signature-
based detection: “…first it can only detect known malware, that is unknown malware 
cannot be detected. Secondly, the authors of malware create self-modifying malware that 
alters its own signature every time. Lastly, encryption can disguise the signature of a 
 25 
 
malware program”. Hence, antivirus software detection is not a completely reliable form 
of protection. 
 
Anti-phishing  
Anti-phishing is a tool used alongside a browser, an added feature for protecting systems 
or mobile devices (James & Philip, 2012). They can be used to intercept phishing e-mails 
and have been proven to be very effective (Gharibi, 2012). Although this approach of 
intercepting phishing e-mails is also associated with anti-spam, “however, the 
effectiveness of anti-spam techniques mostly depends on many critical factors such as 
regular filter training and the availability of anti-spam tools and are currently not used by 
the majority of Internet users” (Gharibi, 2012, p. 3). 
 
Hardware token 
A hardware token is sometimes referred to as a security token. It enables ‘two-factor 
authentication’ in that the two-factor authentication is based on two important elements 
e.g. a password and a hardware token (Lorch, Basney & Kafura, 2004). However, despite 
the use of two-factor authentication, studies have shown that the security features can be 
bypassed or defeated by a knowledgeable attacker in order to gain access to private data 
(Goyal, Ishai, Sahai, Venkatesan & Wadia, 2010; Grand, 2000). It can also be 
compromised when it is stolen or lost.   
 
Encrypted cookies 
Encrypted cookies are commonly used to prevent hackers from viewing cookies’ content 
(Alawatugoda, Stebila & Boyd, 2015). For instance, in a situation where a hacker gains 
access to a mobile device or computer system and scans for cookies, encrypted cookies 
deny or prevent the hacker from gaining access to the contents of the cookie.  Encrypted 
cookies are specifically used on an online banking system as additional security for the 
customer (Atallah & Hopper, 2010). While cookies have been considered to be very 
useful, some studies argue that they can be abused to impersonate a user privacy and in 
most cases reveal confidential information (Queiroz & De Queiroz, 2010; Reisman, 
Englehardt, Eubank, Zimmerman & Narayanan, 2014). 
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Windows Defender 
Windows Defender, formerly known as Microsoft Anti-spyware, was developed by 
Microsoft Window to detect and eliminate malware or spyware (Thurrott, 2009). It 
includes some real-time security agents that monitor several areas of Windows which 
enables downloaded files to be scanned to ensure that malicious software is not 
accidentally downloaded (Xie, Han, Tian & Parvin, 2011). However, Thurrott (2009) 
argues that Windows Defender does not integrate with Firefox or other web browsers and 
thus cannot be a reliable security measure in the banking sector. 
 
2.5.2 Mitigating social threats 
To mitigate social security threats (e.g. malicious insider, user policy violation, data 
privacy violation, a disgruntled employee) there are some security measures used in most 
organizations, especially the banking sector, to mitigate these security threats. Some of 
these include training on acceptable use of ICT policy (Mulligan & Gordon, 2002), 
training on information security (Enisa, 2014) and enforcement of security policy (Herath 
& Rao, 2009), to mention but a few. This existing security measure relates to the 
organization’s policies, principles, and values that define the practices of individuals 
(Ofusori et al, 2018). These social security measures are discussed further in this section. 
 
Training on acceptable use of ICT policy 
Acceptable use of policy is set of rules designed by an organization stipulating the 
practices and constraints that every employee must abide with in order to gain access to 
the organization’s network (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015). While it is important for 
employees to abide with the stipulated ICT policy, it is also essential for the organization 
to give adequate training on the implication of not abiding by the rules (Broughton, 
Higgins, Hicks & Cox, 2009). This is to guide against user policy violation and data 
privacy violation. However, there are still some employees that do not get acquainted 
with this policy (Mulligan & Gordon, 2002). 
 
Training on information security 
Relevant information security training is given to employees and executive management 
to assist in compliance with the terms of policy (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat, 2010). 
Nevertheless, some employees still remain nonchalant by carelessly ignoring this security 
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training and awareness which has led to several security threats, including sharing 
password and data ownership violation (Enisa, 2014; Yeh & Chang, 2007).  
 
Enforcement of security policies 
To prevent any form of data leakage, most organizations enforce security policy on their 
employees. “Employees are forced to comply with the terms of the policy and where it is 
confirmed that an employee has violated the policy, such employee is disciplined or 
reprimanded” (Herath & Rao, 2009, p.113). However, despite the policy enforcement, 
there are still some recurring security threats which include malicious insiders and 
disgruntled employees (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
 
2.5.3 Mitigating mobility threats 
To mitigate mobility security threats such as lost or stolen devices, sharing of mobile 
devices and e-waste, there some security measures used in most organizations, especially 
the banking sector, to mitigate these threats. Some of these include mobile device 
management (Wang et al., 2014), an intrusion detection system (Amer & Hamilton, 2010) 
and a tracking device (Val, Sam & Jim, 2014).These solutions are further discussed as 
follows. 
 
Mobile device management 
Mobile Device Management (MDM) is used in managing BYODs as an enforcement of 
security policies in devices that use them as applications (Wang et al., 2014). However, 
there are two major challenges associated with MDM. “Firstly, it does not separate 
individual and corporate space on the devices (Wang et al., 2014, p. 83). Secondly, the 
security policies administered by MDM are on the entire device due to lack of space 
isolation device” (Wang et al., 2014, p. 83). Hence, employees will no longer enjoy the 
flexibilities attached with personal space once MDM is used. 
 
Intrusion detection system 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is applied to identify pre-mortem and post-mortem 
security threats (Amer & Hamilton, 2010). It has a monitoring component that helps to 
arrest network packets flowing through IDS as well as determining any unwarranted and 
malicious movement (Scheidell, 2009). IDS sends a malicious signal whenever a 
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malicious activity is detected and automatically barricades the network transmission 
coming from the attacker’s Internet protocol (Scheidell, 2009). 
 
Tracking device 
The ever-increasing ubiquity of mobile technologies has made it easier for employees to 
move about with their mobile devices and also to respond to official messages while 
travelling (Val et al., 2014). However, this has also contributed to the high rate of lost or 
stolen devices. Nevertheless, the banking sector can track and wipe off confidential 
information on the device with the help of a pre-installed security feature, a global 
positioning system (GPS) or by using third-party applications (Lee, Park, Chung & 
Blakeney, 2012; Val et al., 2014). However, Lee et al. (2012) have argued that some 
mobile devices do not support the use of a GPS and not all banks have a pre-installed 
security feature on the employees’ mobile devices. Thus, there is every possibility that 
security breaches may occur when a mobile device goes missing. 
 
2.6 Vulnerability in BYOD environment 
Despite the numerous existing security measures adopted in a BYOD environment, there 
are various gaps identified with these security measures. Firstly, in the case of password 
authentication, González, Tapiador and Garnacho (2008) revealed that although the use 
of digital signatures could be an effective method for authentication, such methods have 
significant flaws and are highly reliant on the enforcement of passwords security. In 
addition, despite the use of two-factor authentication, studies have shown that the security 
features can be bypassed or defeated by a knowledgeable attacker to gain access to private 
data (Gui-Hong et al., 2010). Secondly, data encryption with private and public keys is 
difficult to reverse because of the mathematical function and its algorithm (Gharibi, 
2012). Thirdly, Kahate (2013) reveals that a firewall can easily be compromised by an 
unauthorized intruder. Fourthly, not all employees become acquainted with ICT policy 
and some have remained nonchalant by carelessly ignoring security training which has 
led to several security threats (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Lastly, Lee et al. (2012) argue that 
some mobile devices do not support the use of a GPS and not all banks have pre-installed 
security features on the employees’ mobile devices. Thus, there is every possibility that 
security breaches may occur when a mobile device goes missing. 
 
 29 
 
2.7 Related security frameworks 
According to Granneman (as cited in Ofusori et al, 2018), “…security frameworks refer 
to a series of documented processes that are used to define procedures and policies around 
the ongoing and implementation of information security controls in an organization”. 
These frameworks come in various degrees of complexity and are used to build an 
information security program to reduce vulnerabilities and manage risks. 
 
2.7.1 ISO/IEC 27000 series 
The International Standards Organization (ISO) 27000 is a series of standards on 
information security (Granneman, 2013). The use of this standard has enhanced 
information systems protection processes. However, while this framework can be used to 
establish, implement, monitor and improve the information security management system 
(ISMS) of an organization, its adoption for security management is minimal because 
organizations see it as both procedurally and technically challenging (Dobson & Hietala, 
2011). In addition, Al-Ahmad and Mohammad (2013) maintain that ISO/IEC 27000 was 
not designed for the purpose of information security assessment. Hence, it is not suitable 
for mitigating BYOD security threats. 
 
2.7.2 PCI DSS 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) helps in protecting the 
cardholder’s data as well as maintaining a secure network (Council Payment Card 
Industry, 2010). According to Al-Ahmad and Mohammad, (2012), it is compulsory for 
individuals that stores or transmits credit or debit card data to comply with the 
requirements for PCI. This helps organizations to safeguard consumer data, manage 
information security risks and reduces losses resulting from fraud (Council Payment Card 
Industry, 2010). However, Ofusori et al., (2018) argues that PCI DSS is unable to provide 
protection on BYODs due to its incapability to mitigate against security breaches. 
Therefore, it does not guarantee the security consciousness that a banking system would 
depend on for its operations. For instance, every bank would be interested in ensuring 
that its clientele is protected from any form of losses as a result of fraud or any other 
malpractices that jeopardize their personal banking information. Hence, PCI DSS does 
not fit into the objectives of this study.  
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2.7.3 COBIT  
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) developed by the 
Information Systems Audit & Control Association (ISACA) is a mechanism that 
establishes information technology control and governance framework for business 
operations (ISACA, 2011). COBIT can be used to create IT policies, improve IT 
processes and increase organization effectiveness (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2013; 
Barlette & Fomin, 2010). In addition, Parvizi, Oghbaei and Khayami (2013) maintains 
that COBIT can be used to meet an organization’s compliance needs as well as to conduct 
an audit. However, while COBIT is appreciated as a mechanism that provides a necessary 
framework for IT governance (Tambotoh, & Latuperissa, 2014), it does not take into 
consideration the methodologies for information security (Ofusori et al., 2018). This 
makes COBIT framework inadequate in mitigating BYOD security threats. 
 
2.7.4 NIST SP 800 Series 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800 series is 
a security framework that assesses the security controls of information systems whilst 
assessing the risk threshold posed to business operations as a result of exposure to security 
threats (NIST, 2012). Even though this framework has versatile purposes as far as 
protection of business operations is concerned (Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone, 2008; Ross, 
2011), it falls short of providing adequate protection to an IT system thereby exposing 
the entire system to security risks (Ofusori et al., 2018).  Hence, this framework is 
inadequate to address BYOD security threats. 
 
2.7.5 CISCO SCF (Security control framework) 
CISCO security control framework is basically designed for assessing the technical risk 
in infrastructure architecture (Ofusori et al., 2018). The framework consists of a set rules 
for assessing the design of an information systems to ensure effective operation (Al-
Ahmad & Mohammad, 2012). These rules outline the needed requirements to perform an 
assessment on the security architecture (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2012). However, 
while CISCO SCF aimed at using appropriate control sets for specific business 
environments, it does not have an inherent security mitigation mechanism for protecting 
business operations from security threats (Ofusori, et al., 2018). Hence, it is inadequate 
as a security framework for mitigating BYOD security threats. 
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2.7.6 IBM security framework 
International Business Machines (IBM) security framework is used to mitigate against 
business risks associated with data breaches and data loses (Ofusori et al., 2018). It 
addresses security challenges that relates to physical infrastructure, security governance, 
network, server and endpoint, people and identity, data and information, application and 
process, risk management and compliance (Buecker, Borrett, Lorenz & Powers, 2010). 
However, this security framework, only focuses on the ‘what’ not the ‘how’ and therefore 
limited to only interpreting user requirements into business solutions, not into specific IT 
components or solutions (Ofusori et al., 2018). Hence, it is not suitable to be used in a 
BYOD context to mitigate security threats. 
 
2.8 Challenges in securing BYOD environment 
There are several challenges associated with securing the BYOD environment and this 
creates more concern (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015, p. 4). However, this study 
considered the following six major challenges.  
Firstly, it is difficult for organizations to distinguish between the organization’s data and 
private data because the data is mixed (Mphahlele, 2016). While Romer (2014) suggests 
enforcing the usage of two different mobile devices (i.e. one corporate and one personal) 
as a way to separate organization data from private data, this strategy was resisted by the 
employee because it is not convenient. 
Secondly, it is difficult to determine how data is accessed and controlled when 
organizational information is being accessed with personal devices as well as public 
network connection (Astani et al., 2013). Downer and Bhattacharya (2015) also claim 
that it can be challenging to limit how many employees’ mobile devices can gain access 
to certain information at one time and also setting time limits. 
Thirdly, monitoring data on devices is complicated as the organization loses sight of the 
device once it is transferred from the organization’s network to an external network, 
which may lead to data leakage (Lindström & Hanken, 2018). Furthermore, when an 
employee stops working with the organization, he/she still keeps the device where the 
data is stored. However, the organization may not be able to employ certain monitoring 
tools to wipe data remotely from the device because this may cause conflict with privacy 
laws since it is considered a personal device (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015).  
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Fourthly, it is difficult to implement security measures to protect all devices’ hardware 
and software as well as maintaining secure and stable connections for all devices 
connected to the network (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015). This is because extra resources 
are needed to maintain the required level of security (Lindström & Hanken, 2018). 
Downer and Bhattacharya (2015) claim that in order to meet these needs, the 
responsibilities of the security personnel will also increase. In addition, it also requires 
more time and commitment from the security personnel. 
Fifthly, most organizations find it difficult to control and protect the transfer of 
organization data from mobile devices to public cloud and this has created a security 
loophole (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015). This security loophole is heightened when the 
employee enables the ‘remember password’ feature on the cloud storage and mobile 
devices which are out of the organization’s control. 
Lastly, the local government laws and regulations may limit the levels of organizational 
control over enforcing security compliance on employee-owned devices (Downer & 
Bhattacharya, 2015). According to Downer and Bhattacharya (2015), every global 
organization may need to adjust their BYOD polices to align with the local laws of each 
country in which they are based. This makes it more difficult streamlining employee 
contracts. 
 
2.9 Summary 
While recommendations towards enforcing the existing security measures and 
frameworks as a way of addressing BYOD security threats are laudable, these security 
measures have their shortcomings (section 2.6) and do not sufficiently take into 
consideration the significant impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to accommodate 
these security threats. In addition, based on the frameworks reviewed, the identified 
shortcomings are a deterrent to the Fourth Industrial Revolution. “With the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, the possibilities of billions of people connected by mobile devices, 
with unprecedented storage capacity, processing power, and access to knowledge, are 
unlimited” (Schwab, 2016). These possibilities will continuously increase owing to the 
emergence of BYOD, and this will further increase the likelihood of the loss of data as 
well as data contamination (Schwab, 2016). This implies that the organizations have less 
control over every new device brought into the organization (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 
2014).  According to Bello et al. (2015), the major challenge has always been how to 
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prevent and secure data from being compromised or misused on mobile devices. Hence, 
a security framework is urgently needed. However, in order to develop a security 
framework, it is important to first of all understand the theories that guide the use of 
BYOD in any organization.  In chapter three the study will review the relevant theories 
as they relate to BYOD.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews related theories with the aim of conceptualizing an integrated 
security model. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2011), a theory is an 
established scientific framework that explains various variables (constructs) surrounding 
a given phenomenon and their interrelationship. A theory may be presented in a research 
study in the form of a rationale, discussion or an argument which assists to explain any 
phenomena that occur in any part of the world (Creswell, 2013). Furthermore, a theory 
may be used in a mixed-method research, either inductively or deductively. By 
implication, a theory serves as the bedrock upon which the research is built. Hence, this 
chapter reveals the various related theories used in studies of information systems from 
which substantial factors supporting an integrated model for BYOD security were 
identified. The chapter concludes with a discussion of adaptable theories relating to the 
need for an integrated security model. 
 
3.2 Related theoretical models  
There are several theoretical models in information systems literature that suggests 
important factors which are useful for an integrated model. These theories provide better 
comprehension and enhanced visualisation of an integrated security model. Hence, this 
section discusses the theories that are relevant to the research study which helps to form 
the foundation upon which the model is built. 
 
3.2.1 Protection motivation theory  
Catherine (2010) describes protection motivation theory (PMT) as an explanatory theory 
that is used in predicting behaviour. This theory was developed by Rogers (1975) and it 
is used to provide a better understanding of the effects of fear appeals and how people 
cope with them. This is an extension of cognitive processing and expectancy-value theory 
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983). PMT has been applied in different studies but especially in 
personal health contexts (Catherine, 2010). Maddux and Rogers (1983) point out two 
main aspects of this theory, namely threat appraisal and coping appraisal. “Threat 
appraisal relates to users' assessment of the level of risk that results from having a careless 
manner in contracting the disease (perceived vulnerability) and the seriousness (perceived 
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severity)” (Catherine, 2010, p. 625). Coping appraisal refers to how the user manages the 
risk (Woon, Tan & Low, 2005). The self-efficacy is an important aspect of coping 
appraisal. It refers to users' behaviour towards minimizing the risk (Ifinedo, 2012). PMT 
has been widely used in health sciences, but only a handful of researchers in the field of 
information technology have tested the theory (Ifinedo, 2012). While Putri and Hovav 
(2014) applied PMT to investigate employees’ compliance with information security 
policy, Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) used PMT to examine the students’ attitude 
regarding malware threats in a BYOD-enabled university. However, PMT was not used 
in this study because this study does not intend to measure individual attitudes towards 
compliance to information security, but to identify security threats associated with a 
BYOD-enabled environment in order to develop a security framework to curb these 
security threats.  Hence, PMT was not suitable for this study.  
 
3.2.2 Technology threat avoidance theory 
Technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) was proposed by Liang and Xue (2009) in 
order to explain the behaviour of individual IT users that engage in threat avoidance 
behaviours.  TTAT explains how and why individual IT users try to avoid the threat of 
malicious information technologies (Arachchilage & Love, 2014). While most studies 
examined IT security at organizational level, TTAT examined IT security at an individual 
level. This theory was developed to synthesize literature from different areas of study 
which include risk analysis, information systems, psychology and health care (Liang & 
Xue, 2009). TTAT has been found to be useful in explaining user avoidance behaviour 
through the cybernetic theory and coping theory. For instance, Arachchilage and Love 
(2014) used TTAT to investigate users’ self-efficacy to avoid phishing threats. However, 
TTAT was not used in this study because this study does not intend to measure the factors 
influencing threats avoidance in a BYOD-enabled environment but to explore individual 
and organization practices in identifying BYOD security threats with the aim of 
developing a security framework for the banking sector. Hence, TTAT was not 
appropriate for this study.  
 
3.2.3 Security risk perception model 
The security risk perception model was first introduced by Alexandrou and Chen (2015) 
to examine the adoption of mobile devices in medical institutions. This theory was used 
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to gain a better understanding on how healthcare practitioners perceive the risks 
associated with mobile devices as they relate to BYOD (Alexandrou & Chen, 2014). This 
theory postulates that each healthcare practitioner has specific security beliefs that could 
indirectly impact their behavioural intentions to use the devices. This compels the 
healthcare practitioner to adopt security controls while using the device (Alexandrou & 
Chen, 2014). Furthermore, Alexandrou and Chen (2014) explore the various factors 
influencing each healthcare practitioner’s security risk perception on mobile devices and 
their intention to comply with security controls. In this regard, there is a Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) with which the healthcare practitioners are 
expected to comply.  The HIPAA emphasizes the importance of protecting the 
confidentiality of individuals’ medical records. However, it is important to note that the 
key focus of this study is to develop a security framework for the banking sector which 
can only be achieved by identifying the security threats associated with a BYOD-enabled 
environment.  Hence, the security risk perception model was not used for this study 
because it is mostly used for explaining users’ perceptions and adoption and does not 
meet with the objectives of this study. 
 
3.2.4 Organization theories 
Organization theories originate from organizational practices and they explain how 
individuals and groups of people behave in differing organizational arrangements (Yang, 
Liu & Wang, 2013). It captures the diversities of organizational structure and operating 
processes (Robbins, 1990). Furthermore, organization theories are knowledge systems 
which study and explain organizational group behaviour and individual behaviour 
(Czarniawska, 1999). While some studies have used organization theories to focus on 
individual and small groups within the context of an organization, other studies have used 
organization theory to deal with macro-level analyses of organization-wide concepts, 
intergroup relationships, and organization environment interactions (Yang et al., 2013). 
This theory contends that in those instances where organizational policy is flouted or 
abused by employees, it exposes the organization to potential security threats that make 
the organization vulnerable (Yang et al., 2013). In this regard, organization theory helps 
to understand the linkages between individual and organization practices in exploring 
BYOD security threats in the organization. This theory links such practices to security 
concerns that may impair the organization security system capacity to detect such harmful 
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security threats. Hence, this study adopts organization theories in investigating 
organization and individual practices in the context of a BYOD-enabled environment.   
 
However, Yang et al. (2013) argue that organization theories only focus on how groups 
and individuals behave in differing organizational arrangements but do not capture how 
technology influences this behaviour or practices.  Hence, organization theory has to be 
used along with other theories that incorporate technology. Thus, to fully understand how 
technology influences individual and organization practices while using mobile devices 
at work, it is important to review other theories that explain this interrelationship.  
 
3.2.5 Social-technical theory 
According to Bostrom and Heinen (1977), the socio-technical design principle was 
formulated by Cherns (1976). The socio-technical theory implies that organizations are 
made up of people and technology coming together to create an environment for the 
success or failure of the organization (Figure 3.1). Socio-technical theory explains mobile 
devices as productive working tools that are important in any social system so that they 
are not regarded as purely technical artefacts and the organization as a separate social 
entity. Urry (2012) holds the same view which suggests that using mobile devices as  
working tools can increase productivity if they are  used as  socio-technical tools with the 
right training and education, the right controls and the right mobile policies put in place 
(Nunoo, 2013). However, some employees use this device as though it was either a purely 
social artefact or a purely technical artefact (Nunoo, 2013). They do not seem to 
understand it as a socio-technical tool that can increase both the social and technical 
aspects of their working lives if managed as a socio-technical artefact (Akbari & Land, 
2011).  
 
Hence, this study has noted the unique contribution of socio-technical theory and will be 
adopting the social and technical constructs for the following reasons; firstly, to explain 
how the reciprocal interrelationship between technology and people creates an 
environment for either the success or failure of the organization; secondly, to explain the 
theoretical constructs for the social aspect resulting from interactions among people and 
technical aspects resulting from the technology used in the organization. The social 
construct will also be used to identify the security threats associated with employees’ 
interaction, knowledge skills, attitudes, values and organization policies as they relate to 
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BYOD practices. In addition, the technical construct will be used to identify the security 
threats associated with the technical knowledge regarding the use of mobile device as 
well as from BYOD hardware and software technology used for work purposes. Lastly, 
socio-technical theory will be used to explain how the work system and its environment 
also lead to joint optimization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Socio-technical system (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977) 
 
However, despite the socio-technical contribution to the society, Chen and Nath (2011) 
argue that there is no comprehensive mobile workforce framework that incorporates key 
issues from the technical, managerial, behavioural and cultural perspectives. Though the 
socio-technical framework incorporates bits of technology into our social environments, 
mobility and the problems associated with it are not handled properly (Chen & Nath, 
2011).  With this in mind, socio-technical theory is not sufficient to be used alone because 
it does not effectively incorporate mobility and the problems associated with it. Hence, 
the following section discusses mobility theory which encompasses the movement of 
people and objects and their interrelationship. 
 
Social System Technical System 
             Structure 
         People               Tasks 
Technology 
 39 
 
3.2.6 Mobilities theory 
Hannam, Sheller and Urry (2006) define mobilities as a concept that deals with the 
massive movement of humans, information and objects across the globe and local 
environment. Urry (2012) holds the same view by defining mobilities as a model in the 
social sciences that investigates the movement of humans, ideas and objects, and the 
broader social implications of those movements (Urry, 2012). The social perspective of 
mobility mainly refers to the issues of movement and it examines the movement of 
objects, people and work in terms of space, place and time (Kakihara & Sørensen, 2001). 
On the other hand is the technical perspective of mobility: most tools and facilities in the 
office or at home have been reduced significantly to a smaller size and can be carried 
anywhere, making people geographically independent within the next decade. It is 
claimed that the usage of such devices enables people to travel freely and live wherever 
they wish (Makimoto & Manners, 1997). Most employees travel and respond to work-
related business via their portable devices, especially their smartphones. Hence, this study 
adopts the mobility theory for the following reasons: firstly, to understand the concept 
that makes people travel with their mobile devices and exchange information including 
organizational data while travelling; secondly, to understand how mobility has influenced 
the way people interact; and lastly, to explain the implications of those movements.  
 
The mobility construct will be used to identify the security threats associated with 
employees’ location while using their personal devices for work purposes.  Nunoo (2013) 
asserts that employees that travel with their mobile devices mostly used them to access 
open WiFi and not all these WiFi hot spots can be trusted. Some of these open connections 
are owned by malicious hackers who are sniffing around for any confidential data they 
can lay their hands on which could be used to blackmail the organization into giving them 
what they want or could be used against the organization to compromise  its 
trustworthiness to the public. In addition, Urry (2012) also argues that mobility naturally 
influences the way entities interact. It is worth mentioning that security challenges cannot 
be fully addressed without analyzing mobility as this concept is changing the underlying 
theories of information systems, especially from the point of view of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. According to Basole (2004), human interaction can be 
transformed through mobility and defined along spatial, temporal and contextual 
dimensions (Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2: Dimension of mobility (Basole, 2004) 
 
The spatial dimension examines human behaviour in relation to geographical locations 
(Basole, 2004). The temporal dimension enables time savings as well as allowing multiple 
activities to be conducted simultaneously and instantaneously (Hammer & Mangurian, 
1987).  Contextual dimension refers to “…the situation and environment in which humans 
perform their activities” (Basole, 2004, p. 3). More specifically, the contextual dimension 
provides explicit knowledge regarding the way and the circumstances in which the 
activity is being carried out.  
 
Despite the benefits of mobility theory from different dimensions such as spatial, 
temporal and contextual, the theory suffers some limitations. Kakihara and Sørensen 
(2001) argue that there is a misconception about the mobility system as it only deals with 
human geographical movement and such a view is insufficient to capture the complicated 
reality emerging from the mobility system of our social lives. Hence, this study takes into 
cognizance the various dimensions of mobility and will be using mobilities theory as a 
construct that focuses on location or human geographical movement. This construct will 
be used along with other constructs in socio-technical theory as well as organization 
theory. 
 
3.3 Conceptual model 
This study adopts three basic theories as a foundation on which the conceptual model was 
developed. Organization theory was used to explain organization and individual practices 
as they relate to BYOD. Secondly, socio-technical theory was used to place the mobile 
devices as productive tools that are important in any social system so that they are not 
Mobility
Spatial Temporal Contextual
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seen as purely technical artefacts and the organization as a separate social entity. Socio-
technical theory indicates that organizations are made up of people and technology 
coming together to create an environment for the success or failure of the organization 
(Walker, Stanton, Salmon & Jenkins, 2008). This knowledge helps to position personal 
mobile devices in their rightful place from a business perspective and helps incorporate 
the most relevant parts of the surrounding context into the analysis thereby creating 
conditions for successful performance at the workplace. Thirdly, mobilities theory was 
used to provide a basis for human geographical movement (Urry, 2012). Figure 3.3 
presents the conceptual model that incorporates the three theories adopted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Conceptual model (Source: Author’s own) 
 
The organization practices have to do with the concept of allowing the BYOD trend in 
the Nigerian banking sector. This organization practices has a way of influencing the 
individual practices. However, the individual practices explore the interplay between the 
social, technical and mobility domains as they relate to the usage of mobile devices. These 
Mobility 
Social Technical 
Organizational Practices  
Security threats  
Tasks 
Individual Practices 
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Devices Environment 
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mobile devices include those owned by individuals (employees) and/or the organization 
(bank). 
 
The technical domain is influenced by two constructs, namely devices and the tasks 
(Chern, 1976). The ‘devices’ are used as a working instrument in the banking sector. 
These devices support the operation of the bank that enables communication and 
workflow, while the ‘task’ refers to the work the employees are expected to do and also 
how to get the work done. For example, if the work unit is a marketing department, the 
key tasks could be travelling out of the work environment to advertise or market the 
banks’ product and services to customers in other organizations. This could be a routine 
task (Nunoo, 2013).  
 
The social domain is influenced by two constructs, namely the environment and the users 
(Chern, 1976). The ‘environment’ represents the structure (i.e. organization) where the 
employees carry out their official duties and communication while the ‘users’ represent 
the employees who are often the key consideration in any change initiative. They actively 
perform any given tasks with the use of technology and their beliefs, attitudes, skills, 
behaviours, and work policy greatly affect the success of change in any organization.  
 
The mobility domain is significant to this study because of the overlap of mobility 
between the technical and social domains. This overlap explains the interplay between 
the technical and social domains in the context of employees’ movement from one 
location to another while using their mobile devices in performing official duties, possibly 
leading to security threats. Mobility was used to gain an understanding of the concept that 
makes people travel with their mobile devices and exchange information, including 
organizational data, while travelling (Urry, 2012). The risks associated with regard to 
exchanging organizational information with their personal devices while travelling were 
investigated. Based on the conceptual model, security threats that are associated with the 
three dimensional domains were identified.  
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the relevant theories in order to discover and identify the key 
research issues related to the BYOD phenomenon. The review approach can be viewed 
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as an ensemble method that combines three sets of theories which learn from past 
literature and observations. Drawing upon the existing theories reviewed, there is no 
single theory or model that sufficiently explains the variables (constructs) surrounding 
the BYOD phenomenon and its interrelationship with organization and individual 
practices for the following reasons.  
 
Firstly, organization theory only focuses on how groups and individuals behave in 
differing organizational arrangements but does not capture how technology influences 
these behaviours or practices (Yang et al., 2013). Secondly, the socio-technical dimension 
helps to explain the concept of a work unit (organization) being made up of both the social 
and technical elements which is open to its environment, but it does not capture mobility 
and the problems associated with it (Chen & Nath, 2011).  Lastly, mobility theory focuses 
only on human geographical movement and such a view is insufficient to capture the 
complicated reality emerging from the mobility system of our social lives (Kakihara & 
Sørensen, 2001). 
 
Hence, the researcher combined the three theories, namely organization theory, and socio-
technical and mobility theory so as to hypothesise the conceptual model for the Nigerian 
banking sector which will eventually add to the body of knowledge.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi (2006) define research as the procedure of 
discovering novel information on a particular topic. Research helps to provide answers to 
questions, solutions to problems or to gain more knowledge about a certain subject 
(Saunders & Tosey, 2013). Conversely, Van Wyk (2012) refers to research methodology 
as the procedures and approaches adopted when carrying out a research study.  The 
research procedures and approaches used in this study to identify the security threats 
associated with a BYOD-enabled environment is informed by the research onion which 
was developed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009). The summary of the research 
process establishing the research methodology is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Research onion (Saunders et al., 2011, p. 108) 
 
The research process and procedures such as research philosophy, research approach, 
research strategy, research design, techniques and procedures adopted in this study are 
elaborated in the various sections of the chapter to answer the research questions which 
are stated as follows: 
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1. What are the security threats associated with the technical system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
2. What are the security threats associated with the social system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria?  
3. What are the security threats associated with the mobility system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
4. How does the security threat regarding the technical, social and mobility systems 
influence the banking sector of Nigeria? 
5. How do the recommended security measures help to mitigate the security threats? 
 
4.2 Research philosophies 
Saunders et al. (2011) defines research philosophies as worldviews or different types of 
beliefs about a chosen enquiry which give rise to the design, process, strategies and 
methods of reinvestigating an existing knowledge on the construct or the object. This 
study discusses research philosophies in line with the views of Saunders et al. (2011, p. 
108). 
 
Positivism is commonly referred to as an objective research strategy which often follows 
the path of natural science (Saunders et al., 2011). Realism is a type of research 
philosophy that observes two specific features of positivism: an orientation that is totally 
different from the object that is being investigated, and an assumption that social and 
scientific science research must use the same method of data collection (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). Interpretivism emphasizes the necessity to cut down the difference between what 
is being researched and the researcher as one social actor (Kelliher, 2011; Saunders et al., 
2011). In addition, according to the literature, pragmatism relies on situations, actions and 
consequences (Creswell, 2013, p. 10). “Pragmatism argues that the most important 
determinant of the research philosophy adopted is the research question – one approach 
may be ‘better’ than the other for answering certain questions. Moreover, if the research 
question does not suggest unambiguously that either a positivist or interpretivist 
philosophy is adopted this confirms the pragmatist’s view that it is perfectly possible to 
work with both philosophies” (Creswell, 2013, p. 10).  Pragmatism uses mixed methods 
to provide solutions to research questions and problems rather than focusing on 
information about truth and reality (Creswell, 2013). It emphasizes mixed methods to 
 46 
 
produce better results.  This implies that mixed methods, both qualitative and quantitative, 
are possible within one study.  
 
Therefore, this study adopts the pragmatic philosophy for the following reasons; firstly, 
because it is a mixed-method research philosophy that addresses a real-world problem. 
Hence, it offers better results and is helpful in answering the study research questions. 
These research questions are considered suitable for mixed-methods research and 
especially for information systems and social science (Goodyear & Retalis, 2010). 
Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala (2013), assert that pragmatism is more applicable to research 
in information systems. Secondly, the study requires a high level of objectivity and for 
this reason the pragmatic approach was found to be most suitable. Lastly, pragmatic 
philosophy facilitates data triangulation. Data triangulation is essential in mixed-methods 
studies for data verification because it leads to better data collection, analysis and 
interpretation of results which produces outstanding results (Creswell, 2013). Venkatesh 
et al. (2013) and Goodyear and Retalis (2010) argue that while quantitative and qualitative 
studies are based on deductive and inductive reasoning respectively, pragmatism is based 
on abduction which falls between the two. Their argument is based on the fact that 
abduction moves forward and backward between deduction and induction, making it 
suitable for addressing real-world problems through a mixed-methods approach.  The 
mixed method approach is further discussed in section 4.3. 
 
4.3 Research approach 
According to Saunders et al. (2011, p.108), “…research approach is an orderly and 
systematic move taken towards the allocation and analysis of data so that information can 
be obtained”. There two types of research approaches, namely inductive and deductive 
approaches. Trochim and Donnelly (2001) define an inductive approach as starting with 
the specific and ending with the general. Arguments based on observation or experience 
are said to be better expressed inductively. It is a bottom-up approach which is mostly 
concerned with the methods of data collection to obtain un-mediated information on a 
phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2011). This obviously explains the reason why a qualitative 
approach is an inductive inquiry, especially with the use of observation and interviews to 
gain in-depth knowledge which inductively contributes to the body of knowledge 
(Goulding, 2002; Kelliher, 2011). 
 47 
 
However, Soiferman (2010) defines a deductive approach as moving from the general to 
the specific. Studies have shown that arguments based on rules, laws or other related 
principles are best expressed deductively (Saunders et al., 2011). It is a top-down 
approach of scientific inquiry into the literature review which requires an understanding 
of the relationships among the variables (Saunders et al., 2011). This approach enables 
scientific methods of data collection which are subject to statistical analysis and also 
deductively contributes to the body of knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The major 
advantage of this approach is that it is highly objective while the major disadvantage is 
that owing to the rigorous statistical analysis and complex scientific methodology, it may 
not always be needed in social or management sciences research (Saunders et al., 2011). 
 
Hence, this study combines both deductive and inductive research approaches because it 
has been found useful to combine these two approaches. While the questionnaire was 
used to collect data which deductively contributes to the body of knowledge, interviews 
were also used to gain in-depth knowledge which inductively contributes to the body of 
knowledge (Saunders et al., 2011). The integrated approach of deductive and inductive 
methods in a single study is referred to as mixed methods (Creswell, 2013). Therefore, 
the researcher selected this approach as the most appropriate approach to investigate the 
security threats associated with BYOD security threats in the Nigerian banking sector.  
 
4.4 Research choices 
Creswell (2013) categorized research choices into three, namely quantitative, qualitative 
and mixed methods. The quantitative approach is characterized by the use of numbers 
and closed-ended questions as opposed to the use of words and open-ended questions 
or interviews on which the qualitative approach centres (Creswell, 2013; Kumar, 
2011). However, in developing theories it has been found useful to combine these two 
approaches, which is called mixed methods (Saunders et al., 2011). A mixed-methods 
approach involves the “mixing” of qualitative and quantitative data and integrating 
both within a single investigation (Creswell, 2013). This study adopts a mixed-
methods research approach in addressing the research questions for the following 
reasons: 
 
Firstly, it provides an in-depth and a richer understanding in identifying the security 
threats associated with technical, social and mobility domains as they relate to the 
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BYOD phenomenon in the Nigerian banking sector. It is important to note that 
different respondents and organizations may have different practices, views and 
experiences when using mobile devices in a BYOD-enabled environment. Hence, in 
order to achieve the objectives earmarked for this study, the quantitative approach 
employs closed-ended questions to explore individual practices and identify BYOD 
security threats. This was administered to a large sample of employees.  On the other 
hand, a qualitative approach employs a face-to-face interview to explore 
organization practices and identify BYOD security threats as well as how these 
security threats are being mitigated. This was directed to a small number of 
employees, thus, enabling the development of a security framework for the Nigerian 
banking sector.  
 
Secondly, it enables the simultaneous collection of quantitative and qualitative data 
(Hanson, Creswell, Clark, Petska & Creswell, 2005). The qualitative data for this study 
was used to support the quantitative data, hence preventing intrinsic bias that arises 
from a single method (Fidel, 2008). Thirdly, a mixed-method approach helps the 
researcher to understand the study’s problem statement. Fourthly, a mixed-methods 
research approach also offers an opportunity for equal or skewed priority to be given to 
quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2013; Hanson et al., 2005). In this study, 
higher priority was given to quantitative data: through this, generalisation of the study 
findings can be proposed. Lastly, it creates an avenue for separate analysis of quantitative 
and qualitative data which was later integrated at the interpretation stage. Hanson et al. 
(2005) noted that mixed methods enable quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (non-
numerical) data to be collected and analysed either concurrently or sequentially, 
depending on the study’s research questions and objectives as well as the problem 
statement. Thus, a mixed-methods approach was considered more suitable as it falls 
in line with the philosophical worldview of the study (Creswell, 2014).  Two phases 
are considered in this study; the first phase is the threat identification which led to 
the development of a security framework, while the second phase is the framework 
evaluation. 
 
For the first phase (i.e. threat identification) of the study which addressed the 
research questions, a quantitative approach was first of all used to gather information 
regarding individual practices as well as to identify the security threats associated with 
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technical, social and mobility domains as they relate to a BYOD-enabled environment. 
This was followed by a qualitative approach to ascertain organization practices and 
identify BYOD security threats as well as identifying the mitigating strategies. This 
implies that the first phase of the study followed the sequential mixed-methods 
research design. The sequential mixed-methods research design enables data to be 
analysed separately but integrated at the interpretation stage, enabling data triangulation 
in the course of the investigation (Hanson et al., 2005). The outcome of the data analysis 
and the interpretation gave rise to the development of a security framework (chapter 7).   
 
In the second phase (i.e. framework evaluation) of the study, data was collected 
utilising numerical (quantitative) and non-numerical (qualitative) approaches, including 
a structured questionnaire containing closed and open-ended questions. This was 
administered to eight executive management staff (i.e. two each from the four 
participating banks) and four academic staff of information systems and technology 
(i.e. one each from four different universities) to evaluate the developed security 
framework and ascertain whether it meets the required criteria. Hence, the second phase 
of the study followed the concurrent mixed methods research design (Creswell, 
2013). 
 
4.5 Research strategy 
Research strategy refers to the different strategies employed for data collection in order 
to draw realistic deductions (Azika, 2008). The diverse strategies involved in conducting 
a research study include case study, experimental, action, archival, ethnographic, 
grounded and survey research strategies.   
 
A case study research strategy is mostly used for qualitative research but can employ both 
qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection and analysis (Saunders et al., 
2011).  The experimental research strategy is mostly adopted when dealing with both 
laboratory and field experiments (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  Action research is a research 
strategy with the dual purpose of action and research (Dick, 1993). In other words, action 
research is either initiated to solve an instant problem or to reflectively solve a progressive 
problem. Archival research strategy involves the study of historical and administrative 
documents of organizations as a source of data collection (Saunders et al., 2011, p. 150). 
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An ethnographic research strategy employs an open-ended strategy to investigate 
meaning rather than using scientific approach to measure the phenomena (Saunders et al., 
2011, p. 149). Grounded research is helpful to explain and predict behaviour or social 
phenomena or constructs (Creswell, 2013, p. 13). A survey research strategy is a type of 
research strategy that is frequently used in social science (Badke, 2004). It is mainly used 
to collect quantitative data but can also be used to collect qualitative data using open-
ended questions or interviews. This type of research strategy is very flexible and is mostly 
used to gather various forms of data from large or small numbers of people (Badke, 2004).  
 
This study adopts the survey research strategy for the quantitative approach for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the study used probability sampling techniques to draw an 
appropriate sample size from the population of the study in order to provide a numerical 
explanation or description of trends, attitudes or behaviour (Creswell, 2013; Maylor & 
Blackmon, 2005). The participating commercial bank branches were selected using 
simple random sampling. With this research strategy, there is the possibility of 
generalizing the study findings to the entire population. Secondly, a survey approach is 
flexible and can be used to gather different forms of data from a large population (Badke, 
2004). Drawing upon its flexibility, the study explores the interplay between individual 
practices and the security threats experienced as they relate to the technical, social and 
mobility domains of BYOD.  Thirdly, a survey research strategy allows respondents to 
remain anonymous. Hence, this current study allows respondents to remain anonymous 
based on requests for anonymity from the four participating banks. Lastly, a survey 
research strategy enables data to be subjected to statistical analysis using both descriptive 
and inferential statistics after which the outcomes are interpreted, conclusions are drawn 
and recommendations are provided (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, a grounded theory research strategy was used in this study for the 
qualitative approach. This enables the themes to be generated that could be used to 
support or as points of comparison for the quantitative study (Creswell, 2013; Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2014). Grounded theory provides guidelines on how to identify the associations 
between variables and how to develop a theoretical framework. This suggests that the 
guidelines can be adopted as a flexible tool (Creswell, 2013). According to Saunders et 
al. (2009, p. 149), grounded theory is better seen as a set of systematic inductive strategies 
for conducting qualitative research which leads to ‘theory building’. 
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4.6 Research design 
“A research design refers to the plans and procedures which cover the entire decisions 
from broad assumptions through the methods of collecting data to the data analysis” 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 20). There are three kinds of research designs, namely exploratory, 
explanatory and descriptive (Van Wyk, 2012). An exploratory research design is a unique 
way of enquiry into what is happening and to find out new insights on a particular 
phenomenon (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). It is useful in investigating a problem and 
providing a solution to the problem at hand (Saunders et al., 2011). A descriptive research 
design is an extension of exploratory research design that is used to expatiate on 
arguments or discussions (Saunders et al., 2011). It provides adequate description of the 
features of phenomena or variables of interest (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). It is sometimes 
referred to as descripto-explanatory studies (Saunders et al., 2011). An explanatory 
research design is a study that builds relationships between variables (Saunders et al., 
2011). Based on the nature of research questions, an explanatory study may be mixed 
methods or qualitative or quantitative (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Creswell, 2013; Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2009). Data can be subjected to statistical tests (correlation); this gives a better 
view of the relationship (Saunders et al., 2011). Furthermore, explanatory studies can be 
used to predict outcomes (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
 
An explanatory research design was therefore an appropriate design for the study because 
the study seeks to identify the security threats on the variables (technical, social and 
mobility) and how they influence the Nigerian banking sector based on the individual and 
organization practices that are propelled by the BYOD phenomenon. In addition, the data 
collected from the variables can be subjected to statistical tests as well as thematic 
analysis and this gives a better view of the relationship (Saunders et al., 2011). The study 
then classified these variables to gain an understanding of how they influence the Nigerian 
banking sector. 
 
4.7 Research time horizon 
According to Saunders et al. (2011, P. 110), a research time horizon “…refers to the 
length of time it takes for a scholar or researcher to collect data”. There are two types of 
time horizons, namely a longitudinal and a cross-sectional time horizon. A longitudinal 
time horizon research requires data collection more than one time in order to provide 
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answers to the research questions (Saunders et al., 2011; Sekaran & Bougie, 2009), while 
a cross-sectional research study only requires data collection at a particular time and is 
thus less expensive than a longitudinal study (Saunders et al., 2011; Sekaran & Bougie, 
2009). Cross-sectional studies are commonly adopted by students in academic research 
for the award of degrees in management or related fields because of the time horizon: 
they require less time and expense for data collection (Wilson, 2014, p. 112). Hence, this 
study adopts the cross-sectional time-horizon approach because it uses a survey research 
strategy and data collection for threat identification and framework evaluation, and this 
was done within a short period of time. 
 
4.8 Sample design 
The term sample design refers to a road map that guides the selection of the survey sample 
as well as other important aspects of the sample which include the target population, study 
site and sampling techniques (Thomas, 2010). This section presents detailed explanations 
of the selected sample design used in this study. 
 
4.8.1 Study site 
The study was conducted in Lagos State, Nigeria. Lagos State is located in the south-
west geo-political zone of Nigeria. The reasons for choosing Lagos State is that it is the 
commercial nerve centre of Nigeria and also the headquarters of the participating banks; 
this makes the city an appropriate enterprise hub connecting local banking sectors with 
the global firms. There are four banks involved in this study. The researcher maintained 
the anonymity of the four participating banks in Lagos State by using pseudonyms. The 
decision for concealing the names of the four participating banks was based on a request 
from the four banks to remain anonymous. Hence, pseudo-names such as Bank A, Bank 
B, Bank C, and Bank D were used to conceal the identity of participating banks 
throughout the study. Similarly, for the framework evaluation, the study maintained the 
anonymity of the four cybersecurity experts and researchers in academia across the 
countries by using pseudo-names such as Academic Expert 1, Academic Expert 2, 
Academic Expert 3 and Academic Expert 4. 
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4.8.2 Target population 
The target population of a study can be referred to as a group of people the researcher 
wants to investigate (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Thus, in the context of this study, the 
target population refers to the clerical employees who deal directly with the customers 
and the executive management (executive managers and ICT department personnel) in 
the four banks under study. Thus, the estimated research population as at the fourth 
quarter of the year 2017 was 4,163 employees across the four participating banks in Lagos 
State, Nigeria. It is important to note that the study had a pyramidal structure. The 
beginning (threat identification) was broader in scope and it then narrowed towards the 
end (framework evaluation). Therefore, the target population for threat identification was 
4,163 employees consisting of employees and executive management. However, for the 
framework evaluation, twelve participants were considered. This includes eight executive 
managers of the four participating banks (i.e. two each from the four participating banks) 
and four cyber security experts or researchers in academia across four different 
universities in the country. It is important to note that two of these participants are 
within South Africa, while two are outside South Africa (i.e. one from Nigeria and 
another from the United States of America [USA]). 
 
4.8.3 Sampling and sampling techniques 
According to Kumar (2011, p. 193), sampling is “…the process of selecting a few 
(sample) from a bigger group (population) to become the basis for estimating or 
predicting the prevalence of an unknown piece of information, situation or outcome 
regarding the bigger group”. It is a process of selecting a subset from the study 
population (Gill & Johnson, 2010; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).   
 
There are two categories of sampling techniques, namely probability and non-probability 
sampling (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Probability sampling can be defined as sampling in 
which each element in the population has an equal or non-zero chance of being selected 
in the sample (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009) while non-probability sampling can be defined 
as a sampling method in which the techniques are based on a non-statistical or subjective 
approach in selecting a sample (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Wilson, 2014). A simple 
random sampling technique is an example of probability sampling which requires that 
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every element of the study population has the same opportunity of being selected (Sekaran 
& Bougie, 2009).  
 
Hence, this study adopts the simple random sampling technique in which the branches of 
the four participating banks in Lagos, Nigeria were selected randomly for the quantitative 
approach. This offers a high level of reliability and reduces the level of biases while 
making generalizations in relation to the total population (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Sekaran 
& Bougie, 2009). Based on the information obtained from the banks’ documents, Bank 
‘A’ had 76 branches, Bank ‘B’ had 79 branches, Bank ‘C’ had 73 branches and Bank ‘D’ 
had 71 as at the fourth quarter of 2017 in Lagos State, Nigeria. Hence, 10 branches were 
drawn at a regular interval of seven from each list of the bank branches. Thus, 40 branches 
were selected in all from the four participating banks’ branches. This method enables each 
branch on the list to have an equal probability of being selected. Ninety-five (95) copies 
of the questionnaires were assigned to each bank and were later distributed to various 
branches in line with purposive sampling. 
 
Purposive sampling is an example of a non-probability sampling technique. Purposive 
sampling allows participants to be selected based on their knowledge and experience of 
the phenomenon under investigation (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Hence this study adopts 
the purposive sampling technique for the qualitative data in order to draw samples based 
on the respondents’ judgment in order to answer the research questions and achieve the 
study’s objectives (Smith, Colombi & Wirthlin, 2013). More importantly, most 
researchers’ choice of purposive is predicated on the knowledge of the participants and 
their willingness to participate in the study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Thus, for threat 
identification, purposive sampling was used to select participants for the in-depth 
interview. Similarly, for the framework evaluation, purposive sampling was used to select 
participants. Other reasons for adopting purposive sampling in this study are its 
accessibility, proximity, ease of use, cost effectiveness and time requirements. 
 
4.8.3.1 Sample size 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013, p. 241) describe a sample as “…a subset of a population that 
has been chosen to participate in a study”. In other words, sample size refers to the total 
number of people that participate in a study. The researcher selected 380 employees, that 
is, 95 employees per bank, as the required sample size to participate in the quantitative 
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study for threat identification using questionnaires (Table 4.1). A sample size of 380 is 
within the range greater than 30 but less than 500 (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970). At the end 
of eight weeks of distribution and follow-up, a total of 369 questionnaires were returned. 
Nine had not been properly completed and were left out of the analysis. The remaining 
360 questionnaires were usable as shown in Table 4.1 and this represents a 94.7 per cent 
response rate. This decision was supported by the Table of minimum sample sizes for 
different population sizes at a 95 per cent confidence level (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970).  
 
Table 4.1: Banks administered questionnaires 
S/N Name of 
Banks 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires 
Unreturned 
Questionnaires 
Discarded 
Questionnaires 
Usable 
Responses 
1 Bank A 95 92 3 2 90 
2 Bank B 95 90 5 3 87 
3 Bank C 95 93 2 1 92 
4 Bank D 95 94 1 3 91 
 Total 380 369 11 9 360 
 
The qualitative study for threat identification consists of twelve participants. This 
includes eight (8) ICT department personnel (two each from the four participating banks) 
and four (4) executive managers (one each from the four participating banks (Table 4.2)).  
 
Again, the framework evaluation consists of twelve (12) participants which were drawn 
using purposive sampling as shown in Table 4.3. This includes executive management 
(two each from the four participating banks) and four (4) cyber security expert/researchers 
in academia across four different universities in different countries (except two which are 
from the same country). Participants were selected based on their knowledge and 
experience of the phenomenon under investigation (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
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Table 4.2: List of ICT department personnel and executive managers for the interview (Threat 
identification) 
Target Group Participant’s Designation Code 
Bank A 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. ICT Department Personnel 
Participant 1 
Participant 2 
3. Executive Manager Participant 3 
Bank B 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. ICT Department Personnel 
Participant 4 
Participant 5 
3. Executive Manager Participant 6 
Bank C 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. ICT Department Personnel 
Participant 7 
Participant 8 
3. Executive Manager Participant 9 
Bank D 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. ICT Department Personnel 
Participant 10 
Participant 11 
3. Executive Manager Participant 12 
 
 
Table 4.3: List of participants for closed and open-ended questions (Framework evaluation) 
Target Group Participant’s Designation Code 
Bank A 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. Executive Manager 
Participant 2 
Participant 3 
Bank B 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. Executive Manager 
Participant 4 
Participant 6 
Bank C 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. Executive Manager 
Participant 7 
Participant 9 
Bank D 1. ICT Department Personnel 
 
2. Executive Manager 
Participant 11 
Participant 12 
Academic Expert 1 1.  Professor (Prof) Participant 13 
Academic Expert 2 2.  Doctorate (PhD) Participant 14 
Academic Expert 3 3.  Professor (Prof) Participant 15 
Academic Expert 4 4. Doctorate (PhD) Participant 16 
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4.9 Research instrument  
A research instrument refers to the tools utilized for data collection (Saunders et al., 
2009). In a quantitative study, data is collected through questionnaires, which are mostly 
analysed using a statistical package (Creswell, 2013). On the other hand, in a qualitative 
study data is collected using observation, open-ended questions, and interviews which 
can be unstructured, semi-structured or structured, and are mostly analysed using 
thematic analysis (Anderson et al., 2012). For threat identification, a questionnaire was 
useful in collecting quantitative data from the employees of the four participating banks 
(Appendix B). The purpose was to gather as much information as possible about 
employees’ practices and the various BYOD security threats experienced as they relate 
to the technical, social and mobility domains.  A structured interview was useful in 
collecting qualitative data from the executive managers (Appendix C) and ICT 
department personnel (Appendix D) of the four participating banks. The purpose was to 
obtain in-depth information regarding organizations’ practices, the various BYOD 
security threats experienced or reported as well as the mitigating strategies. The result of 
the study was analysed and interpreted using statistical and thematic analysis for the 
questionnaire and interview respectively. The reason for using the questionnaire and 
interview as the study research instruments was to achieve the study’s objectives by 
utilizing mixed methods for data collection and analysis.  
 
However, for framework evaluation an evaluation questionnaire made up of mostly 
closed-ended and open-ended questions was used. This was done in order to assess 
whether the developed security framework it meets the required criteria. Open-ended 
questions were included at the end of the closed-ended question section with the intention 
of gathering important data that may be missed if only closed-ended questions were used. 
This was administered to twelve (12) participants. These include eight (8) representatives 
of executive management (i.e. one executive manager and one ICT department personnel 
each) from the four participating banks and four (4) representatives of the academic staff 
(i.e. one each) from the four participating universities. The closed-ended questions and 
open-ended questions were analyzed using statistical and thematic analysis respectively. 
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4.9.1 Questionnaire design 
For the purpose of data collection, there are three issues that were considered in the design 
of questionnaire. The issues considered were in line with Brace’s (2018) suggestion for 
the design of questionnaires. The first issue was to consider each research objective and 
align this with the research question. The second issue was the wording of the 
questionnaire. All questions were clearly stated and to the point, and the use of 
professional language was avoided. Simple language was used to structure the questions 
for easy understanding by respondents. The last issue that was considered is the 
questionnaire coverage in respect of the population of the study; the questionnaire was 
designed to cut across all employees of the four participating banks in Lagos, Nigeria. 
This consideration was necessary to gather adequate information of the current security 
threats associated with the technical, social and mobility domains in a BYOD-enabled 
environment which includes the Nigerian banking sector. 
 
Two sets of questionnaires were used in this study. The first questionnaire was a closed-
ended questionnaire which was used for threat identification. It was administered to both 
the employees and executive management with the purpose of identifying the security 
threats associated with a BYOD-enabled environment and their influence on the Nigerian 
banking sector (Appendix B). The second questionnaire was a structured questionnaire 
containing both closed and open-ended questions which was used for the framework 
evaluation (Appendix E). This was administered to twelve respondents which included 
executive management (i.e. one executive manager and one ICT department personnel 
each) from four participating banks and four cyber security experts or researchers in 
academia across four different universities in different countries. 
 
First questionnaire: Threat identification 
The first questionnaire was used for threat identification and it involved collecting 
massive data (Appendix B). The research instrument that was used for threat 
identification was made up of six sections. Section ‘A’ was designed to collect 
respondents’ demographic information such as gender, marital status, age group, 
department, educational qualifications, and employment status and work experience. This 
was useful in examining the impact of demographic issues on the key points of this study.  
Section ‘B’ was designed to collect information regarding the general practice of the bank 
as it relates to BYOD. The general practices include both individual (employees) and the 
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organization (executive management responsible for policy making) practices. Sections 
‘C’ was designed to collect information regarding the security threats associated with 
software and hardware, which are the core component of an organization’s BYOD (Ketel 
& Shumate, 2015). In addition, it collected data regarding the security threats emanating 
from the technical knowledge in the use of mobile device (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). Section 
‘D’ was designed to collect information regarding security threats relating to employees’ 
attitude and knowledge skills, and organizations’ policies in the Nigerian banking sector. 
Section ‘E’ was designed to collect information regarding the security threats encountered 
when employees perform banking operations with their portable mobile devices while 
travelling. In addition, it also collected information relating to security threats 
experienced with methods used to prepare and dispose of mobile devices. Lastly, Section 
‘F’ was designed to identify specific types of security threats that have been experienced. 
For all these sections (i.e. sections ‘A’ to ‘F’), the researcher provided a list of options for 
respondents to select the appropriate option for their responses. These options were 
developed in such a way by the researcher that they gave the respondents the opportunity 
to choose the appropriate answers that suited their responses. 
 
Second questionnaire: Framework evaluation 
The second questionnaire which included both closed and open-ended questions was used 
for framework evaluation (Appendix E). The evaluation questionnaire was made up of 
six criteria for the evaluation. Criterion ‘one’ was designed to gather information 
regarding the ‘appropriateness’ of the developed framework which included the 
following; firstly, whether  the developed framework aligned with the policies and 
strategies of the bank; secondly, whether the developed framework enhanced the 
effectiveness of the bank data security; and  lastly, whether the developed framework 
could contribute towards the efficiency of the bank operation. Criterion ‘two’ was 
designed to gather information regarding the ‘adequacy’ of the developed framework 
which included whether the developed framework could address all the technical, social 
and mobility threats identified in the study. Adequacy helps to check the sufficiency of 
the security framework in addressing the security threats associated with these three 
domains. Criterion ‘three’ was designed to gather information regarding the ‘feasibility’ 
of the developed framework. It assessed whether the developed security framework was 
cost-effective, whether it could be implemented in a short period of time and whether it 
could be implemented with the available resources. Criterion ‘four’ was designed to 
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gather information regarding the ‘flexibility’ of the developed framework. It sought to 
determine whether the developed security framework could be easily adopted with 
changing policies and whether it can be adopted for mitigating security threats within or 
across different branches of the bank. Criterion ‘five’ was designed to gather information 
regarding ‘intention to use’ the developed framework. It assessed whether the bank was 
willing to use the framework as it is or with changes. It also sought to know whether the 
bank was willing to adopt the framework immediately or in the near future. Furthermore, 
it sought to know whether the use of the framework by the employees would be difficult 
or easy.  
  
For all of these criteria (i.e. criterion ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, ‘four’ and ‘five’ respectively), 
the researcher used a six-point Likert scale rating. The reason behind embracing the Likert 
scale rating is because of its flexibility in terms of constructing questions and interpreting 
results (Hartley, 2014). Similarly, the reason for the six-point Likert scale is because such 
a scale compels respondents to think deeply before selecting any of the points since there 
is no provision for undecided views (Chomeya, 2010, p. 399). Chomeya (2010, p.399) 
asserts that the six-point Likert scale is an appropriate scale for determining the true 
behaviour of the respondents. Hence, the respondents were allowed to show their 
agreement level with the statements in the questionnaire in accordance with the six-point 
Likert scale rating. 
 
On the other hand, criterion ‘six’ of the questionnaire is an open-ended question which 
was designed to enable participants to further express their opinions in their chosen 
words. The aim therefore is to obtain more information regarding security threats and 
solutions that had not been considered in the developed framework.  
 
4.9.2 Interview design 
An interview refers to the way a researcher collects data from respondents via face-to-
face interactions. According to Kumar (2011), it is at the discretion of the interviewer or 
researcher to determine the format and content of questions, including their wordings 
and the order in which they are asked. In addition, the interview process can range from 
being flexible where the researcher is not restricted to asking only specific predetermined 
questions (unstructured), to being inflexible where the interviewer is restricted to asking 
only specific predetermined questions (structured). This study used a semi-structured 
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interview which falls between the structured and unstructured interview and draws from 
the characteristics of the two extreme forms of interview. Cohen and Crabtree (2006) 
state that a semi-structured interview has a paper-based interview guide which the 
interviewer follows just as in the case of a structured interview, but that discussions can 
diverge at any point in time as in the case of an unstructured interview.  The interviews 
were directed towards the ICT department personnel (Appendix C) and the executive 
manager (Appendix D) and were designed based on three domains, namely technical, 
social and mobility. These three domains explore organizational practices in identifying 
BYOD security threats in the Nigerian banking sector. However, prior to each interview 
session, the participants were initially contacted by the researcher and they were all given 
a covering letter. The covering letter included the researcher’s background, research 
topic, objectives of the study, an informed consent form, as well as the interview questions 
for the participants to study. This covering letter also guaranteed the anonymity and 
confidentiality of records that could identify the participants taking part in the study. All 
the participants voluntarily gave their consent to take part in the study by signing the 
consent form.  
 
4.9.3 Data collection procedure 
Data collection procedure is the process involved in collecting or gathering data for the 
purpose of providing solutions to the research questions, hypotheses and problem 
statement (Creswell, 2013; Saunders et al., 2011). The researcher strictly followed the 
data collection procedures in line with the research objectives. Both primary and 
secondary sources were used in the study. Questionnaires and interviews were used as the 
primary source of data collection while scholarly literature reviews served as a secondary 
source of data collection.  
 
Primary sources of data collection 
The first questionnaire (threat identification) was personally administered with the 
assistance of the executive managers. Three hundred and eighty (380) copies of the 
questionnaire were distributed to the four selected banks (i.e. 95 copies were evenly 
assigned to each bank). The choice of personally administered questionnaires ensured that 
respondents were given the opportunity to ask questions on the spot and the ability to 
collect questionnaires immediately after completion (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
Furthermore, it promoted a high response rate because the researcher could easily follow 
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up on data collection. At the end of eight (8) weeks of distribution and follow-up, a sample 
of 369 completed responses was received. However, nine (9) of the returned 
questionnaires were discarded because multiple answers were given to some questions 
that required just one answer while some questions had not been answered. The major 
challenge of utilizing a personally administered approach was the travelling expenses 
involved in field work (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Wilson, 2014). This explains why a 
mixed method was adopted for the collection of quantitative and qualitative data at a 
single point in time. However, the second questionnaire (framework evaluation) was sent 
online to the e-mail addresses of twelve (12) participants using a purposive sampling 
technique. Two weeks later, responses were received. In addition, the interview 
conducted for threat identification was also a primary source of data. The researcher 
personally interviewed 12 executive management staff in their offices (two ICT 
department personnel and one executive manager each) from the four participating banks.  
 
Secondary sources of data collection 
Literature reviews and the theoretical framework underpinning the study were the 
secondary sources of data used by the researcher in order to fulfil the study objectives. 
Sources of secondary data employed included published and unpublished PhD theses, 
online journal articles, textbooks, and conference papers. These were instrumental in 
identifying BYOD security threats and also in investigating the existing security 
measures. The data gathered from the secondary sources provided justification for data 
triangulation by comparing data collected from secondary and primary sources; this 
reduced the level of bias that might have consciously or unconsciously occurred in this 
study.  
 
4.10 Data quality control 
Reliability and validity are important issues that must be considered by every researcher. 
Research may be questioned or, even worse, rejected as null and void if the validity and 
reliability of the findings are not assured. 
 
4.10.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the level at which a measurement can yield a consistent and stable 
outcome. (Carmines & Zellers in Wilson, 2014). McBurney and White (2009, p. 129) 
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have also defined reliability as the capability of a measuring instrument to produce the 
same outcome under the same situation over time. The aim of reliability is to reduce 
biases and error in a study. Reaves (1992) listed  types of reliability tests which include 
internal consistency reliability which measures the extent to which items on the entire 
scales measure the same attribute; inter-rater reliability which measures the similarity 
between two individuals’ verdicts on the same issue under study; test-retest reliability 
measuring the level to which a single instrument yields the same outcome in two different 
situations; and equivalent forms reliability measures the extent to which two different 
versions of the same research instrument produce similar results (Carmines & Zellers in 
Wilson, 2014). 
 
However, because the research instrument used in this study was developed from scratch 
and because it is not an instrument that measures scales (such as optimism, for example), 
the usual tests are not appropriate. Hence, two different approaches were used. The first 
was to request a professional statistician to check for ambiguities and biases (Appendix 
G). Secondly, the research instruments were subjected to a pilot test to elicit dependable 
responses from a selected sample. A total of 38 participants were selected for the pilot 
test which represented ten per cent of the sample size. This was to check for clarity and 
to test whether the participants understood what was expected of them and guaranteed 
that the kind of data the study was seeking to collect was appropriate for the research 
question. The feedback obtained from the pilot test presented ideas, clarifications and 
correction that were used to improve the questionnaires. 
 
4.10.2 Validity  
Validity refers to the degree to which the measurement procedure actually measures the 
concept that it is intended to measure (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The relationship between 
constructs and its indicators is encompassed by validity. Different types of validity 
include face validity, content validity, construct validity, discriminant validity and 
convergent validity.  
 
In this study, the researcher made use of content and construct validity.  In content 
validity, experts’ opinions and knowledgeable professionals in the field of study were 
sought to evaluate the research instrument, while the construct validity aligned the 
research instrument with the research constructs and objectives. In addition, most 
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constructs used in designing the research instruments were adapted from previous studies 
which were based on sound and tested theoretical frameworks (e.g. socio-technical 
model, and mobility model). This guaranteed the validity of the constructs. Lastly, the 
results of this study were compared with other similar studies to ensure the external 
validity of the instrument. 
 
4.11 Ethical consideration 
The ethical guidelines of the University of KwaZulu-Natal were followed to ensure 
credibility and authenticity of the study. The researcher completed the university’s ethical 
clearance application form and also attached a copy of the research instrument and 
gatekeepers’ letters from the participating banks. An ethical approval letter was issued to 
the researcher by the Humanities and Social Science Research Committee of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal granting the researcher permission to conduct the study 
(Appendix A). The rights of all the participants in this research were considered by 
adhering to the ethical requirement highlighted as follows: 
 
i. Permission or approval (gatekeepers’ letters) were officially obtained from the 
participating banks. 
ii. The researcher ensured that every participant in the study filled an informed 
consent form to validate their willingness to be involved.  
iii. It was clearly stated in the consent form that participation in the study was 
voluntary and that participants could withdraw at any stage. 
iv. Similarly, pseudo-names were used to conceal the identities of the participating 
banks as well as participating universities based on the request for anonymity. 
v. The researcher personally administered the research instrument to the respondents 
and abuse of collected data was avoided. 
vi. Data collected from secondary sources for this study were properly cited and 
referenced to avoid plagiarism. 
vii. Ethical clearance was secured from the University permitting the researcher to 
continue with the study. 
viii. All the data collected will be handed to the School of Management, Information 
Technology and Governance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal for safekeeping 
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4.12 Limitations of the research methodology  
There were some limitations encountered in the research methodology despite the fact 
that the researcher carefully planned and executed the research methodology adopted in 
the study. Non-probability sampling techniques could not be used to sample respondents 
throughout the entire study in view of the size of the population. For example, while the 
purposive sampling technique was used in selecting participants for the executive 
management group, the technique could not be applied to the entire group of respondents. 
In this case, the researcher was left with no choice but to apply a probability sampling 
technique in selecting the entire group of respondents, specifically simple random 
sampling techniques. Furthermore, only the executive management group that was used 
for threat identification was also used for framework evaluation. In addition, the research 
instrument used in this study was limited to the four participating banks in Lagos State, 
Nigeria that gave their consent.   
 
4.13 Summary 
This chapter explained the different levels/layers of the ‘research onion’ showcasing 
fields of application, before adopting the most suitable ‘research onion’ for this study.  
 
Figure 4.2 exhibits the summary of the research methodologies identified for this study. 
This includes research philosophy, research approach, research choices, research strategy, 
research design and research time horizon. 
 
This chapter also justified the basis for the selection of a pragmatic philosophical stand 
for the study, as well as the mixed-method research approach. The threat identification 
followed the explanatory sequential mixed-methods research approach that enables 
data to be analysed separately but integrated at the interpretation stage, thereby enabling 
data triangulation in the course of the investigation (Hanson et al., 2005) while the 
framework evaluation of the study followed the concurrent mixed-methods research 
design (Creswell, 2013).  This approach enables data to be analysed simultaneously 
and interpreted at the same time, thus enabling cross-validation of data.  
 
In addition, a survey research strategy was used for the quantitative approach to explore 
the interplay between individual practices and the security threats experienced as they 
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relate to the technical, social and mobility domains of the BYOD phenomenon while a 
grounded theory research strategy was used for the qualitative approach in order to 
generate the themes to support and compare the quantitative study (Creswell, 2013; 
Leedy & Ormrod, 2014). Furthermore, the chapter also set out the research design, 
sampling technique, research methodology and the research instruments that were used 
to investigate individual practices and the security threats experienced as they relate to 
the technical, social and mobility domains of BYOD. Similarly, the ethical codes of 
conducts in the research were observed and clearly stated while the limitations of the 
research methodology were explained.  
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Research ‘onion’ adopted for the study 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
RESULTS 
  
5.1 Introduction  
Johnson (2013) describes data analysis as the process of examining, cleansing and 
transforming collected data in order to reach a conclusion for a given problem. 
Irrespective of whether the data is quantitative or qualitative, the purpose of data analysis 
is to obtain useful and usable information. The benefits of data analysis as outlined by 
Johnson (2013) are as follows: firstly, data analysis helps to filter and extract meaningful 
information from a data set. Secondly, data analysis helps to structure the findings from 
various sources of data. Thirdly, data analysis provides a clarification of several concepts, 
frameworks, theories and methods used; and lastly, data analysis helps to minimize 
human bias with the help of proper statistical instruments when making a conclusion. In 
this study, data analysis enabled the researcher to structure the findings from collected 
data and extract meaningful information which helped in arriving at a conclusion. Thus, 
this chapter presents the data analysis and interpretation of results for the threats 
identification (quantitative and qualitative data).  
 
However, it is important to note that all the data gathered (quantitative and 
qualitative) for the threat identification were used to answer the first, second and 
third research questions (section 1.4), as they relate to identifying BYOD security 
threats. The quantitative data (questionnaires) were analyzed using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21 while, the qualitative data (interviews) were 
analyzed using thematic analysis.  
 
5.2 The response rate  
A total of 380 copies of questionnaire were distributed to the four participating banks in 
Lagos State, Nigeria. Ninety-five (95) questionnaires were distributed to each of the 
banks as shown in Table 4.1. The questionnaires were personally administered to ensure 
that respondents were given the opportunity to ask questions on the spot and owing to the 
ability to collect questionnaires immediately after completion. This promoted a high 
response rate because the researcher could easily follow up on data collection. At the end 
of eight weeks of distribution and follow-up, only 369 responses had been returned out 
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of the 380 questionnaires distributed. However, out of the 369 returned questionnaires, 
nine were discarded because multiple answers had been given to some questions that 
required just one answer while some questions had not been answered. Hence the sample 
of 360 responses was usable as shown in Table 4.1. This represents a 94.7 per cent 
confidence level.  
 
5.3 Overview of data analytical techniques 
This section discusses the various tests used for the data analysis for the threats’ 
identification. For quantitative data, the tests include descriptive and inferential analysis 
which includes the chi-square goodness of fit, chi-square test of independence and 
binomial test. It is important to note that the reason for choosing chi-square goodness of 
fit is because it has been proven to measure how well the observed distribution of data 
fits with the expected value (Lani, 2011). Similarly, McHugh, (2013) asserts that chi 
square test of independence is best used to determine the significant relationship between 
two categorical variable while the binomial test is best used to compute the number of 
‘successes’ when the process is repeated a specific number of times, each asking a yes or 
no question with a given outcome which is either success or a failure. However, for the 
qualitative data, coding was used to develop themes within the raw data by identifying 
important patterns in the data and encoding these prior to interpretation. The various tests 
used for the data analysis for the threats’ identification (quantitative and qualitative) are 
further discussed in detail as follows; 
 
Wilson (2010, p.213) defines descriptive analysis as the summary or overview of 
demographic data achieved through the use of pie charts, bar graphs, histograms and 
frequency distribution tables which spell out some occurrence and percentage differences. 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarize or describe the crunch of numbers with few 
indices (Sekaran & Bougie, 2011). It is important to begin data analysis with descriptive 
statistics in order to give the reader an overview of the collected data before presenting 
the detailed analysis (Wilson, 2010). This suggests the reason why most researchers and 
students start the data analysis chapter of their theses, dissertations or projects with 
descriptive statistics. In addition, Treiman (2014) recommends the use of descriptive 
statistics to represent the background distribution characteristics of the study participants. 
Hence, this study also considered it essential to present the analysis of the demographic 
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data collected in Section ‘A’ of the questionnaire at the beginning of the analysis (Table 
5.1). The demographic data includes participants’ gender, marital status, age group, 
educational qualifications, department, employment status and work experience.  
 
The chi-square goodness of fit test is a non-parametric test that is used to compare the 
observed value of a given phenomenon with the expected value (Lani, 2011). It is used 
to find out how the observed sample distribution is significantly different from the 
expected probability distribution (Pfeifer, 2008).  In this study, the chi-square goodness 
of fit test was used on a categorical variable (i.e. the type of mobile devices and the 
purpose for usage) to test whether any of the response options are selected significantly 
more or less often than the others in Section ‘B’ of the questionnaire. The variables in this 
case are the types of mobile devices and the purpose for usage. Under the null hypothesis, 
it is assumed that all responses are equally selected. 
 
The chi-square test of independence is mostly used to determine whether there is a 
significant relationship between two categorical (nominal) variables (McHugh, 2013). In 
this study, the chi-square test of independence was used on cross-tabulations to determine 
whether a significant relationship exists between the two variables (i.e. individual 
practices and the security threats) represented in the cross-tabulation in sections ‘C’, ‘D’ 
and ‘E’ of the questionnaire. It compares frequencies of cases that occur in the two 
categorical variables. When conditions are not met, Fisher’s exact test is used. 
 
The binomial test uses the binomial distribution to test the statistical significance of 
deviations from a theoretically expected distribution of observations into two categories 
(Norušis, 2006). In this study, a binomial test was used to test whether a significant 
proportion of respondents selected one of a possible two responses in Section ‘F’ of the 
questionnaire. This can be extended when data with more than two response options is 
split into two distinct groups. 
 
Coding is mostly used in thematic analysis to create meaningful patterns or themes in 
order to determine the relationship between variables and to compare different sets of 
evidence that pertain to different situations in the study (Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 
2013). Coding can be done manually or with a software program. This study found 
manual coding appropriate for the qualitative data because it provides flexibility for 
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approaching research patterns in two ways, i.e. inductive and deductive (Guest, 
MacQueen & Namey, 2011). In an inductive approach, themes are identified and are 
strongly linked to the data collected. In addition, an inductive approach uses research 
questions to narrow the scope of the study, while a deductive approach is mostly based 
on theory and usually begins with hypothesis (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). This study 
adopted the inductive approach because the data collected for this research was 
specifically through an interview and the themes identified are related to the data 
collected. The interview was conducted in English and transcribed into text. In addition, 
the transcribed text was stored as a separate Word document prior to analysis. This was 
to ensure that the data was properly organized and to enable the researcher to become 
more familiar with the data. The actual names of participants were not revealed based on 
their request to remain anonymous. Hence, coded names such as participant 1, 2, 3 and 
the like were assigned to participants (Table 4.2).  
 
5.4 Data analysis: Quantitative data 
This section presents the quantitative data analysis for the threat identification. The 
questionnaire is divided into six (6) sections. Section ‘A’ deals with demographic 
information; Section ‘B’ deals with information regarding the general practice of the bank 
as it relates to BYOD; and Section ‘C’, which is regarded as the technical domain, collects 
information regarding the security threats associated with software and hardware, which 
are the core components of an organization’s BYOD (Ketel & Shumate, 2015).  Section 
‘D’, which is regarded as the social domain, collects information regarding security 
threats relating to employees’ attitudes, knowledge, skills and the organizations’ policies 
in the Nigerian banking sector. Section ‘E’, which is regarded as the mobility domain, 
collects information regarding the security threats encountered when employees perform 
banking operations with their portable mobile devices while travelling. In addition, it also 
collects information relating to methods used to prepare and dispose of mobile devices 
and the security threats experienced. Finally, Section ‘F’ collects data that identifies 
specific types of security threats experienced.  
 
5.4.1 Demographic data 
This section presents the demographic information of participants. This includes 
participants’ gender, marital status, age group, department, educational qualification, 
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employment status and work experience. As presented in Table 5.1, the majority of the 
respondents were male 192 (53.3 per cent). In other words, there were more males than 
females 168 (46.7 per cent) who participated in the study, which reflects the 
representativeness of the randomly sampled respondents. In addition, the majority of the 
respondents were within the age group of 26-30 and 31-35; this constitutes 119 and 106 
participants respectively, which represents 62.5 per cent of the total respondents. 
Likewise, Table 5.1 shows that most of the respondents, namely 158 (43.9 per cent) work 
in the marketing department. Furthermore, the majority (216 or 60 per cent) of the 
respondents’ highest qualifications were a higher national diploma or a bachelor’s degree.  
This implies that the banking sector relies on human skills and technological innovations 
to achieve its objectives. The educational achievements of the employees in this sector 
explain the reason why most of the questionnaires that were returned were properly 
completed, with only nine exceptions. 
Table 5.1: Demographic data 
 Background Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Gender Male 192 53.3 
 Female 168 46.7 
    
Marital Status Single 143 39.7 
 Married 215 59.7 
 Divorced/Separated 2 0.6 
    
Age Group <21 10 2.8 
 21-25 52 14.4 
 26-30 119 33.1 
 31-35 106 29.4 
 36-40 64 17.8 
 >40 9 2.5 
    
Department Operations 90 25 
 Marketing 158 43.9 
 Human Resource 28 7.8 
 Customer Service 50 13.9 
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Table 5.1: Demographic data (Contd…) 
 ICT 20 5.6 
 Executive Manager 4 1.1 
 Others 10 2.8 
    
Educational Qualification Senior Certificate 2 0.6 
 National Diploma 82 22.8 
 HND/Degree 216 60 
 Masters 60 16.7 
    
Employment Status Contract/Temporal 102 28.3 
 Probation 42 11.7 
 Permanent 190 52.8 
 Outsourced 22 6.1 
 Others 4 1.1 
    
Work Experience Up to 5years 166 46.1 
 6-10years 108 30 
 11-15years 59 16.4 
 16-20years 20 5.6 
 
 
5.4.2 General practices 
This section focuses on the general practices of banks’ employees in relation to using 
mobile devices. A descriptive analysis was applied on item 1 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B). 
 
5.4.2.1 Type of device and purpose of usage 
The distribution of respondents based on the type of mobile device and purpose of usage 
is represented in a bar graph in Figure 5.1.  A total of 66.7 per cent of the respondents use 
a smartphone for work and personal usage while a total of 40.3 per cent of the respondents 
use a laptop for work and personal usage. Tablets and ‘other’ devices are used by an 
insignificant percentage of respondents i.e. 21.1 per cent and 8.1 per cent respectively. 
The ‘other’ option gives the respondents ample opportunity to specify other types of 
mobile devices used that may have been omitted.  
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Figure 5.1: Bar graph distribution of type of mobile device and purpose of usage 
 
For each of the devices, a chi-square goodness of fit test was used to test whether any of 
the uses (response options) are selected significantly more than the others. A significant 
number of participants, namely  240 representing 66.7 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that they use a smartphone for work and personal use (χ2 (3) = 362.112, 
p<0.0005), while 145 participants representing 40.3 per cent use a laptop for work and 
personal usage (χ2 (3) = 84.765 p<0.0005). Tablets and ‘other’ devices are not used at all 
by a significant number of respondents (p<0.0005, in each case).  
 
Table 5.2: Chi-square goodness of fit test for device usage 
 1.1Smatphone 
Purpose                                                                                                                                                          
1.2Laptop 
Purpose
1.3Tablet  
Purpose
1.4Other devices 
Purpose 
Chi-Square 362.112a 84.765b 148.799c 321.459d 
df 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
This section has clearly revealed the general practice of employees in terms of using 
mobile devices. This includes the type of device and the purpose for which the device is 
used. These questions help to clearly understand what to include in the security 
framework. The following section will investigate the technical practices of the 
employees and security threats experienced. 
 
5.4.3 Technical practices  
A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between the technical practices on these items 7, 11, 12 and 15 in the 
,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
80,0
100,0
Smartphone Laptop Tablet Other device
15,8 8,3 6,7 6,7
16,7 22,5
10,8 5,6
66,7
40,3
21,1
8,1
,3
18,9
44,4
53,6
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Don't use
Work & Personal
Personal
Work
 74 
 
questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in the 
questionnaire (Appendix B). These specific items were chosen because the practices 
directly relate to some of the threats on item 28. For all these analyses a chi-square test 
of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between the practice and 
the security threats, and where the conditions for this test are not met, Fisher’s exact test 
was used. 
 
5.4.3.1 Managing credentials with security software on the device 
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.3 to show the relationship between the row 
(I allow security software on my device to manage credentials on smartphone) and 
column (data leakage) variables.  The relationship is such that allowing security software 
to manage credentials on smartphone (item 7.2) is related to encountering data leakage 
(item 28.8) and not allowing security software to manage credentials on smartphone (item 
7.2) is associated with not encountering data leakage (28.8). If there were no relationships 
between the row and column variables (items 7.2 and 28.8), then the number of 
respondents who fell in each of the four (4) cells would be the ‘expected count’. The 
illustration in Table 5.3 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in 
the YES/YES block (i.e. 31 is greater than the expected count of 25.4) and the NO/NO 
block (i.e. 37 is greater than the expected count of 31.4). Similarly, fewer than expected 
fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 18 is less than the expected count of 23.6) and the NO/YES (i.e. 
28 is less than the expected count of 33.6) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between 
the two variables.   
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Table 5.3: Cross-tab of respondents managing credential with smartphone and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential 
data were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
Total    Yes No 
7.2Smarphone 
 I allow security  
software on my device 
to manage the credentials 
Yes Count 31 18 49 
Expected Count 25.4 23.6 49.0 
% within 7.2S I allow 
security software on my 
device to manage the 
credentials 
63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 1.1 -1.2  
No Count 28 37 65 
Expected Count 33.6 31.4 65.0 
% within 7.2S I allow 
security software on my 
device to manage the 
credentials 
43.1% 56.9% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -1.0 1.0  
                                            Total Count 59 55 114 
Expected Count 59.0 55.0 114.0 
% within 7.2S I allow 
security software on my 
device to manage the 
credentials 
51.8% 48.2% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test whether any 
of variables are selected significantly more than the others. Table 5.4 shows that there is 
a significant relationship between allowing security software on a smartphone to manage 
credentials and data leakage, χ2 (1) = 4.560, p=0.033. This means that significantly more 
than expected respondents that allow security software on a smartphone to manage 
credentials experience data leakage. 
 
   Table 5.4: Chi-square test of independence for respondents managing credentials with 
smartphone and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.560a 1 .033   
Continuity Correctionb 3.788 1 .052   
Likelihood Ratio 4.600 1 .032   
Fisher's Exact Test    .039 .026 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.520 1 .033   
N of Valid Cases 114     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.64. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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5.4.3.2 Updating mobile devices on public network  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.5 to show the relationship between the row 
(updating mobile device from public network) and column (unauthorized modification of 
confidential information) variables.  The relationship is such that always updating mobile 
devices from public networks (item 11.3) is related to encountering a security threat (item 
28.1) and not always updating from public network (item 11.3) is associated with not 
encountering the risk (item 28.1). The illustration in Table 5.5 shows that more than the 
expected number of respondents fell into the ALWAYS/YES block (i.e. 11 is greater than 
the expected count of 3.2) and SOMETIMES/NO block (i.e. 127 is greater than the 
expected count of 120.1). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the ALWAYS/NO (i.e. 8 
is less than the expected count of 15.8) and SOMETIMES/YES (i.e. 17 is less than the 
expected count of 23.9) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables. 
 
Table 5.5: Cross-tab of respondents updating mobile device on public network and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information 
   28.1 Unauthorized modification 
of confidential information (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
Total    Yes No 
11.3 Updating mobile 
device from public network 
 (e.g. restaurant, airport) 
Always Count 11 8 19 
Expected Count 3.2 15.8 19.0 
% within 11.3 Public 
network (e.g. restaurant, 
airport) 
57.9% 42.1% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 4.4 -2.0  
Sometimes Count 17 127 144 
Expected Count 23.9 120.1 144.0 
% within 11.3 Public 
network (e.g. restaurant, 
airport) 
11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -1.4 .6  
Never Count 6 36 42 
Expected Count 7.0 35.0 42.0 
% within 11.3 Public 
network (e.g. restaurant, 
airport) 
14.3% 85.7% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -.4 .2  
                                               Total Count 34 171 205 
Expected Count 34.0 171.0 205.0 
% within 11.3 Public 
network (e.g. restaurant, 
airport) 
16.6% 83.4% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between updating mobile devices on public network and 
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unauthorized modification of confidential information. Significantly more than expected 
of those employees who update mobile devices on public networks experience 
unauthorized modification of confidential information (χ2 (2) = 25.975, p<0.0005). This 
is presented in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: A chi-square test of independence for updating mobile devices on public networks and 
unauthorized modification of confidential information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.975a 2 .000 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 19.325 2 .000 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test 19.546   .000   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.567b 1 .002 .003 .001 .001 
N of Valid Cases 205      
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.15. 
b. The standardized statistic is 3.093.  
5.4.3.3 Saving work document from laptop to a free cloud storage  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.7 to show the relationship between the row 
(saving work document from laptop to a free cloud storage) and column (data leakage).  
The relationship reveals that saving work documents from a laptop to a free cloud storage 
(item 12.4) is related to encountering data leakage (item 28.8) and not saving work 
documents from a laptop to a free cloud storage (item 12.4) is associated with not 
encountering the risk (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.7 shows that more than the 
expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 88 is greater than the 
expected count of 63.6) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 69 is greater than the expected count 
of 44.6). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 34 is less than the 
expected count of 58.4) and NO/YES (i.e. 24 is less than the expected count of 48.4) 
blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables. 
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Table 5.7: Cross-tab of respondents saving work document from laptop to a free cloud storage and 
Data leakage  
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
12.4Laptop 
Saving work document from a 
laptop to a free cloud storage (eg 
dropbox)  
Yes Count 88 34 
Expected Count 63.6 58.4 
% within 12.4L A free cloud 
storage (eg dropbox) 
72.1% 27.9% 
Std. Residual 3.1 -3.2 
No Count 24 69 
Expected Count 48.4 44.6 
% within 12.4L A free cloud 
storage (eg dropbox) 
25.8% 74.2% 
Std. Residual -3.5 3.7 
 Total Count 112 103 
Expected Count 112.0 103.0 
% within 12.4L A free cloud 
storage (eg dropbox) 
52.1% 47.9% 
 
For each of the variable, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between saving work document to a free cloud storage and data 
leakage. Significantly more than expected of those employees who save work document 
to a free cloud storage experience data leakage, (χ2(1)=45.379, p<0.0005). This illustrated 
in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8: A chi-square test of independence for respondents saving work document from laptop to 
a free cloud storage and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.379a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 43.541 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 47.089 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 45.168c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 215     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 44.55. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
5.4.3.4 Adherence to security measures  
Participants were asked to indicate whether they use security measures for their mobile 
devices. These include password authentication, antiviruses, firewalls and hardware 
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tokens. A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between using security measures on item 15 in the questionnaire (Appendix 
B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in the questionnaire (Appendix B). 
Thereafter, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship 
between types of security measures used and the security threats experienced. However, 
the results presented in Tables 5.9 to 5.16 show that most of the security measures are not 
used and this has resulted in some security threats. 
 
Password authentication 
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.9 to show the relationship between the row 
(password authentication) and column (unauthorized access to social interactive network) 
variables. The relationship is such that NOT using password authentication (item 15.1) is 
related to encountering unauthorized access to social interactive networks (item 28.3) and 
using password authentication (item 15.1) is associated with not encountering the risk 
(item 28.3). The illustration in Table 5.9 shows that more than the expected number of 
respondents fell in the NO/YES block (i.e. 13 is greater than the expected count of 8.3) 
and the YES/NO block (i.e. 217 is greater than the expected count of 212.3). Similarly, 
fewer than expected fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 66 is less than the expected count of 70.8) 
and the NO/NO (i.e. 20 is less than the expected count of 24.8) blocks.  Thus, there is a 
relationship between the two variables. 
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Table 5.9: Crosstab of respondents not using password authentication and unauthorized access to 
social interactive network 
   28.3 Unauthorized access to your 
social interactive network (e.g. 
Facebook, WhatsApp, BBM, WeChat) 
   Yes No 
15.1 Not using password 
authentication 
Yes Count 66 217 
Expected Count 70.8 212.3 
% within 15.1 Password 
authentication 
23.3% 76.7% 
Std. Residual -.6 .3 
No Count 13 20 
Expected Count 8.3 24.8 
% within 15.1 Password 
authentication 
39.4% 60.6% 
Std. Residual 1.7 -1.0 
 Total Count 79 237 
Expected Count 79.0 237.0 
% within 15.1 Password 
authentication 
25.0% 75.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between not using password authentication and encountering 
unauthorized access to social interactive network. There is a significant relationship 
between not using password authentication and unauthorized access to social interactive 
network, (χ2(1)=4.072, p=0.044). Significantly more than expected respondents who do 
not use password authentication experience unauthorized access to social interactive 
networks. This is illustrated in Table 5.10. 
  
Table 5.10: A chi-square test of independence for not using password authentication and 
unauthorized access to social interactive network 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.072a 1 .044 .055 .039 
Continuity Correctionb 3.260 1 .071   
Likelihood Ratio 3.731 1 .053 .089 .039 
Fisher's Exact Test    .055 .039 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.059c 1 .044 .055 .039 
N of Valid Cases 316     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Anti-virus 
A cross-tabulation was used in Table 5.11 to show the relationship between the row (not 
using anti-virus) and column (software making copies of itself) variables. The 
relationship is such that NOT using anti-virus on mobile devices (item 15.3) is related to 
software making copies of itself on the device (item 28.11) and using anti-virus (item 
15.3) is associated with not encountering the risk (item 28.11). The illustration in Table 
5.11 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the NO/YES block 
(i.e. 40 is greater than the expected count of 27.1) and the YES/NO block (i.e. 142 is 
greater than the expected count 129.1). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the 
YES/YES (i.e. 82 is less than the expected count 94.9) and NO/NO (i.e. 24 is less than 
the expected count 36.9) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables. 
 
Table 5.11: Cross-tab of respondents for not using anti-virus and software keeps making copies of 
itself on the device 
   28.11 Software keeps making copies of 
itself on your device  
   Yes No Total 
15.3 Not using anti-
virus 
Yes Count 82 142 224 
Expected Count 94.9 129.1 224.0 
% within 15.3 Anti-virus 36.6% 63.4% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -1.3 1.1  
No Count 40 24 64 
Expected Count 27.1 36.9 64.0 
% within 15.3 Anti-virus 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 2.5 -2.1  
 Total Count 122 166 288 
Expected Count 122.0 166.0 288.0 
% within 15.3 Anti-virus 42.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between not using anti-virus on mobile devices and software 
continually making copies of itself on the device. Table 5.12 shows that there is a 
significant relationship between not using anti-virus on mobile device and software 
continually making copies of itself on the device, (χ2 (1) =13.668, p=0.000). Significantly 
more than expected respondents who do not use anti-virus on their mobile devices 
experience this security threat (i.e. Software keeps making copies of itself on one’s 
device). 
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Table 5.12: A chi-square test of independence for not using anti-virus and software keeps making 
copies of itself on your/one’s device 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.668a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 12.628 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 13.563 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.621c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 288     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.11. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Firewall 
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.13 to show the relationship between the 
row (not using firewall) and column (unauthorized access to social interactive network) 
variables.  The relationship is such that NOT using a firewall on a mobile device (item 
15.5) is related to software making copies of itself on the device (item 28.3) and using a 
firewall (item 15.5) is associated with not encountering the risk (item 28.3). The 
illustration in Table 5.13 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell 
in NO/YES block (i.e. 36 is greater than the expected count of 24.2) and the YES/NO 
block (i.e. 104 is greater than the expected count of 92.2). Similarly, fewer than expected 
fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 21 is less than the expected count of 32.8) and NO/NO (i.e. 56 
is less than the expected count of 67.8) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the 
two variables. 
 
Table 5.13: Cross-tab of respondents for firewall and unauthorized access to social interactive 
network 
   28.3 Unauthorized access to your social 
interactive network (e.g. Facebook, 
WhatsApp, BBM, WeChat)  
   Yes No Total 
15.5 Not using 
Firewall 
Yes Count 21 104 125 
Expected Count 32.8 92.2 125.0 
% within 15.5 Firewall 16.8% 83.2% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -2.1 1.2  
No Count 36 56 92 
Expected Count 24.2 67.8 92.0 
% within 15.5 Firewall 39.1% 60.9% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 2.4 -1.4  
 Total Count 57 160 217 
Expected Count 57.0 160.0 217.0 
% within 15.5 Firewall 26.3% 73.7% 100.0% 
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For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between not using a firewall on mobile devices and unauthorized 
access to one’s social interactive network. Significantly more than expected respondents 
who do not use a firewall experience unauthorized access to their social interactive 
network (χ2(1)=13.644, p=<0.0005). This is represented in Table 5.14. 
 
Table 5.14: A chi-square test of independence for not using firewall and unauthorized access to 
social interactive network 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.644a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 12.516 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 13.580 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.582c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 217     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.17. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Hardware token 
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.15 to show there is a relationship between 
the row (not using hardware token) and column (you saw a number in your dialling list 
that you haven’t dialled) variables.  The relationship is such that NOT using a hardware 
token on a mobile device (item 15.8) is related to having an unknown number in the 
dialling list (item 28.12) and using a hardware token (item 15.8) is associated with not 
encountering the risk (item 28.12). The illustration in Table 5.15 shows that more than 
the expected number of respondents fell in the NO/YES block (i.e. 18 is greater than the 
expected count of 11.5) and the YES/NO block (i.e. 172 is greater than the expected count 
of 165.5). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 17 is less than the 
expected count of 23.5) and NO/NO (i.e.75 is less than the expected count 81.5) blocks.  
Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.  
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Table 5.15: Cross-tab of respondents for hardware token and unknown number in the dialing list 
   28.12 You saw a number in your dialling 
list that you haven’t dialled 
   Yes No 
15.8 Not using Hardware 
token 
Yes Count 17 172 
Expected Count 23.5 165.5 
% within 15.8 Hardware token 9.0% 91.0% 
Std. Residual -1.3 .5 
No Count 18 75 
Expected Count 11.5 81.5 
% within 15.8 Hardware token 19.4% 80.6% 
Std. Residual 1.9 -.7 
 Total Count 35 247 
Expected Count 35.0 247.0 
% within 15.8 Hardware token 12.4% 87.6% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between not using a hardware token and an unknown number in 
the dialling list. A significant relationship exists between not using a hardware token and 
an unknown number in the dialling list (χ2(1)=6. 154, p=0.013). Significantly more than 
expected respondents who do not use a hardware token experience this security threat 
(i.e. unknown number in the dialling list). This is represented in Table 5.16. 
 
Table 5.16: A chi-square test of independence for not using hardware token and unknown number 
in the dialing list 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.154a 1 .013 .020 .013 
Continuity Correctionb 5.238 1 .022   
Likelihood Ratio 5.823 1 .016 .020 .013 
Fisher's Exact Test    .020 .013 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.132c 1 .013 .020 .013 
N of Valid Cases 282     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
This section has clearly revealed the technical practices of employees in terms of using 
mobile devices. This includes the managing of credentials with software, updating 
devices from public networks, saving work documents to a free cloud storage and 
adhering to security measures. All of these questions help to clearly understand what to 
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include in the security framework. The following section will investigate the social 
practices of employees and the security threats encountered. 
 
5.4.4 Social practices  
A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between social practices on items 18, 19 and 23 in the questionnaire 
(appendix B) and the security threats experienced on item 28 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B). These specific items were chosen because the practices directly relate to 
some of the threats on item 28. For all these analyses, a chi-square test of independence 
was used to test for a significant relationship between social practices and the security 
threat. In addition, where the conditions for this test were not met, Fisher’s exact test was 
used. 
 
5.4.4.1 Clicking on items on social media  
Participants were asked to indicate items on which they click on social media. These 
include links, advertisement and videos or audios. A bivariate analysis was carried out to 
determine whether there is a significant relationship between what was selected on item 
18 in the questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in 
the questionnaire (Appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square test of independence was used 
to test for a significant relationship between what was clicked, and the security threats 
experienced. The results are presented in Tables 5.17 to 5.21.  
 
Links  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.17 to show that there is a relationship 
between the row (clicking on links) and column (data leakage) variables.  The relationship 
is such that clicking on links (item 18.1) is related to encountering data leakage (item 
28.8) and not clicking on links (item 18.1) is associated with not encountering data 
leakage (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.17 shows that more than the expected 
number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 139 is greater than the expected 
count of 120.8) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 52 is greater than the expected count of 33.8). 
Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 101 is less than the expected count 
of 119.2) and NO/YES (i.e. 16 is less than the expected count 34.2) blocks.  Thus, there 
is a relationship between the two variables.  
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Table 5.17: Cross-tab of respondents for clicking on links and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
18.1Clicking on Links (e.g. 
shortened links) 
Yes Count 139 101 
Expected Count 120.8 119.2 
% within 18.1 Links (e.g. 
shortened links) 
57.9% 42.1% 
Std. Residual 1.7 -1.7 
No Count 16 52 
Expected Count 34.2 33.8 
% within 18.1 Links (e.g. 
shortened links) 
23.5% 76.5% 
Std. Residual -3.1 3.1 
 Total Count 155 153 
Expected Count 155.0 153.0 
% within 18.1 Links (e.g. 
shortened links) 
50.3% 49.7% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between clicking on links and data leakage. Significantly more 
than expected respondents who clicked on links on the device experience data leakage 
(χ2(1)=25.064, p<0.0005). This is presented in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: A chi-square test of independence for clicking on links and data leakage. 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.064a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 23.707 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 26.096 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 24.982c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 308     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 33.78. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Advertisement  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.19 to show that there is a relationship 
between the row (clicking on advertisement) and column (malicious messages were sent 
to your contact list without your knowledge) variables.  The relationship is such that 
clicking on an advertisement (item 18.3) is related to encountering malicious messages 
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(item 28.8) and not clicking on an advertisement (item 18.3) is associated with not 
encountering malicious messages (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.19 shows that 
more than the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 136 is 
greater than the expected count of 124) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 43 is greater than the 
expected count of 31). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 108 is less 
than the expected count of 120) and NO/YES (i.e. 20 is lesser than the expected count of 
32) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.   
 
Table 5.19: Cross-tab of respondents for clicking on advertisement and malicious messages 
   28.9 Malicious messages were sent 
to your contact list without your 
knowledge  
   Yes No Total 
18.3 clicking on 
Advertisement 
Yes Count 136 108 244 
Expected Count 124.0 120.0 244.0 
% within 18.3 Advertisement 55.7% 44.3% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 1.1 -1.1  
No Count 20 43 63 
Expected Count 32.0 31.0 63.0 
% within 18.3 Advertisement 31.7% 68.3% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -2.1 2.2  
 Total Count 156 151 307 
Expected Count 156.0 151.0 307.0 
% within 18.3 Advertisement 50.8% 49.2% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between clicking on an advertisement and malicious messages. 
Significantly more than expected respondents who clicked on an advertisement on the 
device encounter malicious messages (χ2(1)=11.532, p=0.0010). This is illustrated in 
Table 5.20. 
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Table 5.20: A chi-square test of independence for clicking on advertisement and malicious messages 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.532a 1 .001 .001 .001 
Continuity Correctionb 10.592 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 11.733 1 .001 .001 .001 
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.494c 1 .001 .001 .001 
N of Valid Cases 307     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 30.99. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Videos/Audios  
A cross-tabulation was used in Table 5.21 to show that there is a relationship between the 
row (clicking on videos/audios) and column (you received an access request to device 
resources as part of the terms and conditions to install) variables.  The relationship is such 
that clicking on videos/audios (item 18.4) is related to encountering access requests to 
device resources (item 28.16) and not clicking on videos/audios (item 18.4) is associated 
with not encountering an access request to device resources (item 28.16). The illustration 
in Table 5.21 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the 
YES/YES block (i.e. 230 is greater than the expected count of 211.7) and the NO/NO 
block (i.e. 33 is greater than the expected count of 14.7). Similarly, fewer than expected 
fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 49 is less than the expected count of 67.3) and NO/YES (i.e. 28 
is lesser than the expected count of 46.3) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between 
the two variables.   
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Table 5.21: Cross-tab of respondents for clicking on videos/audios and access request to device 
resources 
   28.16 You received an access 
request to device resources as part of 
terms & conditions to install  
   Yes No Total 
18.4 Clicking on 
Videos/Audios 
Yes Count 230 49 279 
Expected Count 211.7 67.3 279.0 
% within 18.4 Videos/Audios 82.4% 17.6% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 1.3 -2.2  
No Count 28 33 61 
Expected Count 46.3 14.7 61.0 
% within 18.4 Videos/Audios 45.9% 54.1% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -2.7 4.8  
 Total Count 258 82 340 
Expected Count 258.0 82.0 340.0 
% within 18.4 Videos/Audios 75.9% 24.1% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between clicking on a video/audio and an access request to device 
resources. Significantly, more than expected respondents who clicked on a video/audio 
on their device receive an access request to device resources (χ2(1)=36.510, p<0.0005). 
This is presented in Table 5.22. 
 
Table 5.22: A chi-square test of independence for clicking on videos/audios and access request to 
device resources  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.510a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 34.541 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 32.199 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 36.403c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 340     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.71. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
5.4.4.2 Types of confidential information attached on social media  
Participants were asked to indicate types of confidential information attached on social 
media. A bivariate analysis was carryout to determine whether there is a significant 
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relationship between attaching confidential information on item 19 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between attaching confidential information and the security 
threats experienced. The results are presented in Tables 5.23 and 5.24.  
 
Customer bank statement  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.23 to show that there is a relationship 
between the row (attaching customer bank statement) and column (unauthorized 
modification of confidential information) variables. The relationship is such that 
attaching a customer bank statement (item 19.1) is related to encountering unauthorized 
modification of confidential information (item 28.1) and not attaching a customer bank 
statement (item 19.1) is associated with not encountering unauthorized modification of 
confidential information (item 28.1). The illustration in Table 5.29 shows that more than 
the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 43 is greater than the 
expected count of 29.9) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 140 is greater than the expected count 
of 126.9). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 113 is less than the 
expected count of 126.1) and NO/YES (i.e. 17 is less than the expected count of 30.1) 
blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.   
 
Table 5.23: Cross-tab of respondents for attaching customer bank statement and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information 
   28.1 Unauthorized modification of 
confidential information (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
   Yes No 
19.1 Attaching Customers bank 
statement 
Yes Count 43 113 
Expected Count 29.9 126.1 
% within 19.1 Customers bank 
statement 
27.6% 72.4% 
Std. Residual 2.4 -1.2 
No Count 17 140 
Expected Count 30.1 126.9 
% within 19.1 Customers bank 
statement 
10.8% 89.2% 
Std. Residual -2.4 1.2 
 Total Count 60 253 
Expected Count 60.0 253.0 
% within 19.1 Customers bank 
statement 
19.2% 80.8% 
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For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between attaching a customer bank statement to e-mails or instant 
messaging and the unauthorized modification of confidential information. Significantly 
more than expected respondents who attach a customer bank statement to e-mails or 
instant messaging experience unauthorized modification of confidential information 
(χ2(1)=14.145, p<0.0005). This is illustrated in Table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.24: A chi-square test of independence for attaching customer bank statement and 
unauthorized modification of confidential information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.145a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 13.086 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 14.533 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.100c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 313     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.90. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
5.4.4.3 Sharing password with the following people and security threats  
Participants were asked to indicate the people with whom they share a password. This 
includes colleagues and family or friends. A bivariate analysis was carried out to 
determine whether there is a significant relationship between people with whom they 
share a password on item 23 in the questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of 
security threats on item 28 in the questionnaire (Appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square 
test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between the people 
with whom they share a password and the security threats experienced. The results are 
presented in Tables 5.25 to 5.28.  
 
Sharing password with Colleagues  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.25 to show the relationship between the 
row (sharing password with colleagues) and column (data leakage) variables.  The 
relationship is such that sharing a password with colleagues (item 23.1) is related to 
encountering data leakage (item 28.8) and not sharing a password with colleagues (item 
23.1) is associated with not encountering data leakage (item 28.8). The illustration in 
Table 5.25 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES 
block (i.e. 22 is greater than the expected count of 12.6) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 150 
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is greater than the expected count of 140.6). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the 
YES/NO (i.e. 3 is less than the expected count 12.4) and NO/YES (i.e. 133 is less than 
the expected count 142.4) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.   
 
Table 5.25: Cross-tab of respondents for sharing password with colleagues and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data were 
sold out to the bank’s competitors)  
   Yes No Total 
23.1 Sharing 
password with 
Colleagues 
Yes Count 22 3 25 
Expected Count 12.6 12.4 25.0 
% within 23.1 PW 88.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 2.7 -2.7  
No Count 133 150 283 
Expected Count 142.4 140.6 283.0 
% within 23.1 PW 47.0% 53.0% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -.8 .8  
 Total Count 155 153 308 
Expected Count 155.0 153.0 308.0 
% within 23.1 PW 50.3% 49.7% 100.0% 
 
For each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between sharing a password with colleagues and data leakage. 
Significantly more than expected respondents who share a password with colleagues 
experience data leakage (χ2(1)=15.449, p<0.0005). This is presented in Table 5.26.  
 
Table 5.26: A chi-square test of independence for sharing password with colleagues and data 
leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.449a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 13.852 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 17.320 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.399c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 308     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.42. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Sharing password with family/friends  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.27 to show the relationship between the 
row (sharing password with family or friends) and column (data leakage) variables.  The 
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relationship is such that sharing a password with family or friends (item 23.2) is related 
to encountering data leakage (item 28.8) and not sharing a password with family or friends 
(item 23.2) is associated with not encountering data leakage (item 28.8). The illustration 
in Table 5.27 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the 
YES/YES block (i.e. 46 is greater than the expected count of 32.7) and the NO/NO block 
(i.e. 134 is greater than the expected count of 120.7). Similarly, fewer than expected fell 
in the YES/NO (i.e. 19 is less than the expected count of 32.3) and NO/YES (i.e. 109 is 
less than the expected count of 122.3) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the 
two variables.   
 
Table 5.27: Cross-tab of respondents for sharing password with family/friends and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data were 
sold out to the bank’s competitors)  
   Yes No Total 
23.2 Sharing 
password with  
Family/friends 
Yes Count 46 19 65 
Expected Count 32.7 32.3 65.0 
% within 23.2 PW 70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 2.3 -2.3  
No Count 109 134 243 
Expected Count 122.3 120.7 243.0 
% within 23.2 PW 44.9% 55.1% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -1.2 1.2  
 Total Count 155 153 308 
Expected Count 155.0 153.0 308.0 
% within 23.2 PW 50.3% 49.7% 100.0% 
 
Again for each of the variables, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a 
significant relationship between sharing a password with family or friends and data 
leakage. Significantly more than expected respondents who share a password with family 
or friends experience data leakage (χ2(1)=13.775, p<.0005). This is illustrated in Table 
5.28. 
 94 
 
Table 5.28: A chi-square test of independence for sharing password with family/friends and data 
leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.775a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 12.758 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 14.126 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.730c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 308     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 32.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
This section has clearly revealed the social practices of employees in terms of using 
mobile devices. This includes clicking on different types of items, attaching confidential 
information on social media and sharing a password with colleagues, family or friends. 
All of these questions help to clearly understand what to include in the security 
framework. The following section will investigate the mobility practices of the employees 
and security threats encountered. 
 
5.4.5 Mobility practices  
A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between mobility practices on items 24, 25, 26 and 27 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B) and the security threats experienced in item 28 in the questionnaire 
(Appendix B). These specific items were chosen because the practices directly relate to 
some of the threats on item 28. For all these analyses a chi-square test of independence 
was used to test for a significant relationship between mobility practices and the security 
threat. Where the conditions for this test are not met, Fisher’s exact test was used. 
 
5.4.5.1 Methods used to prepare mobile device for disposal  
Participants were asked to indicate methods used to prepare their mobile device for 
disposal. This includes permanently deleting data from the recycle bin, formatting the 
storage device, replacing the hard drive and resetting the device to the factory setting. A 
bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant relationship 
between the methods used to prepare a mobile device for disposal on item 24 in the 
questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in the 
questionnaire (Appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square test of independence was used to 
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test for a significant relationship between methods used to prepare a mobile device for 
disposal and the security threats experienced. The results are presented in Table 5.29 to 
5.36. 
 
Permanently delete data from recycle bin  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.29 to show the relationship between the 
row (permanently delete data from recycle bin to get rid of confidential information) and 
column (unauthorized modification of confidential information) variables.  The 
relationship is such that permanently deleting data from the recycle bin to get rid of 
confidential information (item 24.1) is related to encountering unauthorized modification 
of confidential information (item 28.1) and not permanently deleting data from the recycle 
bin to get rid of confidential information (item 24.1) is associated with not encountering 
unauthorized modification of confidential information (item 28.1). The illustration in 
Table 5.29 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES 
block (i.e. 52 is greater than the expected count of 36.5) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 98 is 
greater than the expected count of 82.5). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the 
YES/NO (i.e. 132 is less than the expected count of 147.5) and NO/YES (i.e. 5 is less 
than the expected count of 20.5) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two 
variables.  
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Table 5.29: Cross-tab of respondents for permanently deleting data from the recycle bin and 
unauthorized modification of confidential information 
   28.1 Unauthorized modification of 
confidential information (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
   Yes No 
24.1 Permanently delete data 
from the recycle bin to get rid of 
critical information 
Yes Count 52 132 
Expected Count 36.5 147.5 
% within 24.1 Permanently 
delete data from the recycle bin 
to get rid of critical information 
28.3% 71.7% 
Std. Residual 2.6 -1.3 
No Count 5 98 
Expected Count 20.5 82.5 
% within 24.1 Permanently 
delete data from the recycle bin 
to get rid of critical information 
4.9% 95.1% 
Std. Residual -3.4 1.7 
 Total Count 57 230 
Expected Count 57.0 230.0 
% within 24.1 Permanently 
delete data from the recycle bin  
to get rid of critical information 
19.9% 80.1% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
permanently deleting data from the recycle bin to get rid of critical information and the 
unauthorized modification of confidential information. Significantly more than expected 
respondents who permanently delete data from the recycle bin to get rid of critical 
information experience unauthorized modification of confidential information 
(χ2(1)=22.730, p<0.0005). 
 
Table 5.30: A chi-square test of independence for permanently deleting data from the recycle bin 
and unauthorized modification of confidential information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.730a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 21.284 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 27.005 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.651c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 287     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.46. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Format the storage devices to get rid of critical information 
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.31 to show the relationship between the 
row (not formatting the storage devices to get rid of critical information) and column (data 
leakage) variables.  The relationship is such that NOT formatting the storage devices to 
get rid of critical information (item 24.2) is related to encountering data leakage (item 
28.8) and formatting the storage devices to get rid of critical information (item 24.2) is 
associated with not encountering data leakage (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.31 
shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell in the NO/YES block (i.e. 
117 is greater than the expected count of 88.9) and the YES/NO block (i.e. 84 is greater 
than the expected count of 55.9). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 
34 is less than the expected count of 62.1) and NO/NO (i.e. 52 is less than the expected 
count of 80.1) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables. 
 
Table 5.31: Cross-tab of respondents for not formatting the storage devices to get rid of critical 
information and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
24.2 Not formatting the storage 
devices to get rid of critical 
information  
Yes Count 34 84 
Expected Count 62.1 55.9 
% within 24.2 Format the 
storage devices to get rid of 
critical information  
28.8% 71.2% 
Std. Residual -3.6 3.8 
No Count 117 52 
Expected Count 88.9 80.1 
% within 24.2 Format the 
storage devices to get rid of 
critical information  
69.2% 30.8% 
Std. Residual 3.0 -3.1 
 Total Count 151 136 
Expected Count 151.0 136.0 
% within 24.2 Format the 
storage devices to get rid of 
critical information  
52.6% 47.4% 
 
Again, a chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship 
between not formatting the storage devices to get rid of critical and data leakage. 
Significantly more than expected respondents who do not format the storage devices to 
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get rid of critical information experience data leakage (χ2(1)=45.527, p<0.0005). This is 
represented in Table 5.32. 
 
Table 5.32: A chi-square test of independence for not formatting the storage devices to get rid of 
critical and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.527a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 43.920 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 46.743 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 45.368c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 287     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 55.92. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Replace the hard drive  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.33 to show the relationship between the 
row (not replacing the hard drive of the device to get rid of the critical information) and 
column (data leakage) variables.  The relationship is such that NOT replacing the hard 
drive of the device to get rid of the critical information (item 24.3) is related to 
encountering data leakage (item 28.8) and replacing the hard drive of the device to get rid 
of the critical information (item 24.3) is associated with not encountering data leakage 
(item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.33 shows that more than the expected number of 
respondents fell in the NO/YES block (i.e. 129 is greater than the expected count of 116.2) 
and the YES/NO block (i.e. 40 is greater than the expected count of 27.2). Similarly, 
fewer than expected fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 18 is less than the expected count of 30.8) 
and NO/NO (i.e. 90 is less than the expected count of 102.8) blocks.  Thus, there is a 
relationship between the two variables. 
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Table 5.33: Cross-tab of respondents for not replacing the hard drive of the device to get rid of the 
critical information and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
24.3 Not replacing the hard drive 
of the device to get rid of the 
critical information 
Yes Count 18 40 
Expected Count 30.8 27.2 
% within 24.3 Replace the hard 
drive of the device to get rid of 
the critical information 
31.0% 69.0% 
Std. Residual -2.3 2.4 
No Count 129 90 
Expected Count 116.2 102.8 
% within 24.3 Replace the hard 
drive of the device to get rid of 
the critical information 
58.9% 41.1% 
Std. Residual 1.2 -1.3 
 Total Count 147 130 
Expected Count 147.0 130.0 
% within 24.3 Replace the hard 
drive of the device to get rid of 
the critical information 
53.1% 46.9% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
NOT replacing the hard drive of the device to get rid of the critical information and data 
leakage. Significantly more than expected respondents who do not replace the hard drive 
of the device to get rid of the critical information experience data leakage (χ2(1)=14.301, 
p<0.0005). Thus, the relationship is such that not replacing the hard drive of the device 
to get rid of the critical information is related to data leakage and replacing the hard drive 
to get rid of the critical information is associated with not encountering data leakage. This 
relationship is significant. 
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Table 5.34: A chi-square test of independence for not replacing the hard drive of the device to get 
rid of the critical information and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.301a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 13.203 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 14.496 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.249c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 277     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Resetting the devices to factory default settings  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.35 to show the relationship between the 
row (not resetting the device to factory default settings to get rid of critical information) 
and column (data leakage) variables.  The relationship is such that NOT resetting the 
device to factory default settings to get rid of critical information (item 24.4) is related to 
encountering data leakage (item 28.8) and resetting the device to factory default settings 
to get rid of critical information (item 24.4) is associated with not encountering data 
leakage (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.35 shows that more than the expected 
number of respondents fell in the NO/YES block (i.e. 118 is greater than the expected 
count of 92.4) and the YES/NO block (i.e. 73 is greater than the expected count of 47.4). 
Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/YES (i.e. 28 is less than the expected count 
of 53.6) and NO/NO (i.e. 56 is less than the expected count of 81.6) blocks.  Thus, there 
is a relationship between the two variables. 
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Table 5.35: Cross-tab of respondents for resetting the device to factory default settings to get rid of 
critical information and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
24.4 Not Resetting the devices to 
factory default settings to get rid 
of the critical information 
Yes Count 28 73 
Expected Count 53.6 47.4 
% within 24.4 Reset the devices 
to factory default settings to get 
rid of the critical information 
27.7% 72.3% 
Std. Residual -3.5 3.7 
No Count 118 56 
Expected Count 92.4 81.6 
% within 24.4 Reset the devices 
to factory default settings to get 
rid of the critical information 
67.8% 32.2% 
Std. Residual 2.7 -2.8 
 Total Count 146 129 
Expected Count 146.0 129.0 
% within 24.4 Reset the devices 
to factory default settings to get 
rid of the critical information 
53.1% 46.9% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
NOT resetting the devices to factory default settings to get rid of the critical information 
and data leakage. Significantly more than expected respondents that do not reset the 
devices to factory default settings to get rid of the critical information experience data 
leakage (χ2(1)=41.248, p<0.0005).  
 
Table 5.36: A chi-square test of independence for not resetting the devices to factory default settings 
to get rid of the critical information and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 41.248a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 39.654 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 42.305 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 41.098c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 47.38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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5.4.5.2 Methods used to dispose of obsolete or faulty devices  
Participants were asked to indicate methods used to dispose of their mobile devices. This 
includes putting them up for sale, giving them to family or friends, and throwing away 
the faulty devices. A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a 
significant relationship between the methods used to dispose mobile device on item 25 in 
the questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of security threats on item 28 in the 
questionnaire (Appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square test of independence was used to 
test for a significant relationship between methods used to dispose mobile device and the 
security threats experienced. The results are presented in Table 5.37 to 5.42.  
 
Put it up for sale  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.37 to show the relationship between the 
row (put it up for sale) and column (unauthorized modification of confidential 
information) variables.  The relationship is such that putting it up for sale (item 25.1) is 
related to encountering unauthorized modification of confidential information (item 28.1) 
and not putting it up for sale (item 25.1) is associated with not encountering unauthorized 
modification of confidential information (28.1). The illustration in Table 5.37 shows that 
more than the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 38 is 
greater than the expected count of 28.4) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 136 is greater than the 
expected count of 126.4). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 112 is 
less than the expected count of 121.6) and NO/YES (i.e. 20 is less than the expected count 
of 29.6) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.   
 
 103 
 
Table 5.37: Cross-tab of respondents for disposing of obsolete or faulty devices and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information 
   28.1 Unauthorized modification of 
confidential information (e.g. customer’s 
bank statement) 
   Yes No 
25.1 Put it up for sale Yes Count 38 112 
Expected Count 28.4 121.6 
% within 25.1 Put it up for sale 25.3% 74.7% 
Std. Residual 1.8 -.9 
No Count 20 136 
Expected Count 29.6 126.4 
% within 25.1 Put it up for sale 12.8% 87.2% 
Std. Residual -1.8 .9 
 Total Count 58 248 
Expected Count 58.0 248.0 
% within 25.1 Put it up for sale 19.0% 81.0% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by putting them up for sale and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information. Significantly more than expected respondents 
disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by putting them up for sale experience 
unauthorized modification of confidential information (χ2(1)=7.794, p=0.005).  
 
Table 5.38: A chi-square test of independence for disposing obsolete/ faulty device and 
unauthorized modification of confidential information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.794a 1 .005 .006 .004 
Continuity Correctionb 7.001 1 .008   
Likelihood Ratio 7.888 1 .005 .006 .004 
Fisher's Exact Test    .006 .004 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.769c 1 .005 .006 .004 
N of Valid Cases 306     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.43. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Give to family/friends  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.39 to show the relationship between the 
row (give to family or friends) and column (data leakage) variables.  The relationship is 
such that giving them to family or friends (item 25.2) is related to encountering data 
leakage (item 28.8) and not giving them to family or friends (item 25.2) is associated with 
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not encountering data leakage (item 28.8). The illustration in Table 5.39 shows that more 
than the expected number of respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 126 is greater 
than the expected count of 109.3) and the NO/NO block (i.e. 60 is greater than the 
expected count of 43.3). Similarly, fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 89 is less 
than the expected count of 105.7) and NO/YES (i.e. 28 is less than the expected count of 
44.7) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the two variables.   
 
Table 5.39: Cross-tab of respondents for disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by giving them to 
family/friends and data leakage 
   28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   Yes No 
25.2 Give it to family/friends Yes Count 126 89 
Expected Count 109.3 105.7 
% within 25.2 Give it to 
family/friends 
58.6% 41.4% 
Std. Residual 1.6 -1.6 
No Count 28 60 
Expected Count 44.7 43.3 
% within 25.2 Give it to 
family/friends 
31.8% 68.2% 
Std. Residual -2.5 2.5 
 Total Count 154 149 
Expected Count 154.0 149.0 
% within 25.2 Give it to 
family/friends 
50.8% 49.2% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
disposing of obsolete or faulty device by giving them to family or friends and data 
leakage. Significantly more than expected respondents who dispose of obsolete or faulty 
devices by giving them to family or friends experience data leakage (χ2(1)=17.926, 
p<0.0005). 
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Table 5.40: A chi-square test of independence for disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by giving 
them to family/friends and data leakage 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.926a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 16.870 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 18.224 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 17.867c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 303     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
  
Throw away faulty device  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.41 to show the relationship between the 
row (throw away faulty device) and column (unauthorized modification of confidential 
information) variables.  The relationship is such that throwing away a faulty device (item 
25.3) is related to encountering unauthorized modification of confidential information 
(item 28.1) and not throwing away a faulty device (item 25.3) is associated with not 
encountering unauthorized modification of confidential information (item 28.1). The 
illustration in Table 5.41 shows that more than the expected number of respondents fell 
in the YES/YES block (i.e. 25 is greater than the expected count of 15.1) and the NO/NO 
block (i.e. 185 is greater than the expected count of 175.1). Similarly, fewer than expected 
fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 55 is less than the expected count of 64.9) and NO/YES (i.e. 31 
is less than the expected count of 40.9) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship between the 
two variables.   
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Table 5.41: Cross-tab of respondents for throwing away faulty device and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information 
   28.1 Unauthorized modification of  
confidential information  (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
   Yes No 
25.3 Throw away the faulty 
device 
Yes Count 25 55 
Expected Count 15.1 64.9 
% within 25.3 Throw away the 
faulty device 
31.3% 68.8% 
Std. Residual 2.5 -1.2 
No Count 31 185 
Expected Count 40.9 175.1 
% within 25.3 Throw away the 
faulty device 
14.4% 85.6% 
Std. Residual -1.5 .7 
 Total Count 56 240 
Expected Count 56.0 240.0 
% within 25.3 Throw away the 
faulty device 
18.9% 81.1% 
 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by throwing them away and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information. Significantly more than expected respondents 
disposing of obsolete or faulty devices by throwing them away experience unauthorized 
modification of confidential information (χ2(1)=10.867, p=0.001).  
 
Table 5.42: A chi-square test of independence for throwing away faulty device and unauthorized 
modification of confidential information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.867a 1 .001 .001 .001 
Continuity Correctionb 9.793 1 .002   
Likelihood Ratio 10.091 1 .001 .002 .001 
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.830c 1 .001 .001 .001 
N of Valid Cases 296     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.14. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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5.4.5.3 Sharing mobile devices with the following people  
Participants were asked to indicate with whom they share their mobile device. This 
included colleagues and family or friends. A bivariate analysis was carried out to 
determine whether there is a significant relationship between sharing mobile devices with 
the people on item 26 in the questionnaire (Appendix B) and the experience of security 
threats on item 28 in the questionnaire (appendix B). Thereafter, a chi-square test of 
independence was used to test for a significant relationship between with whom they 
share their mobile device and the security threats experienced. The results are presented 
in Table 5.43 to 5.46. 
 
Sharing mobile device with colleagues   
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.43 to show the relationship between the 
row (sharing device with colleagues) and column (software keeps making copies of itself 
on the device) variables.  The relationship is such that sharing a device with colleagues 
(item 26.1) is related to encountering software that keeps making copies of itself on the 
device (item 28.11) and not sharing the device with colleagues (item 26.1) is associated 
with not encountering software that keeps making copies of itself on the device (item 
28.11). The illustration in Table 5.43 shows that more than the expected number of 
respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 59 is greater than the expected count of 37.9) 
and the NO/NO block (i.e. 152 is greater than the expected count of 130.9). Similarly, 
fewer than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 28 is less than the expected count of 49.1) 
and NO/YES (i.e. 80 is less than the expected count of 101.1) blocks.  Thus, there is a 
relationship between the two variables.   
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Table 5.43: Cross-tab of respondents for sharing device with colleagues and software keeps making 
copies of itself on the device 
   28.11 Software keeps making copies of itself 
on your device  
   
Yes No Total 
26.1 sharing 
device with 
colleague 
 
 
  
Yes Count 59 28 87 
Expected Count 37.9 49.1 87.0 
% within 26.1 M  67.8% 32.2% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 3.4 -3.0 
 
No Count 80 152 232 
Expected Count 101.1 130.9 232.0 
% within 26.1 M  34.5% 65.5% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -2.1 1.8  
 Total Count 139 180 319 
Expected Count 139.0 180.0 319.0 
% within 26.1 M  43.6% 56.4% 100.0% 
 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
sharing a mobile device with colleagues and software that keeps making copies of itself 
on one’s device. Significantly more than expected respondents sharing a mobile device 
with colleagues experience replication of software on their devices (χ2(1)=28.594, 
p<0.0005).  
 
Table 5.44: A chi-square test of independence for sharing mobile device with colleagues and 
software keeps making copies of itself on one’s device 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.594a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 27.254 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 28.726 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
28.504c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 319     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.91. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Sharing mobile device with family/friends  
A bivariate analysis was performed in Table 5.45 to show the relationship between the 
row (sharing device with family or friends) and column (personal information on your 
mobile device was used without your knowledge) variables.  The relationship is such that 
sharing a device with family or friends (item 26.2) is related to encountering personal 
information on one’s mobile device being  used without one’s knowledge (item 28.7) and 
not sharing a device with family or friends (item 26.2) is associated with not encountering 
personal information on one’s  mobile device being used without one’s knowledge (item 
28.7). The illustration in Table 5.45 shows that more than the expected number of 
respondents fell in the YES/YES block (i.e. 71 is greater than the expected count of 53) 
and the NO/NO block (i.e. 98 is greater than the expected count of 80). Similarly, fewer 
than expected fell in the YES/NO (i.e. 100 is less than the expected count of 118) and 
NO/YES (i.e. 18 is less than the expected count of 36) blocks.  Thus, there is a relationship 
between the two variables.   
 
Table 5.45: Cross-tab of respondents for sharing device with family/friends and personal 
information on one’s mobile device were used without one’s knowledge 
     
   
28.7 Personal information on your mobile 
device such as private photo, login credentials 
were used without your knowledge  
   Yes No Total 
26.2 sharing 
device with 
family/frien
ds 
Yes Count 71 100 171 
Expected Count 53.0 118.0 171.0 
% within 26.2 M  41.5% 58.5% 100.0% 
Std. Residual 2.5 -1.7  
No Count 18 98 116 
Expected Count 36.0 80.0 116.0 
% within 26.2 M  15.5% 84.5% 100.0% 
Std. Residual -3.0 2.0  
 Total Count 89 198 287 
Expected Count 89.0 198.0 287.0 
% within 26.2 M  31.0% 69.0% 100.0% 
 
A chi-square test of independence was used to test for a significant relationship between 
sharing a mobile device with family or friends and personal information on one’s mobile 
device such as private photos and log-in credentials being used without one’s knowledge. 
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Significantly more than expected respondents sharing a mobile device with family or 
friends encounter personal information on their mobile devices being used without their 
knowledge (χ2(1)=21.844, p<0.0005).  
 
Table 5.46: A chi-square test of independence for sharing mobile device with family/friends and 
personal information on your mobile device were used without your knowledge 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.844a 1 .000 .000 .000 
Continuity Correctionb 20.646 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 23.172 1 .000 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
21.768c 1 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 287     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.97. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
5.4.6 Security threats experienced    
Table 5.47 shows the binomial test scores of responses (‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘not sure’ 
responses) of security threats experienced. In this output <=1 implies YES, while >1 
implies NO or NOT SURE. A significant proportion indicated that they have experienced 
unavailable networks during the cause of interaction (69 per cent, p<0.0005) and they 
have received messages stating that they have won a prize and should call a number to 
redeem the prize (73 per cent, p<0.0005). Another significant proportion indicated that 
they have received messages they have won a prize and should click a link to redeem the 
prize (75 per cent, p<0.0005). Similarly, a significant proportion indicated that they have 
received an e-mail request to update their personal information (78 per cent, p<0.0005) 
and a significant proportion indicated they have received an access request to device 
resources as part of terms and conditions to install (72 per cent, p<0.0005).  
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Table 5. 47: Binomial test to determine significant proportion of security threats experienced 
  
Category N Observed Prop. Test Prop. 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
28.1 Unauthorized modification of 
confidential information (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
Group 1 <= 1 60 .17 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 298 .83   
Total  358 1.00   
28.2 Unauthorized login into your 
storage account (e.g. Office server, 
Google))) drive) 
Group 1 <= 1 34 .09 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 324 .91   
Total  358 1.00   
28.3 Unauthorized access to your 
social interactive network (e.g. 
Facebook, WhatsApp, BBM, 
WeChat) 
Group 1 <= 1 80 .22 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 278 .78   
Total  358 1.00   
28.4 Unauthorized access to your 
bank account 
Group 1 <= 1 32 .09 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 325 .91   
Total  357 1.00   
28.5 Unauthorized interception of 
private communication such as a 
phone call, instant message e.t.c. 
Group 1 <= 1 151 .42 .50 .004a 
Group 2 > 1 207 .58   
Total  358 1.00   
28.6 Unavailable network during the 
cause of interaction 
Group 1 <= 1 247 .69 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 111 .31   
Total  358 1.00   
28.7 Personal information on your 
mobile device such as private photo, 
login credentials were used without 
your knowledge 
Group 1 <= 1 89 .25 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 268 .75   
Total  357 1.00   
28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data 
were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
Group 1 <= 1 155 .43 .50 .015a 
Group 2 > 1 202 .57   
Total  357 1.00   
28.9 Malicious messages were sent to 
your contact list without your 
knowledge 
Group 1 <= 1 156 .44 .50 .020a 
Group 2 > 1 201 .56   
Total  357 1.00   
28.10 Confidential information were 
deleted without your knowledge (e.g. 
customer credential details)  
Group 1 <= 1 40 .11 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 317 .89   
Total  357 1.00   
28.11 Software keeps making copies 
of itself on your device 
Group 1 <= 1 140 .39 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 217 .61   
Total  357 1.00   
28.12 You saw a number in your 
dialing list that you haven’t dialled 
Group 1 <= 1 47 .13 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 311 .87   
Total  358 1.00   
28.13 You received messages that 
you have won a prize and should call 
a number to redeem the prize 
Group 1 <= 1 262 .73 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 96 .27   
Total 
 
358 1.00 
  
28.14 You received messages that 
you have won a prize and should click 
a link to redeem the prize 
Group 1 <= 1 269 .75 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 88 .25   
Total  357 1.00   
28.15 You received e-mail request to 
update your personal information 
(e.g.  login credentials) 
Group 1 <= 1 278 .78 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 80 .22   
Total  358 1.00   
28.16 You received an access request 
to device resources as part of terms & 
conditions to install 
Group 1 <= 1 258 .72 .50 .000a 
Group 2 > 1 100 .28   
Total  358 1.00   
a. Based on Z Approximation. 
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However, a significant proportion indicated that they did not experience unauthorized 
modification of confidential information (83 per cent, p<0.0005); they did not experience 
unauthorized login into a storage account (91 per cent, p<0.0005); did not experience 
unauthorized access to social interactive networks (78 per cent, p<0.0005); did not 
experience authorizing access to a bank account (91 per cent, p<0.0005); did not 
experience unauthorized interception of private communication (58 per cent, p=0.004); 
did not experience unauthorized usage of personal information (75 per cent, p<0.0005); 
did not experience data leakage (83 per cent, p=0.015); did not experience malicious 
messages (56 per cent, p<0.020); did not experience replication of software (61 per cent, 
p<0.0005);  and did not experience unknown numbers in their dialling list (87 per cent, 
p<0.0005). 
 
This section has clearly revealed other security threats experienced. These include an 
unavailable network during the course of an interaction, receiving messages stating that 
they have won a prize and should call a number or click a link to redeem the prize, 
receiving an e-mail request to update their personal information and receiving an access 
request to device resources as part of terms and conditions to install. All of these 
responses help to clearly understand what to include in the security framework. The 
following sections (i.e. section 5.5) will further investigate organizations’ practices 
(executive managers and ICT department personnel practices) in terms of using mobile 
devices. 
 
5.5 Data analysis: Qualitative data 
This section presents the threat identification for the qualitative data analysis. All the 
responses gathered from the structured interview with the ICT department personnel and 
executive managers of the Nigeria banking sector are presented in this section. The 
qualitative data provided additional information, thereby creating room for the 
triangulation of data. Fundamental to this section is to present and analyse findings of the 
non-numerical data from the study. The non-numeric data was transcribed using thematic 
analysis. The following section presents the non-numeric data collected for this study. 
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5.5.1 ICT Department personnel interview 
Table 5.48 presents the categories and themes that emerged in the interviews conducted 
with the ICT department personnel of the four participating banks (i.e. two representatives 
each from the four banks). The emerged themes from the interviews were subsequently 
classified into three major categories, namely technical, social and mobility practices. 
 
Table 5.48: Categories and themes that emerged in the qualitative analysis for IT personnel 
Categories Major Themes 
1. Technical Practice Mobile device registration 
Mobile device access to operational service 
Existing security measures 
Security threats experienced/reported 
Measures used to mitigate the security threats experienced or reported 
Aspects of the bank security that needs more focus 
2. Social  
Practice 
Social media 
Backup of organisation’s information 
Employees’ non-compliance with security policy 
3. Mobility  
Practice 
Sharing mobile device 
Lost/stolen device 
Mobile device disposal  
 
5.5.1.1 Technical practice  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ practices in relation to using 
mobile devices (which are either owned by the employee or the bank). The identified 
major themes from the semi-structured interview with the ICT Department personnel on 
questions number 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 (Appendix C) are presented in this section. 
 
Mobile device registration 
Three banks (A, C and D) acknowledged that they do not register employees’ mobile 
devices. According to one participant: 
“No, our bank do not register the mobile devices” (Participant 2). 
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Similarly, another participant commented: 
“The bank does not see that as an issue so employee’s mobile device are not 
registered.” (Participant 7). 
Again, another participant noted: 
“The bank does not register employees’ mobile device.” (Participant 11). 
 
In line with the above statements, it is apparent that the banks do not register employees’ 
mobile devices in their database for knowledge. Hence, the banks cannot easily trace or 
track down any abnormal behaviour in the network. 
 
Mobile device access to operational service 
Two banks (B and D) out of the four banks affirmed that they allow employees’ personal 
devices to access operational services. The narratives of the two participants are as 
follows:  
“Yes, we allow employees’ personal devices to access operational services, but 
they must authenticate through active directory” (Participant 4). 
 
“Employees’ personal devices are allowed to access operational services” 
(Participant 10). 
 
This statement reveals that the banks permit employees’ personal devices to access 
operational services.  
 
Existing security measures 
The four banks (A, B, C and D) affirmed that they have certain forms of security 
measures. Some of the responses of the participants are stated as follows:  
 
“My bank use firewall, antispyware and antivirus” (Participant 1) 
. 
“The bank makes use of proxy server, firewall, intrusion detection system, 
antispyware and antivirus” (Participant 5). 
 
“Firewall, hardware token, and antivirus” (Participant 8). 
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“Proxy server, firewall, antispyware and antivirus are major security measures 
the bank uses” (Participant 11). 
 
The above excerpts suggest that most of the security measures used in the Nigerian 
banking sector were central around firewall, anti-spyware and antivirus software.  
 
Security threats experienced or reported 
Two banks (A and D) affirmed that they have received security threats that have posed a 
risk to the Nigerian banking sector. According to a participant:  
 
“Yes, some hackers attempted to access the bank’s network through a rogue 
device, but we were able detect on time through firewall” (Participant 1). 
 
Another participant quipped that: 
 
“Yes, there was a security threat by hackers using a keystroke logger from a 
remote access to allow a direct connection to a system already connected to a 
trusted website” (Participant 10). 
 
The above excerpts confirm that there have been some security threats experienced by 
employees as identified from the quantitative analysis (section 5.4.3).  
 
Measures used to mitigate the security threat experienced or reported 
The two banks (A and D) use different approaches in mitigating the security threats. 
According to a participant:  
  
“Through the firewall we were able to detect unauthorized access. There was an 
alert that calls the attention of the IT” (Participant 2). 
 
Another interviewee reported: 
 
“The IT department increased the security protocol by performing attack and 
penetration check to identify those vulnerable areas in the network that can easily 
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be accessed by both internal and external users. We also ensure a change of 
password was made on all the system that access the API” (Participant 11). 
 
Aspects of the bank security that need more focus 
Three banks (A, C and D) suggested different/various areas of the security system that 
need more focus. One of the participants remarked that:  
 
 “The bank needs a security program that can pinpoint unauthorized program 
attempting to transmit data over the bank’s network” (Participant 1). 
 
Similarly, another participant indicated that: 
“Customer database is prone to hackers” (Participant 5). 
 
Again, another participant commented that: 
“The banks’ network system” (Participant 11). 
 
5.5.1.2 Social practice  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ practices in relation to social 
media, the backup of organisations’ information and employees’ non-compliance with 
security policy. The identified major themes from the semi-structured interview for ICT 
Department personnel on questions number 15, 16 and 17 (Appendix C) are presented in 
this section. 
 
Social media  
The four banks (A, B, C and D) affirm that they do not allow employees to access social 
media. The responses of the participants are stated as: 
 
 “Not all employees have access to social media, only the executive managers and 
the network filter help to filter unwanted messages. It is a crime for employee to 
indulge in that act” (Participant 2). 
 
 “The network team filters traffic in and outside the bank such that illegal access 
are easily detected and blocked. Access is blocked to some sites such as Facebook, 
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Twitter during working hours so that it won’t consume the time bits, the more the 
traffic the slower the network” (Participant 4). 
 
“Employees are not allowed to access to social media. It is against the bank’s 
policy” (Participant 7). 
 
 “Access to social media are blocked during working hours so employees cannot 
access social media” (Participant 10). 
 
The excerpts above suggest that employees are not allowed to access social media for 
official purposes. However, this is in contrast with the quantitative analysis which 
revealed that employees access social media and click on links, images, advertisement, 
videos and audios and games (section 5.4.4).  
 
Backup of organisation’s information 
Three banks (A, B and D) confirm that they allow employees to back up work documents 
on their laptops as well as the bank’s server. One of the participants stated that:  
 
 “Employees are allowed to backup work documents on server and laptop” 
(Participant 1). 
 
Similarly, another participant remarked: 
 
 “The bank allows employees’ to backup work documents on their laptops and the 
bank’s server” (Participant 5). 
 
Again, another participant commented: 
 
“Employees are allowed to back up on the bank’s server. Although the bank also 
allows backup on their laptop” (Participant 11). 
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Employees’ non-compliance with security policy  
All the four banks (A, B, C and D) assert that they have been faced with security threats 
due to employees’ non-compliance with security policy. The responses of the participants 
are stated as follows:   
 
“The bank has once been vulnerable to hackers which led to loss of confidential 
information” (Participant 2). 
 
“Due to employees’ non-compliance there have been cases of data leakage” 
(Participant 4). 
 
“The bank lost some confidential information” (Participant 7). 
 
“Several confidential information has been lost as a result of employees’ non-
compliance. This has also led to the dismissal of such employees” (Participant 
10). 
 
This is a validation of the security threats experienced as outlined in the quantitative 
analysis (section 5.4.3 to 5.4.6). This suggests that some of security threats faced in the 
Nigerian banking sector were central around non-compliance with security policies. 
 
5.5.1.3 Mobility practice  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ practices in relation to the sharing 
of mobile devices, lost or stolen devices and mobile device disposal. The identified major 
themes from the semi-structured interviews with ICT Department personnel on questions 
number 18, 22, 23 and 24 (appendix C) are presented in this section. 
 
Sharing mobile devices 
Two banks (C and D) out of the four banks affirmed that employees are not allowed to 
share their mobile devices.  One of the participants remarked that: 
 
““No, the bank does not allow employees’ to share mobile devices”  
(Participant 8). 
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Another participant pointed out: 
 
“Sharing of mobile device is not allowed when it is being used for work purpose” 
(Participant 11). 
 
The above excerpts are in contrast with the quantitative finding that revealed that 
employees’ do share their mobile devices (section 5.4.5). This explains the reason why 
some of the employees are experiencing security threats as identified in the quantitative 
analysis (section 5.4.5). 
 
Lost/stolen devices  
Three banks (A, C and D) acknowledged that they did not recover employees lost or 
stolen mobile devices. According to one participant: 
 “Yes, it was reported but not recovered” (Participant 1).  
Another participant stated that: 
“There was no way the bank could recover the lost/stolen device since it was not 
registered” (Participant 8).  
Again, another participant remarked: 
“There are reported cases of lost/stolen device, but the bank could not recover 
them” (Participant 11).  
All the comments made by the participants suggest that that there have been cases of lost 
or stolen devices that were reported but not recovered. In addition to the lost/ or stolen 
devices, when questions were raised regarding how the banks were able to address the 
security threats caused by lost or stolen devices, the following responses were given: 
 
“Unfortunately, the bank could not do anything to the security issues” 
(Participant 2).  
 
“If the mobile devices were registered, the bank would have been able to wipe out 
confidential data from the device but that was not possible since it was not 
registered” (Participant 5).  
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 “There were no security measures used for the lost/stolen” (Participant 10).  
 
The excerpts above imply that cases of lost or stolen devices are not been taken seriously 
as a major security concern. 
 
Mobile device disposal  
Two banks (B and D) affirmed that they allow employees to dispose of their mobile 
devices by themselves. According to a participant: 
 
“It is employees’ personal device, so they are allowed to dispose it if they want 
to” (Participant 5). 
 
Another participant responded that: 
“Employees are allowed to dispose their mobile device, but they are at their own 
risk” (Participant 10). 
These responses suggest that it is the sole responsibility of the employees to dispose of 
their mobile devices. 
 
5.5.2 Executive managers’ interview 
Table 5.49 presents the categories and themes that emerged in the interviews conducted 
with the executive managers of the four participating banks (i.e. one representative each 
from the four banks). This was done in other to examine the banks’ policies regarding the 
BYOD phenomenon. The themes emerged from the interviews were subsequently 
classified into three major categories, namely technical, social and mobility. 
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Table 5.49: Categories and themes that emerged in the qualitative analysis for executive managers 
Categories Major Themes 
1. Technical practice Policies that supports BYOD trend 
Acquisition, monitoring and maintenance 
Operating system 
2. Social  
practice 
Time interval for policy review 
Policy guiding employees’ interaction 
Budget constraint for framework development 
3. Mobility  
practice 
Policy guiding retrieval of lost/stolen device 
Policy guiding disposal of faulty/obsolete device 
Policy guiding sharing of mobile device 
 
5.5.2.1 Technical  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ policies in relation to the BYOD 
phenomenon. The major themes identified from the semi-structured interviews with the 
executive managers on questions number 1, 2 and 3 (Appendix D) are presented in this 
section. 
 
Policies that support BYOD trend 
Three banks (A, C and D) out of the four banks indicated that they do not have a definite 
policy that supports the BYOD trend. The responses of the participants are stated as 
follows:  
 
“There is no definite policy that support the use of BYOD” (Participant 3). 
 
“The bank does not have a policy that guides BYOD” (Participant 9). 
 
“There is no policy for BYOD. The bank might consider reviewing the security 
policy to accommodate BYOD phenomenon in the future” (Participant 12). 
 
This implies that employees are allowed to bring their own devices without any policy 
guiding those devices. 
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Acquisition, monitoring and maintenance  
The four banks (A, B, C and D) affirmed that they allow their employees to acquire the 
mobile devices they used for office work by themselves. In addition, two out of the four 
banks (A and B) admits they give out laptops to their employees. However, the banks do 
not monitor or maintain these devices. The statement below is a response from one of the 
participants and it reads as follows: 
 
“In terms of acquisition, the bank gives out laptops to the employee for official 
purpose and also allows employees to bring in their personal devices such as 
smartphones and tablets. In terms of monitoring, we don’t monitor usage of these 
devices but update is being sent from the central server. In terms of maintenance, 
the IT department does the maintenance of the mobile devices” (Participant 3). 
 
Similarly, another participant commented: 
“Employees are allowed to personally acquire their mobile device. However, the 
banks do not monitor these devices. Also, the maintenance of these devices is the 
responsibility of the employee” (Participant 6). 
 
Again, another participant commented thus: 
“Since the bank allows employees’ to bring their mobile devices, it means they 
are allowed to acquire their mobile device.  The bank does not monitor the device 
but if there is any form of security breach, the employee will be held responsible. 
In terms of maintenance, the employees’ takes care of their mobile devices’ 
themselves” (Participant 9). 
 
Furthermore, another participant commented: 
“The bank gives out laptops and also allows employees to acquire their personal 
devices such as smartphones and tablets. In terms of monitoring, the bank does 
not monitor apps or track mobile location” (Participant 12). 
 
Operating system 
The four banks (A, B, C and D) acknowledged that there is no specific operating system 
approved for employees’ mobile devices. The responses of the participants are stated as 
follows: 
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“The bank does not have any specific operating system approved for mobile 
device” (Participant 3). 
 
“Employees’ are allowed to acquire their mobile device with any operating 
system they wish” (Participant 6). 
 
“There is no restriction as to which operating system the device must have” 
(Participant 9). 
 
“Employees can use whichever operating system they want” (Participant 12). 
 
It can be inferred that the banks do not have a specific operating system expected to be 
used by the employees who bring their mobile devices to the bank.  
 
5.5.2.2. Social  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ practices regarding the time 
interval for policy review, policy guiding employees’ interaction and budget constraints 
for framework development. The identified major themes from the semi-structured 
interviews with the executive managers on questions number 9, 10 and 11 (Appendix D) 
are presented in this section. 
 
Time interval for policy review 
Two banks (A and C) claim they do not have a specific time interval for reviewing 
security policy. One participant indicated: 
 
“The bank does not have a particular interval for reviewing security policies” 
(Participant 3). 
 
Another participant remarked: 
 
“The bank only review security policy once there a need for it” (Participant 9). 
 
From the excerpt above, it implies two banks only review security policy if they deem it 
necessary. 
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Policy guiding employees’ interaction  
The respondents claimed that there are restrictions that guide the interaction of ex-
employees, disgruntled and outsourced employees. The responses of the participants are 
stated as follows: 
 
“There are restrictions on the network that don’t allow access to previous 
employees. For disgruntled employees’, their activities are being monitored by 
their actions while contract employees don’t have full access to the bank’s 
resources same with outsourced employees” (Participant 3). 
 
“Once an employee is disengaged, his/her rights and accessibility to bank’s 
resources is withdrawn. There is no way the bank can know a disgruntled 
employee except he/she comes to complain. However, contract and outsourced 
employees’ have limited access to the bank’s resources” (Participant 6). 
 
“Previous employees cannot access the bank’s network because they have been 
disconnected. When the bank notices that an employee is misbehaving in an 
unusual way, then we know he/she is not happy. Both contract and outsourced 
employees’ can only access limited resources” (Participant 9). 
 
“Previous employees cannot access the bank’s network; their access code has 
been disabled. The bank does not know if an employee is disgruntled or not. The 
bank does not give full access contract and outsourced employees” (Participant 
12). 
 
Budget constraint for framework development 
Notably, two banks (B and D) confirmed that they do not have the financial capability in 
terms of developing a security framework. The statement below is a response from one 
of the participants and it reads as follows: 
 
“Yes, we have budget constraint in upgrading the security system”  
(Participant 6). 
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Another participant commented: 
 
“Most of the security resources are expensive, it will cost the bank a lot of money 
to acquire it and this is not in the bank’s budget” (Participant 12). 
 
5.5.2.3. Mobility  
This study carried out interviews to establish the banks’ policies regarding the retrieval 
of lost or stolen devices, the disposal of faulty or obsolete devices and the sharing of 
mobile devices. The identified major themes from the semi-structured interviews with the 
executive managers on questions number 12, 14 and 15 (Appendix D) are presented in 
this section. 
 
Policy guiding retrieval of lost or stolen devices 
Three banks (A, C and D) out of the four banks confirmed that the banks do not have a 
policy that supports the retrieval of lost or stolen devices. The responses of the 
participants are stated as follows:  
 
“There is nothing the bank can do in terms of retrievals once it is lost or stolen” 
(Participant 3). 
 
Once the bank is aware of the lost/stolen device the employee involved will be 
held responsible for the cost because there is no way the bank can retrieve it” 
(Participant 9). 
 
The bank does not have a policy for retrieval of lost/stolen device. The bank can 
now start thinking of that” (Participant 12). 
 
This implies that the bank does nothing regarding the lost or stolen devices; rather the 
employee is held responsible for any misfortune that comes out of it. 
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Policy guiding disposal of faulty/obsolete 
The four banks (A, B, C and D) confirmed that they do not have a policy that guides the 
disposal of faulty or obsolete devices owned by employees. The statement below is a 
response from one of the participants and it reads as follows: 
 
“No employee has the right to dispose the mobile device given to him/her by the 
bank, except the device owned by the employee” (Participant 3). 
 
“The bank does not have anything to do with employees’ faulty/obsolete device. 
It is the responsibility of the employee to take care of it” (Participant 6). 
 
“It is the responsibility of the employee; the bank has no policy for that” 
(Participant 9). 
 
“So far the mobile device is for employees, they are at liberty to do whatsoever 
they want with it including disposing it” (Participant 12). 
 
The above excerpt explains the reason why some employees are experiencing security 
threats as identified in the quantitative data (section 5.4.5). 
 
Policy guiding sharing mobile devices  
Two banks (A and B) out of the four banks indicated that there are no rules guiding the 
sharing of mobile devices but there are rules for sharing access rights. One of the 
participants remarked that: 
“There are no rules guiding sharing of mobile devices but sharing of access right 
such as password is not allowed” (Participant 3). 
 
“The bank only has rules for sharing of password but there are no rules guiding 
sharing of mobile devices” (Participant 6). 
 
The above statement implies that employees are not guided in terms of sharing mobile 
devices. This validates the quantitative data that reveals that employees share mobile 
devices with colleagues and family or friends (section 5.4.5) but contradicts the 
quantitative data which shows that employees share passwords (section 5.4.4.3) 
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5.6 Summary 
The study revealed the security threats associated with BYOD in the Nigerian banking 
sector which help to answer research questions one, two and three respectively. In 
addressing these questions, three variables (domains) of interest, namely, technical, social 
and mobility, were scrutinized.  These domains were found to be suitable in identifying the 
security threats emanating from BYOD while exploring individual and organizational 
practices.  
 
It is important to note that while the quantitative component of the study revealed 
different types of BYOD security threats that emanate from individual practices which 
were considered under these domains (technical, social, mobility), the qualitative 
component of the study revealed various types of security threats that emanate from 
organizations’ practices and were also considered under the same domains.   
 
Some sections of the qualitative study also support the findings of the quantitative study. 
For example, the quantitative study shows that employees share mobile devices because 
the qualitative findings indicate there are no rules guiding the sharing of mobile devices. 
However, contrary to the finding from the quantitative study which indicates that 
employees access social media to click on links, images and advertisement, the 
qualitative findings show that employees are not allowed to access social media for 
official purpose. Likewise, contrary to the quantitative study which reveals that 
employees share passwords, the qualitative findings reveal that there are rules guiding 
the sharing of passwords. This implies that employees do not comply with organizational 
rules and policy guiding the sharing of passwords.  Additionally, while there seem to be 
no security threats relating to keystroke logging and rogue devices for the quantitative 
findings, the qualitative findings revealed some security threats experienced and these 
include keystroke logging and rogue devices. This indicates that keystroke logging and 
rogue devices are also part of BYOD security threats identified. 
 
A discussion of the findings which concluded the development of a security awareness 
framework is presented in the next chapter (i.e. chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the results of the data analysis (both quantitative and qualitative 
results) that were presented in chapter 5. A comprehensive discussion in which the results 
corroborate or refer to past literature or theories on the security threats associated with 
the BYOD phenomenon is presented. The goal of this chapter is to establish whether 
research questions were answered and whether the objectives of the study were met. The 
relevant research questions considered for discussion are stated as follows: 
1. What are the security threats associated with the technical system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
2. What are the security threats associated with the social system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
3. What are the security threats associated with the mobility system in the banking 
sector of Nigeria? 
 
In addition, this chapter covers a detailed explanation as to whether the findings of the 
study confirm or refute the literature. The discussion on the findings emanating from the 
analyzed data explains the link between individual and organization practices in exploring 
BYOD security threats under three major domains, namely technical, social and mobility. 
Hence, section 6.2 provides a detailed discussion on technical security threats as they 
relate to BYOD hardware and software as well as the technical skills in the use of mobile 
device. Section 6.3 details social security threats as they relate to individuals’ attitudes, 
and organizations’ norms, principles, policies and values that define the practices among 
employees. Section 6.4 presents mobility security threats as they relate to the use of 
portable mobile devices while travelling, methods used to prepare mobile devices for 
disposal and methods used to dispose of mobile devices. Consequently, in this study, the 
findings are synthesized into a security framework for the Nigerian banking sector as 
discussed in chapter 7. 
 
6.2. Technical security threats 
In this study, technical security threats are threats emanating from the technical knowledge 
in the use of mobile devices as well as from BYOD hardware and software technology 
 129 
 
used for work-related purpose. This technology supports the operation of the bank that 
enables communication and workflow (Bello et al., 2015). It is important to discuss these 
security threats because by their very nature, they can be harmful to individuals or 
organizations to the extent that they expose them to other security threats that require 
separate security management (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). 
 
6.2.1 Quantitative findings 
From the data collected through questionnaires from the bank employees on technical 
security threats, four major technical practices exercised by individuals (employees) that 
lead to security threats have been identified. Two out of these four technical practices 
which are “allowing software on device to manage login credentials” and “saving work 
documents from laptop to a free cloud storage” (questions number 7 and 12 in the 
questionnaire) have the same responses to the security threat which is “data leakage” 
(sections 5.4.3.1 and 5.4.3.3). Supporting this finding, Karen (2015) confirms that mobile 
device users that allow software to manage login credentials on their mobile devices are 
vulnerable to data leakage by other users who have access to their mobile devices. Not 
only can other users who gain access to their mobile devices log into their accounts, but 
hackers can do the same as well if the mobile device falls into wrong hands. This in turn 
leads to data leakage (Wang, Streff & Raman, 2012). On the other hand, Bakshi and 
Yogesh (2010) argue that free cloud storage such as iCloud, Dropbox and Google Drive 
enable individuals to copy files into the cloud for later retrieval. However, corporate 
information residing in such services may pose a security threat since they no longer 
reside in the protected corporate boundaries (Bakshi & Yogesh, 2010). Dimensional 
Research (2013) and Uz (2014) reveal that individuals that use free or personal hired 
cloud storage to save or backup information face the danger of “data leakage and data 
ownership violation”. This is because such information can be stolen by a knowledgeable 
hacker while uploading into the cloud storage (Dimensional Research, 2013; Uz, 2014). 
Furthermore, it can also be mismanaged by the third party (Bakshi & Yogesh, 2010).  
 
The third technical practice, “updating mobile device on public network” (question 
number 11) leads to “unauthorized modification of confidential information” (section 
5.4.3.2). According to Felt, Finifter, Chin, Hanna and Wagner (2011), unauthorized 
modification of confidential information occurs as a result of “WiFi eavesdropping”. 
WiFi eavesdropping works in several ways such as accessing confidential information, 
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accessing location information and activating a device’s camera or microphone in order 
to modify information, or gain access to a user’s browsing history (Du & Zhang, 2006). 
Hence, when individuals update their mobile devices on public networks, such a device 
is susceptible to WiFi eavesdropping (Chanda & Zaorski, 2013).  Hackers take advantage 
of such wireless networks to eavesdrop on conversations and remotely modify messages 
from the device (Needham & Lampson, 2008). It is also important to note that accessing 
location information and activating a device’s camera or microphone is also part of the 
function of WiFi eavesdropping (Du & Zhang, 2006). However, some studies have 
referred to “accessing location information” as “unauthorized location tracking” 
because it is being accessed under wrap (Nguyen et al., 2013). Most mobile device are 
endowed with various sensors that can be used to deduce the user’s whereabouts and also 
collect as much data as possible (Nguyen et al., 2013). Unfortunately, most users are 
ignorant of this and have fallen prey to cybercriminals who use this information to 
perpetrate fraud (Enck, Gilbert, Han, Tendulkar, Chun, Cox and Sheth, 2014). 
 
The fourth technical practice, namely “not adhering to security measures” (question 
number 15) leads to “unauthorized access to social interactive network”, “software 
making copies of itself on the device” and “having an unknown number in the dialling 
list” (section 5.4.3.4). APWG (2013) refers to unauthorized access to social interactive 
networks as a type of “phishing”. A phishing attack is a form of deception from hackers 
with the aim of collecting or forcing mobile device users to send confidential information 
about themselves (Ngoqo & Flowerday, 2015). It can be used to persuade individuals to 
download malicious applications onto their mobile devices (APWG, 2013). Disterer and 
Kleiner (2013) affirm that one of the major concerns of mobile users is when attackers 
spy on data exchanges being transmitted to a mobile device. In addition, Morrow (2012) 
refers to software making copies of itself on the device without the user’s consent as a 
“virus”. A virus affects the device negatively by altering the way the device works 
without the user's permission (Lee, 2015). In addition, “having an unknown number in a 
dialling list” is a form of “malware attack” (Wang et al., 2014). One of the ways malware 
functions is to initiate phone calls or encrypt data on one’s device (Wang et al., 2014). 
For example, WannaCry is a type of malware which gets into the computer or mobile 
device through e-mail attachments or WhatsApp messages and automatically encrypts 
every file (Ehrenfeld, 2017). Furthermore, Karen (2015) and Juniper Network (2011) 
argues that some mobile device users do not enable the security software that comes with 
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their mobile devices because they believe using their mobile device to surf the Internet is 
safer or as safe as surfing on their computers.  
 
6.2.2 Qualitative findings: ICT department personnel 
The interview conducted with the ICT department’s personnel confirms that there have 
been cases of security threats that involve hackers using a “keystroke logger” and “rogue 
device” from a remote area to access the organization’s resources (section 5.5.1.1). 
Ladakis et al. (2013) argue that keylogging is used to record typed characters on mobile 
devices in order to capture valuable or sensitive information such as a user’s 
identification, password and credit card numbers. The captured information is usually 
transferred to a cybercriminal e-mail address or website (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). 
Keylogging occurs when an attacker monitors and archives keystrokes in order to access 
sensitive information (Pratt Jr & Jones, 2013). On the other hand, a rogue device is an 
unauthorized connection of mobile devices to the network which poses a security threat 
to the organization (Golde et al., 2012). It is used to breach the key areas of security for 
mobile subscribers such as intercepting communication, impersonating traffic and 
tracking phones (Chen, Chen, Lin & Sun, 2014; Golde et al., 2012). This is a pointer to 
the fact that the organizations are vulnerable to any form of attacks.   
 
6.2.3 Qualitative findings: Executive managers 
From the interview conducted with the executive managers, three major technical 
practices exercised by the organization that lead to security threats are identified. Firstly, 
“there is no definite policy guiding the use of BYODs” (section 5.5.2.1). In other words, 
the organization lacks a BYOD policy guiding mobile device usage. Bello (2014) asserts 
that where there are no policies guiding the use of BYOD, security threats such as 
malware, phishing, and data leakage are inevitable. This confirms the security threats 
identified from employees (section 5.4.3). Supporting this claim, Vance et al. (2012) 
argue that owing to the liberty given to individuals to bring their own devices, most 
organizations are constantly facing several challenges in ensuring that the organizations’ 
information is protected.  
 
Secondly, “the organization provides laptops to individuals’ for official purpose as well 
as allowing employees to personally acquire their own mobile, but the organization does 
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not monitor or maintain this device” (section 5.5.2.1).  This implies that regardless of the 
organization-owned laptops given to individuals, they are allowed to acquire their own 
mobile devices and also maintain them personally.  However, the effect of allowing 
individuals to acquire their devices implies a lack of control over what is on individuals’ 
devices and a lack of control over the amount of information that should be stored at the 
endpoint of the mobile device (Astani et al., 2013). Similarly, these devices are not being 
monitored, neither are they being maintained by the organization. This implies that 
individuals are at liberty to do whatsoever they want with their mobile devices which 
includes downloading unapproved applications. Supporting this claim, CISCO (2013) 
reveals that 69 per cent of BYOD users have unapproved applications which makes it 
challenging for the ICT department’s personnel to track the applications running on these 
devices. According to Rogers (2012), most mobile device users jailbreak their devices in 
order to enjoy the flexibility of downloading preferred software or modifying the 
operating system. “Jailbreaking” allows users to install third-party applications that are 
unavailable on official vendor stores, modify the operating system and perform other 
operation that would normally be restricted or that the manufacturer would not have 
allowed (Rogers, 2012). The implication of jailbreaking is that some applications are 
malicious in nature and if downloads are not being monitored, information security can 
be jeopardized once these applications have been downloaded (Gharibi, 2012).  
 
Lastly, the finding reveals that “the organization does not have a specific operating 
system approved to be used” (section 5.5.2.1). The implication of this is that if some 
versions of an operating system no longer release updates or patches, it makes the device 
vulnerable to security threats such as malware, phishing and virus attacks (Gharibi, 2012). 
For example, patches on the latest versions of Windows give clues to vulnerabilities on 
older software that had not been discovered previously. 
 
6.2.4 Overview of technical security threats 
The section presents an overview of all the technical security threats identified.  The data 
collected through questionnaires from the bank employees identified the following 
security threats: data leakage, WiFi eavesdropping, phishing, viruses and malware. The 
data collected through interviews with ICT departments’ personnel identified keystroke 
logging and rogue devices. However, the data collected through interviews with executive 
managers did not specifically identify any threat, but the literature points outs some 
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security threats associated with their practices (section 6.2.3) which include malware, 
phishing, data leakage and jailbreaking. These security threats confirm the security threats 
identified through questionnaires from the bank employees. It is important to note that 
Nguyen et al. (2013) also identified unauthorized location tracking as one of the security 
threats associated with bank employees using their mobile devices outside the workplace 
(section 6.2.1). 
 
This section has been able to establish the fact that these technical security threats 
occurred as a result of individuals’ and organizations’ practices which relate to all 
categories of BYOD hardware and software technology used for work-related purposes. 
It has also been able to ascertain that some of these technical security threats occur as a 
result of individuals’ technical knowledge of the use of mobile devices. This suggests that 
there is a lack of adequate awareness and comprehension amongst employees on the 
severity and vulnerability of using mobile devices in a work context.  Supporting this 
claim, Astani et al. (2013) maintain that security awareness on BYODs is so poor that it 
leaves businesses vulnerable to security threats.  
 
6.3 Social security threats  
In this study, social security threats are threats emanating from employees’ attitudes and 
norms, and the organizations’ principles, policies and values that define the practices of 
individuals (i.e. employees). Whilst these threats are normally not well addressed because 
of their invisibility compared to other forms of security threats, it is important that 
organizations recognise their influence on the security system (Bello et al., 2015). 
Otherwise, they have the potential to expose organizations to other security threats owing 
to their association with people and their environment (Arregui et al., 2016). 
 
6.3.1 Quantitative findings 
From the data collected through questionnaires from the bank employees, three major 
social practices exercised by individuals (employees) that lead to security threats have 
been identified. Firstly, “Clicking on links”, “advertisement” and “videos/audios” on 
social media (question number 18 from the questionnaire) results in “data leakage”, 
“unsolicited malicious messages” and “access request to device resources” respectively 
(section 5.4.4.1). According to Chanda and Zaorski (2013), hackers coax unsuspecting 
individuals into clicking on links on social media in order to steal and sell confidential 
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information in exchange for financial gain, hence leading to data leakage. Aula (2010) 
argues that some of the personal and organization’s information made available on social 
media is being stolen by knowledgeable hackers who buy and sell the information in order 
to commit security breaches. Moreover, IBM (2014) describes the mass distribution of 
unsolicited malicious messages as “spamming”. In spamming, massive amounts of 
unsolicited messages are sent to unsuspecting people directing them to visit a website 
where they are asked to update personal information such as passwords, and credit card 
and personal information (Lin, Lin, Chiou & Liu, 2013). Spamming can easily be found 
on the Internet via social networking sites (Lin et al., 2013; Sheu, Chu, Li & Lee, 2017). 
In addition, “granting access request to device resources as part of the terms and 
condition to install” can be regarded as “jailbreaking” ( Rogers, 2012). Jailbreaking 
gives users the flexibility to download preferred software. However, some of these 
downloads are contaminated and they open the device up to security risks that can 
compromise sensitive data on the device (Rogers, 2012). Furthermore, if these devices 
are used in a BYOD-enabled environment, it will affect the information security of the 
organization (Arregui et al., 2016). Supporting this claim, Chanda and Zaorski (2013) 
reveal that when individuals access social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, 
WhatsApp, LinkedIn) through their devices for either work or personal purpose, they risk 
endangering the organization’s information by unknowingly acquiring “malware, viruses 
and spyware”. Additionally, hackers coax unsuspecting individuals into clicking on links, 
images, advertisements, videos, games or downloading free applications that covertly 
deliver spyware which infiltrates the organization’s entire system (Chanda & Zaorski, 
2013).   
 
Secondly, “attaching customer bank statement to e-mail/instant messages” (question 
number 19 from the questionnaire) results in “unauthorized modification of confidential 
information” (section 5.4.4.2). According to Du and Zhang (2006), unauthorized 
modification of confidential information is a form of “WiFi eavesdropping”.  This 
security threat is  concomitant with several earlier works that also confirm that while it is 
convenient for an employee to attach confidential information to e-mails or instant 
messaging, it can be dangerous to the information security of the organization because 
such attachments can be captured in transit and modified (Goverdhan & Sammulal, 2013).  
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Thirdly, “sharing of password with colleagues or friends/family” (question number 23 
from the questionnaire) results in “data leakage” (section 5.4.4.3). Supporting these 
findings, Notoatmodjo and Thomborson (2009) assert that the greatest volume of security 
breaches comes from employees’ inadvertently misusing data as a result of shared 
passwords (Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009). This implies that some employees 
casually share passwords in order to make their lives easier without any idea of how it 
might cause a security breach. They unknowingly share sensitive information that could 
fall into the wrong hands almost on a daily basis (Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009).  
 
6.3.2 Qualitative findings: ICT department personnel 
In contrast to the quantitative findings on social media (section 5.4.4.1) where individuals 
(i.e. employees) acknowledged that they click on links, advertisements and videos or 
audios on social media, the interviews conducted with the ICT department personnel have 
revealed that “the banks do not allow employees to use social media” (section 5.5.1.2). 
This is a clear indication of employees’ non-compliance. Most BYOD users use social 
media as a platform to interact with other colleagues or other users (Aula, 2010). 
Unfortunately, some of the personal and organization’s information that is made available 
on the social media is being stolen and used to commit security breaches, referred to as 
“data privacy violation” (Aula, 2010).  In addition, the interviews conducted with the 
ICT department personnel have revealed that “organization information backups are 
allowed on laptops as well as the bank’s server” (section 5.5.1.2). This is line with the 
quantitative results (section 5.4.3.3) where employees admit to saving work documents 
on laptops before uploading it to free cloud storage. However, Bakshi and Yogesh (2010) 
point out that free cloud storage services may pose a security threat such as data leakage 
(Bakshi & Yogesh, 2010). This is because such information can be stolen by a 
knowledgeable hacker while being uploaded into the cloud storage (Dimensional 
Research, 2013; Uz, 2014). These results satisfied the objective of utilizing mixed 
methods in this study owing to the limitations of mono methods (Creswell, 2013). 
However, while the portability of these mobile devices allows continuous access to work-
related functions and personal information from any location, it also leads to incidences 
of theft or loss (Karen, 2015). The implication of such lost or stolen mobile devices is 
that confidential information can be compromised by a malicious hacker (Karen, 2015). 
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Lastly, the interviews conducted with ICT department personnel reveal “employees’ non-
compliance to security policies” (section 5.5.1.2) which has resulted in “loss of 
confidential information”. Supporting this finding, CISCO (2009) confirms that 69 per 
cent of mobile device users do not comply with security policies: this has paved the way 
for hackers to penetrate and hack into the device. According to Ehimen and Bola (2010), 
employees’ non-compliance with security policies is a major challenge to any 
organization. Disterer and Kleiner (2013) argue that employees’ non-compliance is as a 
result of their inadequate knowledge of what constitutes a security threat. 
 
6.3.3 Qualitative findings: Executive managers 
From the interview conducted with the executive managers, three social practices 
exercised by the organization that lead to security threats have been identified. Firstly, 
“there is no specified interval for reviewing security policies” (section 5.5.2.2). In 
support of this finding, SAN (2001) affirms that the policies, standards, guidelines, and 
training materials that are not reviewed are “obsolete” and are particularly dangerous to 
any organization because management is often deceived into believing that security 
policies do not exist and that the organization is operating more effectively than it actually 
is. All organizations need to periodically review, test, and discard obsolete rules, controls, 
and procedures to avoid this false sense of security (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).   
 
Secondly, “disgruntled employees are only being monitored by their action” (section 
5.5.2.2). However, Cardenas et al. (2009) argue that merely monitoring disgruntled 
employees by actions may not be sufficient because the organization’s confidential 
information can easily be destroyed or compromised by a highly disgruntled employee. 
An employee normally becomes disgruntled owing to an unmet expectation or an 
unfortunate event such as been dismissed from work or not been promoted, or they could 
be dissatisfied with their current wages (CERT insider threat, 2015). Furthermore, 
disgruntled employees always have their target, which can either be the organization or a 
specific co-employee; whichever way, a disgruntled employee is a threat to any 
organization (Andrew & Kyle, 2015; CERT insider threat, 2015).  According to Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010), there should be strict security policies that relate to disgruntled employees 
and which must be reviewed regularly.  
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Lastly, “there are budget shortages in developing a security framework” (section 5.5.2.2). 
This establishes the fact that there is an issue with the security policy just as the study has 
confirmed “obsolete security policy” (section 6.2.3).  What this implies is that either the 
organization is ignorant of the potential security threats that can have a detrimental impact 
on the information security, or they are nonchalant about information security (Yayla & 
Hu, 2014). 
 
6.3.4 Overview of social security threats 
The section presents an overview of all the identified social security threats while the data 
collected from the bank employees through the questionnaire identified the following 
security threats: data leakage, spamming, jailbreaking and WiFi eavesdropping. The data 
collected through interviews with the ICT departments’ personnel identified employees’ 
non-compliance and loss of confidential information (i.e. data leakage). However, the 
data collected through interviews with executive managers did not specifically identify 
any particular threat but the literature point’s outs some security threats associated with 
their practices (section 6.3.3) which include obsolete security policies, budget shortages, 
and disgruntled employees. It is also important to note that the literature has established 
some other security threats that can also be found in the social domain which include 
malware, viruses and spyware, data privacy violation, data leakage and the sharing of 
passwords. These security threats confirm some of the technical threats identified (section 
6.2.1). Hence, all these security threats will be taken into consideration in the 
development of a security framework. 
 
This section has been able to establish the fact that these security threats relate to 
organizations’ principles, policies and values that define the practices of individuals (i.e. 
employees’). The organizations need to acknowledge that employees can be ‘the weakest 
link’ in the security environment because they fail to perform specified security functions 
owing to insufficient awareness (Johnston, Warkentin, McBride & Carter, 2016). 
Additionally, employees’ non-compliance is as a result of their inadequate knowledge of 
what constitutes a security threat (Kathleen, 2015). Thus, it is important for any 
organization to have adequate measures of security awareness. 
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6.4 Mobility security threats  
In this study, mobility threats refer to those threats associated with device location. These 
devices are connected to secure and unsecure networks where the security policies differ 
(Bello, 2015). In addition, they also refer to the security threats experienced with methods 
used to prepare mobile devices for disposal as well as methods used to dispose of mobile 
devices. 
 
6.4.1 Quantitative findings 
From the data collected through questionnaires from the bank employees, there are three 
major mobility practices exercised by individuals (employees) that lead to security 
threats. Two out of these three mobility practices, namely “methods used to prepare 
mobile device for disposal” (question number 24 in the questionnaire) and “methods 
employees’ used to dispose obsolete/faulty devices” (question number 25 in the 
questionnaire) have the same responses to a security threat which is “unauthorized 
modification of confidential information (i.e. WiFi eavesdropping)” and “data leakage” 
(sections 5.4.5.1 and 5.4.5.2 respectively). Supporting this claim, Gartner (2014) asserts 
that methods used to prepare mobile devices for disposal can result in security breaches 
which can be harmful to organizational systems and customers’ information when such 
device are disposed of. What this implies is that the method used to prepare a mobile 
device before disposal certainly determines whether such a device will be vulnerable to 
attack when disposed of. Supporting these findings, the UCSC (2015) confirms that there 
are several reports of mobile device disposal (i.e. e-waste) that contained sensitive 
information which has led to exposure of data (i.e. data leakage). Unfortunately, most 
employees are not aware of this and have ignorantly fallen victim of data leakage (Keys, 
2013). This implies that necessary precautions have to be taken to avoid these security 
threats. 
 
Lastly, “sharing mobile devices with colleagues” and “sharing mobile device with 
family/friends” (question 26 in the questionnaire) lead to “software making copies of 
itself on their device (i.e. virus attack)” and “personal information on their mobile device 
were used without their knowledge (i.e. phishing)” respectively (section 5.4.5.3). A virus 
has been defined as a computer program which can make a copy of itself without the 
user's consent (Lee, 2015). It can cause the loss of critical information as it negatively 
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alters the way the computer works (Ghosh, Gajar & Rai, 2013).  In addition, Khan (2013) 
referred to the situation where personal information on the mobile device is used without 
users’ consent as “phishing”. It is also important to note that when these devices are 
shared with colleagues or family and friends to check e-mails, social media or do other 
personal work, they can come across some confidential information (e.g. personal 
identification number) which can be retrieved and used without the knowledge of the 
owner (Ghosh et al., 2013). Thus, the study highlights the importance of awareness 
because phishing is not just a technical issue but also a mobility issue. 
 
6.4.2 Qualitative findings: ICT department personnel 
Contrary to the quantitative findings on the sharing of mobile devices (section 5.4.5.3) 
where employees admitted they share mobile devices, the interviews conducted with the 
ICT department personnel have revealed that “employees’ are not allowed to share their 
mobile devices” (section 5.5.1.3). This implies that employees do not comply with the 
organizations’ policy regarding sharing mobile devices. According to Karen (2015), most 
employees share their mobile devices that contain sensitive information without realizing 
the adverse effect.  
 
Furthermore, the qualitative findings reveal that there have been cases of “lost/stolen 
devices” that were reported but not recovered (5.5.1.3). Supporting this finding, Juniper 
Network (2011) confirms that there have been several cases of security breaches as a 
result of lost or stolen devices in every sector, especially the banking sector. The 
implication of lost or stolen devices that contain confidential information is that it can be 
compromised by a malicious hacker (Juniper Network, 2011). 
 
Again, the qualitative findings for ICT department personnel reveal “how security issues 
caused by lost/stolen device was addressed” (section 5.5.1.3). Unfortunately, the banks 
were unable to address security issues caused by lost or stolen devices (section 5.5.1.3) 
because these devices were not registered in the first place. If the device had been 
registered, the bank would have been able to remotely wipe off confidential data from the 
device using the device International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) code (Friedman 
& Hoffman, 2008). Remote wipe can be used to either permanently delete data on a lost 
mobile device or recover the device (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). However, before using 
these functionalities, it is recommended there should be a policy for this technology 
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asking users to sign a consent form (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). This is because remote 
wipe could put users’ personal data at risk (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). 
 
Lastly, the qualitative findings for the ICT department personnel reveal that “employees 
are allowed to dispose their faulty/obsolete device by themselves” (section 5.5.1.3). This 
finding is in affirmation of the findings from the executive manager, namely “there is no 
policy guiding employees’ disposal of mobile device” (section 5.5.2.3.). The UCSC 
(2015) warns that the improper disposal of devices that contain a wealth of useful 
information can cause a security breach if they fall into wrong hands.  
 
6.4.3 Qualitative findings: Executive manager 
From the interview conducted with the executive managers, three major mobility 
practices exercised by the organization that lead to security threats were identified. 
Firstly, “there is no policy that guides lost/stolen device” (section 5.5.2.3). In other words, 
the bank does nothing to retrieve lost or stolen devices (section 5.5.2.3). This implies that 
the organization is nonchalant about missing devices. This could be as a result of a lack 
of awareness of what constitutes a security threat or inadequately crafted policy (Ghosh 
et al., 2013). 
 
Secondly, “there is no policy guiding sharing of mobile devices” (section 5.5.2.3). This 
confirms the quantitative findings which also revealed that employees share mobile 
devices with colleagues, family and friends (section 5.4.5.3). This happens as a result of 
a lack of policy guiding the sharing of mobile devices. This implies that employees are at 
liberty to share their devices. However, the sharing of mobile devices with colleagues or 
family and friends has resulted in the security threats as identified in the quantitative 
analysis (section 5.4.5.3). 
 
Lastly, the interview conducted with the executive managers affirms that “that there is 
no policy that guides employees’ disposal of mobile devices” (section 5.5.2.3.). This 
finding confirms the qualitative findings from the ICT department personnel, namely 
“employees are allowed to dispose of their mobile devices by themselves” (section 
5.5.1.3.). This also confirms employees’ responses in the questionnaire where they 
acknowledged using different methods to dispose of their mobile devices has led to 
security threats (section 5.4.5.2). 
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6.4.4 Overview of mobility security threats 
The section presents an overview of all the mobility security threats identified.  The data 
collected through the questionnaire from the bank employees identified the following 
security threats: WiFi eavesdropping, data leakage, viruses and phishing. The data 
collected through interviews with the ICT departments’ personnel identified the sharing 
of mobile devices, lost or stolen devices and faulty or obsolete devices as threats. 
Similarly, the data collected through interviews with executive managers identified lost/ 
or stolen devices, the sharing of mobile devices and the disposal of mobile devices (e-
waste) as security threats. It is important to note that most of the security threats identified 
from the executive managers’ findings confirm the security threats from the ICT 
department personnel. 
 
This section has been able to establish the fact that most of these identified security threats 
occurred as a result of individual (employees) and organization practices which relate to 
travelling from one location to another, methods used to prepare mobile devices before 
disposal and methods used to dispose of mobile devices. These findings show that there 
is inadequate awareness amongst individuals and organizations regarding the severity and 
vulnerability of using mobile devices outside the work environment as well as methods 
used to dispose of mobile devices. In support of this finding, some studies have argued 
whether individuals should be allowed to access or connect to the organizations’ network 
with their mobile devices (Astani et al., 2013). The study thus recommends that 
organizations should have an awareness sensitization framework that conscientizes its 
employees (individual) on the threats posed to the institution as a result of the 
aforementioned practices. 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter concludes that there are some security threats that are peculiar to only one 
domain (i.e. they affect one domain at a time), whilst some security threats are related to 
two domains (i.e. they affect two domains at a time). Additionally, there are some security 
threats that are related to all three domains (i.e. they are common to three domains and 
only affect three domains at a time), hence a threat classification is required to give an 
understanding of the influence of these security threats. Additionally, in as much as 
organizations may have substantial knowledge of the subject of BYOD, research findings 
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have shown that individuals are either still not aware of the possible threats associated 
with BYOD or decide to ignore them. Most employees who bring their personal devices 
to the workplace to access organizations’ information are not fully aware of what 
constitutes security threats. In addition, the organization does not ensure employees’ 
compliance to security policies because they do not understand the severity of these 
security threats. Lack of awareness is capable of infiltrating all the risk regions regardless 
of the powerful firewalls, proxy servers and encryptions the organization may have 
(Elwess, 2015). However, it is important to know the influence of these security threats 
on the banking sector.  Hence, the outcome of the data analysis and the interpretation 
were used to answer the fourth research question which gave rise to the development of 
the security awareness framework (chapter 7). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THREE-DIMENSIONAL (3-D) SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK FOR BYOD ENABLED BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
IN NIGERIA 
  
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter attempts to answer the fourth research question (section 1.4) by developing 
a security framework for the Nigerian banking sector based on the outcome of the 
research findings. Hence, the following five steps were followed:  
 
Firstly, a broad classification of threats based on the influence of technical, social and 
mobility domains on the Nigerian banking sector is established in section 7.2. Threats’ 
classifications are important in identifying the impact of the security threat at the various 
risk levels such as low risk, medium risk and high risk (Jouini, Rabai & Aissa, 2014). 
Moreover, it takes into consideration the security threats that threaten the systems and 
assists in understanding the appropriate capabilities and countermeasures per security 
impacts to reduce risks (Gerić & Hutinski, 2007).  
 
Secondly, the classified security threats were further grouped based on individual and 
organization practices. This is to help in distinguishing the security threats that are 
specific to individual practices from organization practices as presented in sections 7.3 
and 7.4 respectively. In addition, it helps the organizations to identify threats which 
influence their information systems and the areas which each threat could affect as a result 
of their practices and hence to protect their systems in advance (Jouini et al., 2014). 
Likewise, it gives the individuals a better understanding of threats and how to curtail 
practices that expose their mobile devices to vulnerabilities (Jouini et al., 2014).  
 
Thirdly, solutions to the classified security threats as they relate to individual and 
organization practices are discussed in sections 7.5 and 7.6 respectively. In a BYOD-
enabled environment, information security is critical for both individuals and 
organizations (Peltier, 2010). Whilst no one organization is immune to security threats, 
there is an urgency to proffer solutions that can mitigate against these security threats 
(Gerić & Hutinski, 2007). Hence the study proposes suitable countermeasures to mitigate 
the security threats.  
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Fourthly, the representation of the activities involved in device management as they relate 
to both individual and organization practices are presented in section 7.7.  These activities 
include device acquisition, device monitoring, device maintenance and device disposal. 
Each activity enforces a connection between individual and organization. This is 
important as multiple systems are required to complete each activity involved in the 
management process for the various set of devices running several operating systems, 
which frequently leads to increased disintegration of data, workflows and processes 
between the systems in place (Miradore, 2016). 
 
Lastly, a 3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in Nigeria is 
incrementally developed from section 7.2 and presented in section 7.8. This framework 
encompasses the security threats and their corresponding security solutions as well as the 
stages involved in device management with respect to both individual and organization 
practices. A security framework that captures the security threats has the potential to 
protect the banking sector from the security threats that can harm their business and 
expose them to significant market and revenue losses (Jouini et al., 2014).   
 
7.2 Security threats classification 
Threats classification is a representation of threats in diagrams or charts in order to 
enhance the organization’s understanding (Margaret, 2013). It is a tool for 
communicating specific risks an organization is undertaking (Jouini et al., 2014). The 
goal of threats classification is to inform the organization of the various risk levels and 
their impact on the organization (Margaret, 2013). Thus, this study adopts a threats 
classification technique in exploring the influence of technical, social and mobility 
security threats in the Nigerian banking sector because it gives a clearer pictorial 
representation of the security threats that helps enhances the organization’s 
understanding. It also creates security consciousness of the various risk levels of the 
security threats and how these affect the organization. 
 
Hence, based on the discussion from the research findings in chapter six, security threats 
were considered under three major domains (i.e. technical, social and mobility). The 
following security threats, namely data leakage, WiFi eavesdropping, unauthorized 
location tracking, phishing, viruses, malware, jailbreaking, keylogging and rogue devices 
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(section 6.1) were identified under the technical domain. Similarly, data leakage, 
spamming, jailbreaking, WiFi eavesdropping, data privacy violation, malware, viruses, 
spyware, obsolete security policies, budget shortages, disgruntled employees, sharing of 
passwords, and employees’ non-compliance (section 6.2) were identified under the social 
domain. Finally, WiFi eavesdropping, data leakage, viruses, malware, phishing, sharing 
of mobile devices, lost or stolen devices, faulty or obsolete devices and e-waste (section 
6.3) were identified under the mobility domain. 
 
From the above-mentioned security threats, there are some security threats that are 
specific to only one domain (i.e. they are  common to only one domain and  affect one 
domain at a time), whilst there are some security threats that are related to two domains 
(i.e. they are  common to two domains and  affect two domains at a time). Additionally, 
there are some security threats that are related to all three domains (i.e. they are common 
to three domains and affect all three domains at a time), hence a threat classification is 
required to give an understanding of the influence of these security threats. Furthermore, 
it will also be used to identify different risk levels, namely low, medium and high risk.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Broad classification of threats  
 
 
 
Low risk (LR) 
Medium risk (MR)  
High risk (HR) 
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Low risk 
Goguen, Stoneburner and Feringa (2017) describe low risk (LR) security threats as threats 
that have little or no impact on information security systems. Similarly, in this study, LR 
represents those security threats that are specific to each domain: they do not affect more 
than one domain at a time (Figure 7.1). These include technical, social and mobility 
domains. The security threats that are specific to each of these domains are discussed as 
follows. 
 
Technical threats are threats associated with software and hardware which are the core 
component of an organization’s BYOD (Ketel & Shumate, 2015). Hence, key logging 
and rogue devices are technical threats which occur only in the technical domain. 
Similarly, social threats are threats emanating from people’s attitudes and organizations’ 
policies (Ifinedo, 2012). Whilst these threats are normally not well addressed because of 
their invisibility compared to other forms of security threats, it is important that 
organizations recognize their influence on the security system (Bello et al., 2015). Hence, 
employees’ non-compliance, disgruntled employees, obsolete security policies and 
budget shortages are social threats which occur only in the social domain. Likewise, 
mobility threats refer to those threats associated with device location (Ghosh et al., 2013). 
These devices are connected to secure and unsecure networks where the security policies 
differ (Bello et al., 2015). In addition, they also refer to the security threats associated 
with methods used to prepare mobile devices for disposal as well as methods used to 
dispose of mobile devices. Hence, lost or stolen devices, faulty or obsolete devices, and 
e-waste are mobility threats which occur only in the mobility domain.  
 
Thus, technical, social and mobility domains can be regarded as LR domains because the 
security threats are only related to one domain; they do not affect more than one domain 
at a time (Yang & Yao, 2009). Thus, LR are security threats that are harmful but not to 
the same extent as the other two risks that will be discussed later, namely medium risk 
(MR) and high risk (HR) (Ghosh et al., 2013).   
 
Medium risk 
Security threats are classified as medium risk (MR) if their impact on information security 
system is moderate (Goguen et al., 2017), in other words, if they are not considered to be 
high risk.  In this study, MR represents those security threats that affect two domains at a 
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time (Figure 7.1). These include the socio-technical, pervasive and e-commuting 
domains. Hence, the security threats that are common to two domains will be identified 
and the literature will be referred to where necessary to properly assign the security threats 
that best fit these domains.  
 
Sociotechnical threats are threats that are common to social and technical domains (Figure 
7.1). The relationship is such that these security threats involve people communicating 
with one another through the use of network technology rather than the natural world, 
hence it is can be referred to as sociotechnical (Appelbaum, 1997; Ostwald, 2017). Thus, 
security threats such as jailbreaking, WiFi eavesdropping, data privacy violation and 
spamming are related to two domains (social and technical) and are considered under the 
sociotechnical domain.  
 
Similarly, pervasive threats are threats that are common to social and mobility domains 
(Figure 7.1). The relationship is such that the interaction is between people and devices, 
hence it is can be referred to as pervasive (Urry, 2012). Thus, the sharing of mobile 
devices is related to two domains (i.e. social and mobility) and is considered under the 
pervasive domain. 
 
 Likewise, e-commuting threats are threats that are common to technical and mobility 
domains (Figure 7.1). This relationship is such that the threats occur as a result of work 
undertaken at a location while using mobile technology, hence it can be referred to as e-
commuting (Raffaele & Connell, 2016). Thus, security threats such as unauthorized 
location tracking, phishing and spyware are related to two domains (i.e. technical and 
mobility) and are considered under the e-commuting domain.  
 
Hence, sociotechnical, pervasive and e-commuting domains can be regarded as MR 
domains because the security threats are only common to two domains and can bring 
down the two domains at the same time if the right security measures are not put in place 
(Ghosh et al., 2013). Thus, MR are security threats that are harmful but not to the same 
extent as the High Risk (HR) and are more harmful than LR (Goguen et al., 2017).   
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High risk 
High risk (HR) security threats are threats that could have a significant impact on 
information security systems if the right security measures are not put in place (Goguen 
et al., 2017). Thus, in this study, HR represents those security threats that affect the three 
domains at a time, hence they are referred to as a lack of awareness domain (Figure 7.1). 
The following security threats are considered under the lack of awareness domain, namely 
data leakage, viruses and malware. It is important to note that a lack of awareness is a 
fundamental issue responsible for most of the identified security threats that emanate from 
all categories of BYOD hardware, software, database and network technology (Astani et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, “unavailable network during the cause of interaction” (section 
5.4.6) which is being referred to as ‘denial of service’ is also related to three domains (i.e. 
technical, social and mobility). The relationship is such that denial of service (DoS) 
involves someone who is technologically knowledgeable to be able to disrupt or make 
unavailable network resources intended for users (Dittrich, Reiher & Dietrich, 2004). In 
addition, “receiving messages stating that they have won a prize and should call a number 
or click a link to redeem the prize” (section 5.4.6) which is referred to as the ‘Wangiri 
scam also affects the three domains at the same time. The Wangiri scam is a type of phone 
fraud where the perpetrator dials random mobile numbers and then hangs up after one 
ring to give a missed call on the recipient’s phone (Geldenhuys, 2016). When the recipient 
returns this call (believing it to be a legitimate call), an avalanche of spam messages is 
triggered (Zhang, 2017). However, this can only happen when the individual or 
organization is not adequately informed of these security threats; hence it can be 
considered under the lack of awareness domain (Kathleen, 2015). 
 
The lack of awareness domain is considered a HR domain because it affects the three 
domains at the same time which can be very harmful to the organization (Ghosh et al., 
2013). Kathleen (2015) argues that lack of awareness is a major factor attributed to most 
security threats. Thus, it is very important for individuals and organizations to understand 
the risk level associated with the classified threats.  
 
Based on the above-mentioned risk levels (i.e. low, medium and high), the study has been 
able to establish the influence of these security threats associated with technical, social 
and mobility domains on the Nigerian banking sector. Hence, both individuals and 
organizations need to be well informed of these security threats and take the necessary 
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precautions. Supporting this claim, Rose (2013) asserts that most employees that bring 
their mobile devices to the workplace to access organizations’ information are not fully 
aware of what constitutes security risk. Some employees are completely unaware of the 
type of device allowed to be used in an organization as well as the security policies 
guiding those devices (Ray, 2014). Obviously, this lack of awareness is a major challenge 
that leads to some arguments among the researchers whether employees should be 
allowed to access or connect to the organizations’ network with their mobile devices 
(Astani et al., 2013). Some studies also reveal that most networks have been hacked as a 
result of employees accessing organizations’ information from their mobile devices 
(Astani et al., 2013; Ehimen & Bola, 2010). Although this study identified some security 
measures put in place such as firewalls, antivirus software, antispyware, proxy servers 
and intrusion detection systems (section 5.5.1.1), these are effective for mobile security 
but are not sufficient and may not address employees’ and organizations’ lack of 
awareness (Granneman, 2013). Furthermore, the findings reveal some areas that need 
more security focus which include the banks’ network systems and customer databases 
(section 5.5.1.1). This also justifies the fact that the existing security measures are not 
sufficient, hence a security framework is required. However, in order to effectively 
develop this security framework, the classified security threats are grouped based on 
individual and organizational practices in sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. This is done 
in order to distinguish the security threats that are specific to individual practices from 
organization practices to be able to proffer solutions accordingly. 
 
7.3 Threats based on individual practices 
In this study, the security threats for individual practices are discussed under the classified 
threats which includes technical, social, mobility, sociotechnical, pervasive, e-commuting 
and lack of awareness threats.  
 
Technical threats represent those threats that relate to susceptible device usage (Figure 
7.2). Keystroke logging is considered under susceptible device usage. However, 
browsers’ exploits and drive-by downloads can also be considered under susceptible 
device usage (Thilagavathi & Saradha, 2014). This is because they are associated with 
hardware, software and network technology (Ketel & Shumate, 2015).  
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Social threats relate to sabotage behaviour (Figure 7.2) such as employees’ non-
compliance and disgruntled employees. However, they are not limited to the above-
mentioned; other social threats such as insider abuse and employees’ sabotage can also 
be considered under sabotage behaviour (Matthew, 2013). This is because they are 
associated with individuals’ attitudes (Ifinedo, 2012).  
 
Mobility threats represent those threats that relate to device misuse (Figure 7.2). Hence, 
faulty or obsolete devices and lost or stolen devices are considered under device misuse. 
However, using recycled or pre-owned mobile devices can be also considered under 
device misuse (Kearns, 2016). Although recycling is generally considered to be a good 
thing, however when it comes to recycling mobile devices, it can constitute a security 
threat (Ghosh et al., 2013).  
 
Sociotechnical threats are threats that are associated with data protection violation (Figure 
7.2). The following security threats are considered under data protection violation, 
namely data privacy violation and jailbreaking. However, ‘Man-in-the-middle’ (MITM) 
can also be considered under data protection violation because it involves people 
communicating with one another through the use of network technology (Appelbaum, 
1997; Ostwald, 2017).  
 
Pervasive threats represent those threats that relate to ethical violation (Figure 7.2). 
Hence, the sharing of mobile devices is considered under ethical violations. However, 
other pervasive threats such as e-mail or instant messaging violation can be considered 
under ethical violations because it involves the interaction of people with devices (Urry, 
2012). 
 
E-commuting threats relate to location-based threats (Figure 7.2).  Phishing and spyware 
are considered to be location-based threats. However, they are not limited to the above-
mentioned; electronic eavesdropping can also be considered under location-based threats 
because it can occur as a result of work undertaken at a location while using mobile 
technology (Raffaele & Connell, 2016).  
 
Lack of awareness represents those threats that relate to obliviousness as a result of 
individual practices. These include data leakage, Wangiri scam, viruses and malware. 
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These security threats occur as a result of individual obliviousness. However, they are not 
limited to the above-mentioned as employees’ ignorance, carelessness and non-
compliance (Ray, 2015) can also be attributed to a lack of awareness.   
 
   
 
Figure 7.2: Threats based on individual practices  
 
7.4 Threats based on organization practices 
Again, the security threats for organization practices are presented under the classified 
threats which include technical, social, mobility, sociotechnical, pervasive, e-commuting 
and lack of awareness threats.  
 
Technical threats represent those threats that relate to unrestricted device connectivity 
(Figure 7.3). Hence, a rogue device is considered under unrestricted device connectivity. 
Nevertheless, other technical threats such as script kiddies and network disruption can 
also be considered under unrestricted device connectivity because they are associated 
with hardware, software and network technology (Ketel & Shumate, 2015). 
 
Social threats represent those threats that relate to the lack of an ICT policy (Figure 7.3).  
Obsolete security policies and budget shortages can be considered under a lack of an ICT 
 152 
 
policy because they are associated with organizations’ principles, policies and values 
(Ifinedo, 2012). 
 
Mobility threats represent those security threats that relate to vulnerable remote devices 
(Figure 7.3). E-waste and lost or stolen devices are considered under vulnerable remote 
devices. However, they are not limited to the abovementioned; a defunct device can also 
be considered under vulnerable remote devices (Kearns, 2016).  
 
Sociotechnical threats represent those security threats that relate to poor access control 
(Figure 7.3).  Hence, WiFi eavesdropping and spamming are considered under poor 
access control. However, cyber stalking can also be considered under sociotechnical 
threats because it involves people communicating with one another through the use of 
network technology rather than the natural world (Appelbaum, 1997; Ostwald, 2017). 
 
Pervasive threats relate to ICT policy violation (Figure 7.3). Sharing of passwords is 
considered under ICT policy violation. However, other pervasive threats such as data 
ownership violation and office e-mail violation can also be considered under ICT policy 
violation (Urry, 2012).  
 
E-commuting threats relate to location-based intrusion (Figure 7.3). Hence, unauthorized 
location tracking is considered under location-based intrusion. Likewise, Trackmageddon 
flaws can be considered under location-based intrusion because they occur as a result of 
work undertaken at a location while using mobile technology (Raffaele & Connell, 2016).   
 
Lack of awareness represents those threats that relate to laxity as a result of organization 
practices. These include denial of service and data leakage. They are not limited to the 
above-mentioned security threats as zero-day exploits can also occur as result of software 
flaws if the organization is  not security conscious (Raffaele & Connell, 2016). Likewise, 
an organization’s ignorance and carelessness (Ray, 2015) can be attributed to a lack of 
awareness.   
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Figure 7.3: Threats-based organization practices 
 
7.5 Solutions for threats arising from individual practices 
In this study, the solutions to threats for individual practices are presented under technical, 
social, mobility, sociotechnical, pervasive, e-commuting and security awareness 
domains. 
 
The technical solution refers to those security measures that relate to prescriptive device 
usage (Figure 7.4). This study proffers prescriptive device usage for individuals based on 
the security threats classified under susceptible device usage for individual practices 
(section 7.3). Although existing security measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems and proxy servers are effective for mobile security, they are not sufficient 
(Kearns, 2016). Sipponen (2000) laments that organizations are still struggling to reach a 
point where the workforce would internalize and follow given guidelines; as a result 
employees are still unaware of policies or they fail to apply them (Kearns, 2016). Thus, 
this study recommends prescriptive device usage for individuals. Individuals are expected 
to show full prescriptive commitment by adhering to organization security policies when 
using mobile devices in the workplace. Prescriptive commitment can take different forms 
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such as having individuals who will avoid installing unnecessary applications, avoid 
sharing organization’s confidential information especially over unprotected networks, 
avoid jailbreaking, and have good physical control of mobile devices. This is an additional 
security measure to the existing security measures which include password 
authentication, personal firewall and antivirus software (Gui-Hong et al., 2010).  
 
Social solutions refer to those security measures that relate to work agreement (Figure 
7.4). This study recommends work agreement for individuals based on the security threats 
classified under sabotage behaviour for individual practices (section 7.3). According to 
Johnston et al. (2016), individuals are the “weakest link” in the security environment 
because they fail to perform specified security behaviours owing to insufficient 
awareness. Allowing employees to use their mobile devices for work purposes has raised 
several concerns (Silvergate & Salner, 2011). In a BYOD context, the concerns 
emphasize addressing the existing policies, regulations and legislations between 
employers and employees (Lebek et al., 2013). The BYOD philosophy causes violations 
of working hour regulations because employees are forever connected to jobs, even after 
working hours (Silvergate & Salner, 2011). Employees are able to access work materials 
on weekends, even on vacations. Consequently, this can lead to employees’ demanding 
compensation for the expanded working hours (Silvergate & Salner, 2011). However, 
failure by the organization to compensate employees for the expanded working hours can 
lead to sabotage, industrial actions or even litigations by employees (to section 7.3). In 
addition, there is an assumption that employees are concerned about being liable when 
corporate information gets lost and when employees lose or damage their devices (Lebek 
et al., 2013). In order to avoid sabotage, industrial actions or even litigation, it is advisable 
in the interest of industrial harmony that employees request a review of working 
conditions from employers to accommodate demands which are associated with BYOD.  
 
Mobility solutions refer to those security measures that relate to device protection (Figure 
7.4). This study recommends device protection for individuals based on the security 
threats classified under device misuse for individual practices (section 7.3). Some 
organizations have introduced policies on individuals’ use of mobile devices and data, 
thereby contributing to specific sections of the organization’s handbook (Herath & Rao, 
2009). Individual are expected to comply with the stipulated policy guiding the usage of 
mobile device; failure to do so puts the organization at significant risk (Herath & Rao, 
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2009). Furthermore, it is very important for individuals to enable mobile device security 
software such as anti-virus software or malware and personal firewalls. Antivirus 
software is used as a signature-based detection in a computer system or mobile device to 
identify, prevent and take action to remove malicious software programs, such as viruses, 
malware and worms (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). An anti-virus program is known to 
scan several files on user’s system to identify matches between each file’s code and those 
in the signature database. Such identified matches are flagged as malware (Friedman & 
Hoffman, 2008). In addition, Friedman and Hoffman (2008) describe the role of a firewall 
on mobile devices as blocking the use of WiFi, Bluetooth and phone communication. A 
firewall is a software program or piece of hardware used to protect corporate resources 
from outside intruders (hackers, viruses, and worms) that try to reach the computer over 
the Internet (Clark, 2013). Security software has been known to help prevent security 
threats associated with mobile devices, hence it is advisable that individuals be more 
security conscious by enabling the security software on their mobile devices. It is also 
important that they abide by the conditions of use stipulated in the licenses that come with 
the software.  
 
Sociotechnical solutions refer to those security measures that relate to data protection 
measures (Figure 7.4). This study recommends data protection measures for individuals 
based on the security threats classified under data protection violation for individual 
practices (section 7.3). It is important to protect confidentiality of corporate data on 
BYODs. Data encryption at rest and in motion helps to prevent data loss in the case of 
stolen or lost devices (Gui-Hong et al., 2010). Thus, it is recommended that individuals 
ensure that sensitive data such as passwords, login information and accounts must by no 
means travel unencrypted over a wireless system. This is to protect the data from hackers 
as a wireless system can be easily sniffed and thus compromised. Furthermore, the 
technical procedures and measures used for managing cryptographic keys should be 
effective (Nunoo, 2013). 
 
Pervasive solutions refer to those security measures that relate to ethical principles 
(Figure 7.4). This study recommends ethical principles for individuals based on the 
security threats classified under ethical violation for individual practices (section 7.3). 
Ethical principles and values shape an organization’s definition of acceptable behaviour 
(Dittrich & Kenneally, 2012). Hence, it is very important for individuals to have a robust 
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ethics and compliance initiative in a BYOD environment where mobile devices are used 
to enhance business operations. Some considerations for an individual determining an 
ethical principle and compliance initiative include being in accordance with the standards 
or rules for right conduct or practice, especially the standards of a profession (Dittrich & 
Kenneally, 2012). It also incorporates the values that most people associate with ethical 
behaviour such as being law abiding, honest and having integrity. 
 
E-commuting solutions refer to those security measures that relate to data obfuscation 
(Figure 7.4). This study recommends data obfuscation for individuals based on the 
security threats classified under location-based threats for individual practices (section 
7.3).  Data obfuscation can help to safeguard confidential data by making it “harder to 
understand” (Drape, 2004). It is recommended that individuals ensure data security by 
obfuscating confidential data on their mobile devices. Location-based services collect 
location-related data and transmit it without the user’s consent or knowledge 
(Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). This does not only raise concerns about vendor ethics 
and privacy, but also about what other kinds of sensitive data that applications may be 
transmitting without the employees’ knowledge or consent (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 
2014). Although location data helps mobile networks route calls faster and more 
efficiently, employees are going suddenly to find many useful tools are not so useful 
without location services. Furthermore, most mobile devices come with turn-on location 
services by default, but they all provide the option to turn them off (Su, 2016). It is 
advisable that individuals be aware of how applications (apps) use and share data with 
just a vague click-through agreement during installation (Su, 2016). Apps that are allowed 
to access communication networks may pose a risk to data security and 
organizations’ compliance (Gharibi, 2012). 
 
Awareness refers to those security measures that create consciousness. It is very important 
that every employee should understand and comply with security policies and guidelines 
laid down by the organization. According to Ehimen and Bola (2010), the issue of non-
compliance with security policies is a major challenge to most organizations. CISCO 
(2015) confirms that 69 per cent of mobile device users do not comply with security 
policies: this has paved the way for hackers to penetrate and hack into the device. 
However, Disterer and Kliner (2013) argue that employees’ non-compliance is as a result 
of their inadequate knowledge of what constitutes a security threat. Hence, having 
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revealed what constitutes security threats and the various risk levels, it is recommended 
that employees comply with the proffered solutions to these security threats as discussed 
in section 7.5. In addition, it is advisable that employees comply with the security policy 
and guidelines laid down by the organization. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Solution for threats based on individual practices 
 
7.6 Solution for threats arising from organization practices 
In this study, the solutions to threats for organization practices are presented under 
technical, social, mobility, sociotechnical, pervasive, e-commuting and security 
awareness domains. 
 
The technical solution represents those security measures that relate to restricted device 
connectivity (Figure 7.5). This study recommends restricted device connectivity for the 
organization as an additional security measure for technical solutions based on the 
security threats classified under unrestricted connectivity for organization practices 
(section 7.4). Restricting device connectivity is among the most significant of the security 
measures as individuals currently enjoy almost unrestrained access to networks and 
organizations’ data at all times (Kearns, 2016). It is essential for organizations to monitor 
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and reject unauthorized and illegal access of corporate data. Unauthorized access comes 
from insiders (employees) when they are not supposed to access corporate data (Kearns, 
2016). Illegal access comes from outsiders when they want to recover corporate data 
stored on a device, e.g. malicious users try to steal data from a lost device.  Restricting 
device connectivity can be implemented to ensure each individual can only access 
information remotely that is consistent with limited privilege. Restricting device 
connectivity can include the following processes: device identification (e.g. International 
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)), device ownership and device operating systems. 
These processes will ensure that rogue mobile devices do not gain unauthorized access. 
Furthermore, this study recommends a service-oriented approach (SOA) for the 
organization as an additional security measure. A SOA automatically downloads all the 
security measures when an employee’s ‘approved device’ is connected to the 
organization’s network and makes it active on the employee’s device.  
 
Social solutions represent those security measures that relate to establishing an ICT policy 
for an organization (Figure 7.5). This study proffers establishing an ICT policy based on 
the security threats classified under lack of an ICT policy for organization practices 
(section 7.4). Research findings reveal that organizations lack an ICT policy to insure 
data protection against threats created by the practice of BYOD (section 5.5.2.1). This 
lack of an ICT policy exposes the organization to security threats including malware and 
virus attacks, phishing, data leakage, compromised systems and services, and even 
criminal liability (Enisa, 2014; Yeh & Chang, 2007). It is important for an organization 
to create a well-defined ICT policy beyond a formal policy of a simple list of best 
practices. The policy should be designed to explain policy procedures and protect users 
from any unacceptable behaviours or mismanagement of these technologies by users.  The 
process of creating an ICT policy should be in line with the Nigerian national policy for 
information technology and endorsed by the senior management; otherwise compliance 
will be difficult to maintain or achieved. However, it is not the responsibility of the IT 
team to create an ICT policy; rather it should be a steering team charged with the 
responsibility of pinpointing vital areas to address in the policy (Enisa, 2014). The IT 
team plans and implements the technical controls to follow the policy while the auditors 
decide whether the controls are compliant or not (Enisa, 2014).  Once the policy has been 
created by the team, it must be enforced and followed (Yeh & Chang, 2007). The penalty 
for wilful non-compliance should be outlined in the policy and be circulated all over the 
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organization so employees are aware of it.  It is important for an organization to review 
this policy at regular intervals. Furthermore, it is recommended that the policy 
encompasses adequate budget availability to update and maintain IT infrastructure. The 
cost of maintenance of an infrastructure asset can be determined by how well it was 
designed, its fitness for purpose, the quality of construction, and the materials specified 
and used and not just by the capacity, nature and size of that infrastructure (Su, 2016). 
 
Mobility solutions represent those security measures that relate to vulnerable remote 
devices (Figure 7.5). This study proffers remote device management for the organization 
as an additional security measure for mobility solutions based on the security threats 
classified under vulnerable remote devices for organization practices (section 7.4).  It is 
essential for every organization to protect devices that contain confidential information 
of corporate data used within a BYOD environment. In order to protect the device, Su 
(2016) opines that the organization can remove the native application (app) stores that 
come with the device operating system and instead provide a company one which only 
has approved (whitelisted) apps that users can download. This removes issues around 
licensing as the app store will only feature paid and licensed (where necessary for 
corporate use) apps. If an unlisted app is required, the administrator (or licensing 
committee) can consider making it available via to the app store once it has been vetted, 
tested, approved and licensed for use (Su, 2016).    
 
Furthermore, it is recommended that certain device types that have not been built with 
tough security levels should not be allowed to contact the corporate network. In addition, 
mobile device disposal should be properly handled in order to avoid a detrimental effect 
on the organization (Keys, 2013). The methods used to prepare mobile devices for 
disposal will either increase or reduce the risks of attacks when they are disposed of 
(Keys, 2013). It is important that the organization should take absolute precautions when 
preparing mobile devices for disposal or else it may expose confidential information to 
unnecessary and entirely preventable security threats. Some of the precautions 
recommended that can be taken include formatting the storage devices, replacing the hard 
drive of the device or resetting the device to the factory default setting. It is also 
recommended that the organization have an e-waste management system put in place. 
Such a system should deal carefully with measures for mobile device disposal under any 
circumstances that do not pose a security threat to the organization or the environment. 
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Furthermore, the organization should endeavour to be updated with the latest scientific 
knowledge on the safe management of mobile device waste by undertaking more training 
in e-waste management (Keys, 2013).  
 
Sociotechnical solutions refer to those security measures that relate to access control 
management (Figure 7.5). This study recommends access control management for the 
organization as an additional security measure for sociotechnical solutions based on the 
security threats classified under poor access control for organization practices (section 
7.4). It is strongly recommended that organizations should ensure they have access 
control to the server. The access control involves both insider and outsider users who may 
want to access organizations’ resources (Gui-Hong et al., 2010).  Allowing access to 
organizations’ resources should be based on the resources necessary for a user to perform 
his/her respective tasks while disallowing access to resources that are not relevant to the 
user. Access control can include the following three processes: authentication, 
authorization and audit (Gui-Hong et al., 2010). Authentication validates users’ 
identifications (e.g. username and password or multifactor authentication) in order to 
grant access to resources. Authorization, the second process, permits users’ access to the 
precise servers or applications while the third process, auditing, creates a users’ activities 
trail. This will enable the administrator to analyze the trail and identify abnormalities that 
might reveal unauthorized access attempts on the users’ part or inappropriate access 
assignment on the part of the administrators. 
 
Pervasive solutions represent those security measures that relate to ensuring ICT policy 
compliance (Figure 7.5). This study recommends ICT policy compliance for an 
organization as an additional security measure for pervasive solutions based on the 
security threats classified under the ICT policy violation for organization practices 
(section 7.4). It is recommended that the organization should ensure relevant information 
security training is given to employees and executive management to assist in compliance 
with terms of policy. They should provide a series of security training tailored to meet the 
needs of the organization in order to ensure that they maximise the benefits of the IT 
services and information management systems. Furthermore, it is recommended that the 
security training should be designed for all employees which include the IT team and the 
executive managers who need to acquaint themselves with the world of security threats 
(Broughton et al., 2009). 
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E-commuting refers to those security measures that relate to location-based device usage 
control (Figure 7.5). This study proffers location-based device usage control for the 
organization as an additional security measure for e-commuting solutions based on the 
security threats classified under location-based intrusion for organization practices 
(section 7.4).  Organizations can ensure location-based device usage control through 
device freezing, remote wiping and tracking device location. Device freezing ensures the 
safety of the devices and the important information they contain (Guo, Xu, & Chen, 
2017). It allows the organization to remotely control the endpoint so that it can protect 
endpoint data, enforce best practices and manage the inventory. Device freezing can be 
used when the organization receives an alert that a suspicious activity has occurred 
such as s suspicious location, encryption that is not working or a username change ( Lee 
et al., 2009). It can also be used to limit unauthorized roaming and control devices 
whenever employees are on a trip, as travel often puts devices and the data they 
contain at risk (Guo et al., 2017). Furthermore, when devices are in transit, they can 
be frozen until the end user is validated. In addition, many mobile device users have 
experienced panic whenever their mobile device is missing (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 
2014). The risks are raised even higher when a stolen or lost device is issued by the 
organization, or when the stolen or lost device is a personal device that an individual use 
for work purposes and which contains sensitive data (Karen, 2015). However, security 
can be further fortified with remote “find” and “wipe” capabilities (Friedman & Hoffman, 
2008). These can be used to either permanently delete data on a lost mobile device or 
recover the device.   
 
Before using these functionalities, it is recommended that there should be a policy for this 
technology asking users to sign a consent form (Karen, 2015). This is because “find me” 
services can raise privacy concerns while remote wipe could put a user’s personal data at 
risk (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). Similarly, the global positioning system (GPS) helps 
to track the geographical location of mobile devices (Hofmann-Wellenhof, Lichtenegger 
& Collins, 2012). It calculates the exact longitude, latitude and altitude values which can 
be used in finding the location of the device (Kaplan & Hegarty, 2005). With GPS 
technology, the location of anyone carrying a GPS-enabled device can be accurately 
tracked at any time (Hofmann-Wellenhof et al., 2012). This can therefore be a useful 
feature for the Nigerian banking sector to track devices or connect with one another. It 
can also be used to track mobile devices that may be stolen or lost. In addition, this study 
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recommends switching between mobile device operating modes based on location and 
also restricting applications and information sharing based on location. This implies that 
when an employee is at a location other than the organization, the mobile device 
automatically switches operating mode and restricts applications or information sharing. 
This further strengthens the security system. 
 
Awareness refers to those security measures that relate to an organization acquiring 
knowledge and disseminating the knowledge to the employees.  The primary goal for 
organizations in creating an information security awareness programme is to change 
individuals’ attitudes towards information security (Qudaih, Bawazir, Usman & Ibrahim, 
2014). Organizations should endeavour to be updated with the latest scientific knowledge 
on security awareness such as the use of persuasive technology for employees. Persuasive 
technology can be used to change attitudes by conveying social presence and persuasion 
(Qudaih et al., 2014). For example, dialogue boxes can be used to persuade users to update 
software, to stop visiting malicious web sites, and to renew passwords. With all these, 
users may infer that the computing product is animate in some way to which can lead to 
their attitudes and their behavioural change. 
 
According to Ferebee (2010), for an awareness programme to be effective and successful, 
organizations need to target people’s behaviours, attitudes or mind-sets towards change. 
Persuasive technology is fundamentally about learning to automate behaviour change to 
that which can be effectively encoded in creating experiences that change behaviours in 
information security awareness in an organization (Fogg, 2009). The tools for creating 
persuasive products have become very easy to be used in organizations (Fogg, 2009). For 
example, organizations can design experiences and innovations in social networks, online 
videos, and presentations that influence people’s behaviours by means of technology 
channels. Hence it is recommended that organizations use the persuasive technology to 
create awareness and to train their employees regarding information security, which can 
help employees to change their behaviour. This is an additional security measure to the 
existing security measures which include training on the acceptable use of ICT policies, 
information security and enforcement of security policies. 
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Figure 7.5: Solution for threats based on organization practices 
 
For the purpose of clarity, the threats and solutions for individual practices as indicated 
in Figures 7.2 and 7.4 are summarized in Figure 7.6, while the threats and solutions for 
organization practices as indicated in Figures 7.3 and 7.5 are summarized in Figure 7.7. 
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To guarantee BYOD security, mobile device users must ensure they follow specific processes 
(Bello et al., 2015). This is essential because most BYOD users do not know how to protect 
both their devices and the information on them against security threats (Twinomurinzi & 
Mawela, 2014).  Hence, as far as an information security system is concerned, it is imperative 
for individual and organization to be educated on the stages involved for device management 
to prevent security breaches (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). Hence, section 7.7 presents 
the various stages involved in device management. 
 
7.7 Activities guiding device management 
This section discusses the activities guiding device management for both individual and 
organization practices as they relate to BYOD. The activities are cyclical in nature and ensure 
a systematic best practice for both individual and organization. It is composed of four parts, 
namely device acquisition, device monitoring, device maintenance and device disposal. Each 
part of the processes enforces a connection between individual and organization. Figure 7.8 
shows a pictorial representation of the flow of the recommended activities for device 
management. 
 
7.7.1 Device acquisition     
The research findings show that organizations give out mobile devices such as laptops to the 
employees for official purposes and also allow employees to acquire their own mobile 
devices such as smartphones, tablets and laptops (section 5.5.2.1). Supporting this finding, 
Lennon (2012) reveals that prior to the BYOD era, most organizations provided employees 
with mobile devices (laptops and smartphones). These devices were configured and given 
the right type of access as stipulated in company policy (Lennon, 2012). As the prices for 
smartphones started to drop, users started being able to afford them. As a result, advanced 
devices came out faster than organizations could afford to replace them (Wills, 2013). Wills 
(2013) further explains that replacing the devices was no longer feasible but organizations 
were forced to adopt mobile devices from employees, hence the emergence of BYOD. 
However, the study also confirmed there is no definite policy that guides the use of BYODs 
(section 5.5.2.1). Thus, organizations must have well-defined ICT policies that encompass 
device acquisition. 
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Figure 7.8: Activities guiding device management 
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In addition, organizations must specify the type of mobile device, the operating system, the 
purpose for acquisition, and the place where the device can be used. Furthermore, the 
research findings reveal that organizations do not register employees’ mobile devices 
(section 5.5.1.1.). Bello et al., (2015) argues that it is the responsibility of the organization to 
register the device users and the device in the organization’s database; this includes device 
identification e.g. International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)), device ownership and 
the operation system (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). On the other hand, individuals (i.e. 
employees) need to adhere to device specification which includes the type of device and type 
of operating system. Furthermore, individuals are also expected to adhere to the purpose for 
device acquisition as well as places allowed for device usage.   
 
7.7.2 Device monitoring 
As employees are increasingly accessing privileged corporate information and applications, 
it is important they understand the security implications caused by personal or unknown 
devices entering the organizational environment (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). This 
study identified some security threats relating to the use of mobile devices (section 5.4.3 to 
5.4.6). Thus, it is the responsibility of individuals to comply with the stipulated policy 
guiding the usage of mobile device by familiarising themselves with the terms of policy 
relating to the use of mobile devices (Enisa, 2014). Furthermore, individuals are expected to 
show prescriptive commitment (section 7.5) in adhering to organizations’ security policies 
when using mobile devices in the workplace. It is also the responsibility of individuals to 
monitor and protect corporate data by enabling device security software, running regular 
updates, running regular backup and monitoring third party device usage (Kearns, 2016).  
 
On the other hand, the study revealed that organizations do not monitor applications and 
location (section 5.5.2.1). It is advisable for organizations to monitor users’ activities on the 
network such as regular updates, locations and apps usage (section 7.6). For example, the 
organization can monitor and prevent individuals from running apps that could compromise 
security such as those that record phone calls or access a user’s contacts (Lennon, 2012). It 
can highlight unnecessary costs, such as excessive data use by certain apps and identify apps 
that cause direct or indirect licensing issues (section 7.6).   This can be done using mobile 
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device management (MDM), intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), key management and 
firewalls (Wang et al., 2014).  
 
7.7.3 Device maintenance 
It is essential for organizations to restrict device usage relating to applications, e-mails, 
location and corporate information backup (Kearns, 2016). In addition, an organization can 
remove the native app stores that come with the device operating system and instead, provide 
a company one which only has approved (whitelisted) apps that users can download (Su, 
2016). If an unlisted app is required, the administrator can consider making it available via 
the app store once it has been vetted, tested, approved and licensed for use. Furthermore, 
mobile devices that have not been built with tough security levels should not be allowed to 
contact the corporate network. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of individuals to 
notify the organization promptly of any faulty or obsolete device as well as any lost or stolen 
devices (Kearns, 2016). This guards against unnecessary security threats that can hijack data 
when a device is missing or sold (Gui-Hong et al., 2010). 
 
7.7.4 Device disposal 
From the data analysis, individuals (i.e. employees) have no right to dispose of mobile 
devices given to them by the organization, except in cases where the organization allows 
them to dispose of them (section 5.5.2.3). Thus, it is the responsibility of the individuals to 
protect their devices (section 7.5). Before disposing of the devices, employees must erase all 
personal data and backup data, and disable the location tracking. On the other hand, it is the 
responsibility of the organization to have strategies and procedures for device maintenance 
(section 7.6). Such a system should deal carefully with measures for mobile device disposal 
under circumstances that do not pose a security threat to the banking system or the 
environment (Keys, 2013). Before disposing of the devices, organizations must ensure they 
erase device ID from the databases, erase device ownership from databases and erase all 
corporate data from the devices. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the organization to 
ensure that, if necessary, they should be updated with the latest scientific knowledge on the 
safe management of mobile device waste by undertaking more training in e-waste 
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management (Keys, 2013). The methods used to prepare mobile devices for disposal will 
either increase or reduce the risks of attacks when they are disposed of (Keys, 2013). 
 
It is evident that risk management is a critical aspect that needs to be addressed when 
developing a security framework (Matinde, 2015). Therefore, to manage risk, individuals and 
organizations must understand the probability of the occurrence of security threats and their 
impact on the organization (NIST, 2018). This understanding gives the organizations the 
capability to determine the risk level which is expressed by its risk threshold (NIST, 2018). 
Furthermore, this information also gives the organization the capacity to prioritize their 
security activities (NIST, 2018).  
 
7.8 Three-dimensional (3-D) security framework  
This section presents a 3-D security framework that could be initiated in BYOD-enabled 
banking institutions where mobile devices are used by both individuals and the organization.  
It is important to note that this security framework is driven by the data collected for the 
threat identification of the study. The framework is composed of three parts: Firstly, ‘threats 
and solutions for individual practices’; secondly, ‘threats and solutions for organization 
practices’; and lastly, ‘the activities guiding the device management’. When these three parts 
are combined, it gives a strategic approach to managing the risk levels associated with each 
category of security threats as it relates to both individual and organization practices 
respectively.   
 
The ‘threats and solution categories for individual practices’ and the ‘threats and solution 
categories for organization practices’ form the context in which an individual and an 
organization understand the security threats’ categories and the processes established to 
manage them. The activities guiding device management spell out the interconnectivity and 
the alignment of the procedure that guides the framework. The various activities can be used 
to pinpoint areas for mitigating the security threats by comparing the threats associated with 
each domain (e.g. technical, social, mobility) with the solutions to the threats as they relate 
to both individual and organization practices. 
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As presented in Figure 7.9, device acquisition has a direct relationship with the technical 
domain. Similarly, device monitoring has a focus on the social domain, while device 
maintenance has a focus on the mobility domain (Figure 7.9). However, device disposal has 
a direct link with device acquisition. It is an iterative process that goes back to device 
acquisition after device disposal (Figure 7.9). Furthermore, there are intermediate 
relationship such as validation, compliance, defunct and decommissioning. The intermediate 
relationship has a link with socio-technical, pervasive and e-commuting domains, except for 
defunct which has a direct link with device disposal. Both individual and organization need 
to be aware of the security threats and security solutions for all these domains and take 
proactive steps for device acquisition, device monitoring, device maintenance and device 
disposal as stated in sections 7.7.1, 7.7.2, 7.7.3 and 7.7.4 respectively. It is important to note 
that the interrelations among these domains as investigated in the study provide the synthesis 
guiding device management which leads to the security framework as shown in Figure 7.9. 
This approach gives both individual and organization the ability to distinguish threats in such 
a way that can easily be detected and mitigated without affecting other assets of the 
organization (NIST, 2018).  
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 Figure 7.9: Three-dimensional (3-D) security framework  
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7.9 Summary 
This chapter presented a 3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions 
in Nigeria. The framework describes the link between individual and organization 
practices in exploring BYOD security threats and their security solutions under three 
major domains, namely technical, social and mobility. Wang et al. (2014) assert that 
owing to the type of transactions and sensitive information processed within the banking 
system, risk management is a critical aspect that must be addressed when developing a 
security framework. Similar empirical studies by Matinde (2015) and Bello et al. (2015) 
affirm that the magnitude of BYOD challenges will always intensify as long as business 
models continuously evolve. This necessitates the review of existing relevant security 
frameworks with a view to strengthening them for better performance. However, none of 
these security frameworks reviewed (section 2.6) have been able to sufficiently address 
the significance of individual and organization practices as they relate to BYOD security 
threats.  Hence, based on the findings of this study, a security framework comprising 
threats, solutions and the activities guiding device management for both individual and 
organization practices was presented in Figure 7.9. The framework spelt out the 
interconnectivity between the three major domains (technical, social and mobility) as well 
as the processes and their sustainability to ensure optimal delivery in meeting the sector’s 
needs. It concludes by sending the developed security framework (Figure 7.9) for 
evaluation. The reason for sending out the security framework for evaluation is to 
determine whether it is feasible, implementable and whether it meets the expected 
security requirements. 
 
This is important because evaluating a security framework offers significant insight 
regarding the functionality of the system which can result in a measure of confidence that 
the system meets the required expectations (Asheri et al., 2012). Hence, the outcome of 
the evaluation and the interpretation were used to answer the fifth research question 
(chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 8: EVALUATION OF THREE-DIMENSIONAL (3-D) 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR BYOD ENABLED BANKING 
INSTITUIONS IN NIGERIA 
  
8.1 Introduction   
Evaluating a security framework is a process by means of which the evidence for 
assurance is identified, assembled and analyzed against criteria for security functionality 
and guarantee level (Asheri, Louise & Stewart, 2012). In other words, it is a process by 
means of which evidence that a particular system meets its security requirements is 
presented. This understanding can result in a measure of confidence that shows how well 
the system meets particular security targets or objectives (Asheri et al., 2012). Hence, to 
evaluate the confidence or assurance level that the 3-D security framework for BYOD-
enabled banking institutions in Nigeria meets the security functionality, the unified 
perceptions of the participating banks’ executives (i.e. ICT department personnel and 
executive managers) and the academic experts in information security were sought. The 
evaluation results help to answer the fifth research question which is stated as follows: 
 
How do the recommended security measures help to mitigate the security threats? 
 
The evaluation follows the mixed-methods research design. The quantitative and 
qualitative data components are used to provide a complete understanding of the 
realization and sustainability of the security framework. As explained in the research 
methodology (chapter 4), twelve participants were involved in the evaluation. This 
includes eight executive management staff from the four participating banks (i.e. one ICT 
department person and one executive manager each from the four banks) and four 
academic experts in information security from four different universities (i.e. one 
academic staff member each).  Closed and open-ended questions were employed, and a 
questionnaire was distributed to the twelve participants via e-mail. The twelve 
questionnaires were all completed and returned. The success recorded in retrieving the 
questionnaires may be attributed to the small number of participants which made the 
follow up easier. The evaluation analysis is presented in two sections – descriptive 
analysis and thematic analysis.  
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8.2 Descriptive analysis  
A descriptive analysis was carried out on the security framework’s appropriateness, 
adequacy, feasibility, flexibility and intention to use. The results of the analysis are 
presented as follows: 
 
8.2.1 Appropriateness 
Participants were asked to assess the criteria presented in item 1 of the evaluation 
questions (Appendix E) to determine the appropriateness of the security framework. The 
outcome of the assessment is illustrated in Figures 8.1 to 8.3.  
 
Figure 8.1 show that 16.7 per cent of the participants strongly agreed, while 33.3 per cent 
agreed and 41.7 per cent slightly agreed that the security framework aligned with the 
policies and strategies of the bank. Contrariwise, 8.3 per cent of the participants slightly 
disagreed with this statement. This result has found out that the vast majority (91.7 per 
cent) of the participants believed that the security framework aligned with the policies 
and strategies of the bank. According to Vanderlinde, Dexter and Van Braak (2012), 
policies are shaped by coalescing the various requirement of top managers, IT executives 
and key users within the organization. It is from the combination of executive managers’ 
and IT executives’ perspectives in evaluating the information systems framework that the 
appropriateness of the framework emerges (Torres, Sarriegi, Santos & Serrano, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 8.1: The framework is aligned with the policies and strategies of the bank 
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Again, the results in Figure 8.2 shows that 25 per cent of the study participants strongly 
agreed, while 41.7 per cent agreed and 33.3 per cent slightly agree that the security 
framework enhances the effectiveness of the bank’s data security. This result shows that  
all of the participants (100 per cent) believed that the security framework enhances the 
effectiveness of the bank’s data security. Supporting this finding, Cameron and Whetten 
(2013) claim that the primary task for any investigator of effectiveness lies in determining 
whether it boosts the organization’s information security system. Effective information 
security focuses on identifying the essential success factors for information security 
implementation which include how organizations could align information security system 
with business goals, security strategies, policies’ enforcement and investments (Torres et 
al., 2006). 
 
Figure 8.2: The framework enhances the effectiveness of the bank’s data security 
 
Likewise, Figure 8.3. clearly shows that 16.7 per cent of the participants strongly agreed 
that the security framework could contribute towards the efficiency of the bank operations 
while 58.3 per cent and 16.7 per cent agreed and slightly agreed respectively. Conversely 
8.3 per cent slightly disagreed.  This result shows that the vast majority (91.7 per cent) of 
the participants believed that the security framework could contribute towards the 
efficiency of the bank operations. This implies that the efficiency of the security 
framework is credible. Kamatchi and Modi (2016) assert that the efficiency of a security 
system lies in its ability to be utilized with minimal maintenance. Furthermore, a security 
framework is considered efficient if it can identify and minimize risk when handling 
information (Torres et al., 2006). 
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Figure 8.3: The framework could contribute towards the efficiency of the bank operations 
 
8.2.2 Adequacy 
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outcome of the assessment is illustrated in Figures 8.4 to 8.6.  
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Figure 8.4: The framework could address all the technical threats identified 
 
Again, the results in Figure 8.5 show that 16.7 per cent of the participants strongly agree, 
while 33.3 per cent agree and 33.3 per cent slightly agree that the security framework 
could address all the social threats identified. Conversely, the remaining 16.7per cent of 
the participants slightly disagreed with this statement. This result has found that the vast 
majority (83.3 per cent) of the participants believed that the security framework could 
address all the social threats identified. These social security threats are threats from 
employees’ attitudes and organizations’ norms, principles, policies and values as revealed 
in the data analysis chapter (i.e. chapter 5). Bello et al. (2015) opine that organizations 
should recognise the influence of these security threats and address them accordingly.  
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Figure 8.5: The framework could address all the social threats identified 
 
Similarly, Figure 8.6 reveals that 16.7 per cent of the study participants strongly agreed, 
while 66.7 per cent agreed that the security framework could address all the mobility 
threats identified. Contrariwise, 16.7 per cent slightly disagreed with the statement. This 
result has found that a vast majority (83.3 per cent) of the participants believed that the 
security framework could address all the mobility threats identified. It is important that 
organizations integrate a security framework into management systems that substantially 
improves their ability to respond to various information security threats (Astani et al., 
2013). In addition, Wolden, Valverde and Talla (2015) maintain that vulnerabilities can 
be dealt with through security measures that can be created via a security framework.  
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Figure 8.6: The framework could address all the mobility threats identified 
 
8.2.3 Feasibility 
Participants were asked to assess the criteria presented in item 3 of the evaluation 
questions (Appendix E) to determine the feasibility of the security framework. The 
outcome of the assessment is illustrated in Figures 8.7 to 8.9.  
 
Figure 8.7 reveals that 25 per cent of the study participants strongly agreed, while 33.3 
per cent agreed and 25 per cent slightly agree that the security framework could be cost 
effective. However, 8.3 per cent slightly disagree and 8.3 disagree with the statement. 
This clearly show that a vast majority (83.3 per cent) of the participants affirm that the 
security framework could be cost effective. This implies that the security framework 
could be implemented with minimal cost. Asheri et al. (2012) affirm that the three most 
cited measures of information system performance are cost, budget performance and 
return on investment. The cost of maintenance of an infrastructure asset can be 
determined by how well it was designed, its fitness for purpose, the quality of 
construction, materials specified and used and not just by the capacity, nature and size of 
that infrastructure (Su, 2016). However, 16.6 per cent of the participants disagreed that 
the security framework could be cost effective. This is as a result of budget constraints 
which were identified in section 5.5.2.2. Hence there is a need to consider the availability 
of funds.  Hong (2013) maintains that the feasibility of a system or business could be 
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determined by forecasting and analysing the resources and cash-flows as well as other 
financial tests. 
 
 
Figure 8.7: The framework could be cost-effective 
 
Again, the results in Figure 8.8 show that 33.3 per cent of the study participants strongly 
agreed, while 33.3 per cent agreed and 16.7 per cent slightly agree that the security 
framework could be implemented within a short period of time. However, 16.7 per cent 
disagreed with the statement. This infers that a vast majority (83.3 per cent) of the 
participants confirm that the security framework could be implemented within a short 
period of time. In addition, this implies that the organization has the necessary 
infrastructure to implement the security framework within a short time frame. Supporting 
this finding, Cameron and Whetten (2013) affirm that timeline feasibility is important to 
determine whether the organization can implement the framework within a specified 
period. In addition, Hong (2013) emphasizes the need for an organization to have the 
required resources and capabilities to implement the framework within a time frame. 
However, 16.7 per cent of the participants disagreed that the security framework could be 
implemented within a short period of time. This is also attributed to budget constraints 
(section 5.5.2.2). Hence it is noted as one of the limitations of this study. 
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Figure 8.8: The framework could be implemented within a short period of time 
 
Likewise, Figure 8.9 shows that 8.3 per cent of the study participants strongly agreed, 
while 50 per cent agreed and 16.7 per cent slightly agree that the security framework 
could be implemented with the available resources of the bank. Contrariwise, 8.3 per cent 
slightly disagree and 16.7 per cent disagreed with the statement. This implies that a vast 
majority (75 per cent) of the participants believed that the security could be implemented 
with the available resources of the bank. Supporting this finding, Vateva-Gurova, Luna, 
Pellegrino and Suri (2014) assert that the feasibility of implementing a security 
framework depends on the organization’s available resources and capabilities to support 
the process of implementation. However, 25 per cent of the participants did not believed 
that the security framework could be implemented with the available resources of the 
bank. This implies that the available resources at hand are insufficient for the 
implementation of the framework. This is also considered as one of the limitations of this 
study as the resources available for each bank is not the same for framework 
implementation.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Slightly
Disagree
Slightly
Agree
 Agree Strongly
Agree
Frequency 2 2 4 4
Percentage 16,7 16,7 33,3 33,3
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
an
d
 F
re
q
u
en
cy
The framework could be implemented within a short period of 
time
 183 
 
 
Figure 8.9: The framework could be implemented with the available resources of the bank 
 
8.2.4 Flexibility 
Participants were asked to assess the criteria presented in item 4 of the evaluation 
questions (Appendix E) to determine the flexibility of the security framework. The 
outcome of the assessment is illustrated in Figures 8.10 to 8.13.  
 
Figure 8.10 reveals that 8.3 per cent of the study participants strongly agreed, while 41.7 
per cent agreed and 25 per cent slightly agree that the security framework could be easily 
adopted with changing policies. Conversely, 25 per cent slightly disagree with the 
statement. This infers that a vast majority (75 per cent) of the participants confirm that 
the security framework could be easily adopted with changing policies. According to 
Ifinedo (2012), change is a major part of our lives, whether it is change in social policies 
or technologies policies. “Policy change occurs through interactions between wide 
external changes and the success of the ideas in the coalitions, which may cause actors in 
the advocacy coalition to shift coalitions” (Cerna, 2013). However, 25 per cent of the 
participants disagreed somewhat that the security framework could be adopted with 
changing policies. This is owing to inconsistency in terms of ICT policy across the bank 
(Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015). Hence, an ICT policy guideline is required for each 
bank: this was not considered in this research. 
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Figure 8.10: The framework could be easily adopted with changing policies 
 
Again, the results in Figure 8.11 reveal that 8.3 per cent of the study participants strongly 
agreed, while 58.3 per cent agreed and 33.3 per cent slightly agree that the security 
framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats within different branches of 
the bank. This shows that 100 per cent of the participants opine that the security 
framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats within different branches of 
the bank. Vateva-Gurova et al. (2014) maintain that a business must have the capacity to 
withstand tempestuous occasions and to ride out sudden hard blows. This implies that the 
business ought to be sufficiently adaptable to deal with both the unforeseen dangers and 
opportunities posed by an indeterminate future and unstable environment. 
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Figure 8.11: The framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats within different 
branches of the bank 
 
Similarly, Figure 8.12 shows that 8.3 per cent of the study participants strongly agreed, 
while 25 per cent agreed and 41.7 per cent slightly agree that the security framework 
could be adopted for mitigating security threats across different banks. However, 16.7 per 
cent slightly disagree and 8.3 per cent disagree with the statement. This infers that a vast 
majority of the participants (75 per cent) believed that the security framework could be 
adopted for mitigating security threats across different banks. This finding is consistent 
with the literature that indicates that the more adaptable companies become, the better 
they can respond to security risks ranging across companies (Cameron & Whetten, 2013). 
However, the remaining 25 per cent of the participants do not believe that the security 
framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats across different banks. This 
can also be attributed to inconsistency in terms of ICT policy across the banks (Downer 
& Bhattacharya, 2015). Hence an ICT policy guideline is required across the banks, a 
factor which was not considered in this study: hence it is noted for recommendation. 
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Figure 8.12: The framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats across different banks 
 
8.2.5 Intention to use 
Participants were asked to assess the criteria presented in item 5 of the evaluation 
questions (Appendix E) to determine the intention to use the security framework. The 
outcome of the assessment is presented in Figures 8.13 to 8.15.   
 
Figure 8.13 reveals that 91.7 per cent of the participants are willing to implement the 
framework as it is. This implies that participants are happy and comfortable with 
implementing the security framework. The findings may also be consistent with the 
literature, which indicated that organization are more comfortable with implementing a 
security framework if it addresses the security concerns of the organization (Wolden et 
al., 2015). 
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Figure 8.13: The bank’s willingness to implement the framework 
 
Again, the results in Figure 8.14 reveal that 75 per cent of the participants are willing to 
adopt the security framework immediately. This implies that participants are satisfied 
with adopting the security framework straight away. Cameron and Whetten (2013) claim 
that organizations that adopt a framework will probably be a function of the framework’s 
flexibility, and efficiency. This suggests that acceptability in the organization is innate in 
these characteristics.  However, 25 per cent of the participants were of the opinion that 
adopting the framework should take place in the future. This may also be attributed to 
budget constraints as identified in section 5.5.2.2. 
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Figure 8.14: The bank willingness to adopt the framework  
 
Similarly, Figure 8.15 shows that 91.7 per cent of the participants affirmed that the use 
of the security framework by employees could be easy. According to Cameron (2014), 
since a framework is result driven, it empowers versatility. It is this flexibility that enables 
the framework to be easily used by organizations (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
 
 
Figure 8.15: Use of framework by bank employees’ could be easy 
 
This section of the study presents the closed-ended data analysis obtained from the 
evaluation. The quantitative data was gathered via responses from the closed-ended 
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questions to validate the security framework using Likert-scale measures. The outcome 
of the analysis affirms the security framework validity. The next section presents the 
qualitative data that was obtained from the open-ended questions. The open-ended 
questions were included in order to obtain detailed information on any data that maybe 
missed if only closed-ended questions were used. The result is analysed using thematic 
analysis. 
 
8.3 Thematic analysis  
This section presents the analysis of the open-ended data collected at the evaluation phase. 
The data in this phase was coded and analysed using thematic analysis. A thematic 
analysis technique was considered to be suitable because it enables researchers to 
determine the relationship between various concepts and relate them alongside other 
replicated data (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). The themes that emerged in the open-ended 
questions were subsequently classified into three (3) major categories, namely 
recommendation for threats and solutions that are not considered in the framework, 
implementation comments and general comments. This is illustrated in Table 8.1. 
 
Table: 8.1: Categories and themes that emerged in the open-ended questions  
Categories Major Themes 
1. Recommendation for threats and solutions that are not 
considered in the framework 
1. Training 
2.    Credit card encryption 
2. Implementation comments 1. Possibility for changes at the 
implementation stage 
2. Budget constraint 
3. General Comments 1. Acceptability of the security 
framework 
 
8.3.1 Recommendations for threats and solutions not considered in the 
framework 
Participants gave recommendations for solutions that were not considered in the security 
framework. The following threats and solutions were recommended: 
 
Training 
Two participants recommended training as a solution that was not covered in the security 
framework. The statement below is a comment from one participant:  
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“Training should be included in the security framework” 
 
Another participant remarked: 
 
“Provide more training and awareness programmes piloting before roll out” 
 
This implies that the participants identified training as a vital need to be considered for a 
successful security framework. This finding is consistent with those of other studies that 
suggest the need for ICT programmes and formal training for employees as key 
organisational aspects to provide knowledge of security awareness (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). According to Downer and Bhattacharya (2015), the primary goal of organizations 
in conducting information security training is to disseminate adequate knowledge which 
will eventually change individuals’ attitudes towards information security. Shaw, Chen, 
Harris and Huang (2009) maintain that the major reason for training is to ensure 
awareness of risks and convey how to maintain good practices.  
 
However, it is important to note that training was considered in the previous security 
framework, but it was made implicit (Figure 7.9). Hence, in order to make a better 
presentation, the security framework is revised to make ‘training’ explicit (Figure 8.16). 
In addition, it can be recalled (Figure 7.9) that knowledge and consciousness were 
solutions recommended for organizations and individuals respectively under the high risk 
region. Hence, it is important to note that training encompasses both knowledge and 
security consciousness. In other words, the training will be used to provide the relevant 
knowledge for organization as well as creating a security consciousness for employees. 
According to Keys (2013), organizations should endeavour to be updated with the latest 
scientific knowledge on security awareness by attending information security training. 
This training can be in form of workshops, conferences or seminars (Kearns, 2016).  
 
Similarly, individuals should be trained on how to be more security conscious when using 
their mobile devices (Keys, 2013). Such training may include how to run regular updates, 
regular backups, avoid installing unnecessary applications, avoid sharing organizations’ 
confidential information especially over unprotected networks, avoid jailbreaking and 
have good physical control of mobile devices (Kearns, 2016). Hence, while incorporating 
these changes in the high risk region, the awareness domain (Figure 7.9) was also revised 
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to obscure interaction domain (Figure 8.16). This is because the interaction of the three 
domains (i.e. technical, social and mobility) makes it the most vulnerable to security flaws 
which can be obscure in nature. Apelbaum (2007) argues that obscure interaction may 
have theoretical or actual security vulnerabilities; however, its flaws are not visible, hence 
it gives room for successful attack.  Thus, there is a need for training to create security 
awareness for both organization and individual. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that training can be a meaningful driver of an effective 
and strong cybersecurity culture that helps the organization to actively respond to new 
threats and technologies as well as changing their goals, processes and structures (Enisa, 
2017). According to Abawajy (2014), building a strong cybersecurity culture through 
consistent training, awareness and promotion will ensure that employees are well 
informed of cybersecurity policies thus improving resilience against all cyber threats. 
Alfawaz (2010) suggests that organization should draft out cyber security strategy and 
policy using guidelines from other cyber security documentations or standards that is 
informed by best practices. This will help organizations to regularly measure and evaluate 
employees’ opinions on cybersecurity, which can heighten awareness and enhance 
culture (Enisa, 2017). “This approach moves employees from risk factor to 
security advocate, and employees may even proactively protect the business 
as they become more cognizant of cybersecurity practices”  (Alfawaz, 2010). 
 
Credit card encryption 
Similarly, one participant recommends credit card encryption as a solution that was not 
covered in the framework. The statement below is a suggestion from the participant, and 
it reads: 
 
“Credit card numbers should be encrypted with one master card” 
 
From the excerpt above, it can be deduced that the participant expected the security 
framework to capture smart cards, which include credit and debits cards. However, it can 
be recalled from the threat identification (section 5.4.2.1) that a descriptive analysis was 
carried out on the categorized four types of mobile devices (smartphones, laptops, tablets 
and other devices). The ‘other devices’ options give the respondents ample opportunity 
to specify other types of mobile devices used that may have been omitted (e.g. smart 
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cards). However, an insignificant number of respondents specified other types of mobile 
devices. Hence, the 3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in 
Nigeria was based on the threat identification findings where a significant number of 
respondents specified smartphones, laptops and tablets. This implies that the security 
framework does not capture smart cards which include credit and debit cards. However, 
this is one of the limitations of this security framework and it is noted for recommendation 
for future research. 
 
8.3.3 Implementation comments 
Participants made   general remarks regarding the implementation of the security 
framework. These are presented as follows: 
 
Possibility for changes at implementation stage 
Two participants remarked that the framework is subject to change at the implementation 
stage. The statement below is a response from one of the participants:  
 
“To the best of my knowledge, the basic threats have been identified and solutions 
proffered. Other possible issues will be tackled at the implementation stage” 
(Participant 16). 
 
Another participant notes: 
 
“I think the framework is well detailed but there is possibility for changes at the 
implementation stage”. 
 
From the excerpt above, it can be deduced that the participant believed that the framework 
is well detailed to tackle the security threats and if peradventure there is any issue at the 
implementation stage it can easily be tackled to incorporate any changes. 
 
Budget constraint 
Two out of the twelve participants maintain the willingness to use the security framework 
in the near future is due to financial constraints. The statement below is a response from 
one of the participants:  
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“The framework can be implemented in future due to budgetary reasons” 
(Participant 11). 
 
Again, another participant notes: 
 
“The framework is subject to management approval for implementation which 
may be delayed due to budgetary reasons” (Participant 2). 
 
The foregoing suggests that only two participants foresee financial constraint as a 
challenge to implement the security framework immediately. This result corroborates the 
ideas of Su (2016) which asserts that for an organization to have effective IT 
infrastructure, adequate budget must be made available by the organization to update and 
maintain the IT infrastructure. However, this is one of the limitations of this security 
framework and it is noted for recommendation for executive managers. 
 
8.3.4 General comments 
Participants made general remarks regarding the acceptability of the security framework. 
These were presented as follows: 
 
Acceptability of the security framework 
Seven participants commented via e-mail that they are satisfied with the security 
framework as it addresses the important areas of the security threat. The responses of the 
participants are stated as follows: 
 
“Great work! I endorsed the framework as a realistic and pragmatic 
intervention that can secure banks in general from any security threats” 
(Participant 2). 
 
“We believe this framework will go a long way to address any threats that 
jeopardize our operation as a bank”. (Participant 8). 
 
 “We have evaluated your security framework and we are satisfied that it captures 
the essential aspects of security threats”. (Participant 11). 
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“The framework will accelerate the knowledge process on BYOD security”. 
(Participant 13).  
 
“I can say that it is a very comprehensive framework that has been well 
researched and conceptually sound, and which encompasses several dimensions 
of inquiry” (Participant 14). 
 
“The security framework gives a clearer indication on the security awareness for 
BYODs” (Participant 15). 
 
“This security framework is pivotal to maintain data security while employees use 
their mobile devices” (Participant 16). 
 
It can be inferred from the above statements that participants are delighted with the 
security framework. These results validate the concepts of Stouffer et al. (2008) who 
declared that having a security framework in a business enterprise promotes greater 
sensitivity to whatever constitutes a security threat to the enterprise’s assets, improves 
trust in relationships among individuals and groups and supports greater consistency in 
the standards and quality of products. This implies that the acceptability of the security 
framework is positive. Thus, the main objective of this chapter, which is to validate the 
3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in Nigeria, has been met. 
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                                    Figure 8.16: Three-dimensional (3-D) security framework (Revised)
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8.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the empirical findings obtained from the analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data that evaluates the 3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking 
institutions in Nigeria.  The quantitative results indicate the level of acceptance of the security 
framework which largely depends on the framework’s appropriateness, adequacy, feasibility, 
flexibility and intention to use. These findings are fully supported by the qualitative data 
where themes such as training and acceptability of framework also emerged.  This indicates 
that training and acceptability of the framework also account for the credibility of the security 
framework. However, it is important to note that training was implicit in the previous 
framework (Figure 7.9) but has now been made explicit based on the evaluation responses in 
the revised framework (Figure 8.16).  
 
In addition, the framework was endorsed as a realistic and pragmatic intervention that can 
secure Nigerian banks in general from any security threats. The findings may also be 
consistent with the literature, which indicated that organizations are more comfortable to 
implement a security framework if it addresses the security concerns of the organization 
(National Institute of Standards Technology, 2014). This justifies the credibility and 
acceptability of the 3-D security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in 
Nigeria. 
 
The next chapter presents the summary of the study. This is followed by the contribution of 
the thesis to the body of knowledge, the limitations of the study and recommendations for 
further study. Lastly, the research conclusion is drawn. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of the study and its major findings. The chapter then 
discusses the contribution of the study to the body of knowledge. The limitations of the study 
and some useful recommendations on the way forward also form part of the chapter.  
 
It is important to note that the essence of the study was to develop a security framework that 
will address BYOD security threats in the Nigerian banking sector. In order to develop this 
security framework, ways of addressing BYOD security threats were explored. The literature 
reviews provided information regarding BYOD security threats as well as ways to tackle the 
security threats, particularly ways in which other researchers have tackled similar security 
threats. Similarly, the threat identification findings (chapter five) from the study explain the 
link between individual and organization practices in exploring BYOD security threats under 
three major domains, namely technical, social and mobility.  In addition, the influence of 
these security threats on the Nigerian banking sector also emerged from the threat 
identification findings. These findings were used in the development of a security framework 
with each of the domains having a specific research question and a unique objective to be 
achieved. Thereafter, the viability of the security framework was investigated in the 
framework evaluation.  
 
Section 9.2 presents the summary of the major findings from the literature review. Section 
9.3 discusses the summary of the major findings from the threat identification; Section 9.4 
presents the summary of the major findings from the framework evaluation; Section 9.5 
presents the contribution to body of knowledge; Section 9.6 discusses the limitation of the 
study; Section 9.7 outlines the recommendations while section 9.8 presents the summary. 
 
9.2 Findings from the literature 
It was revealed from the literature that individual and organization practices have to be re-
defined and policies have to be drawn up to provide guidelines that accommodate the BYOD 
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trend in the banking sector, especially in developing countries which include Nigeria 
(Mphahlele, 2016). In addition, the literature revealed that organization practices, which 
include allowing employees to use their mobile devices from home or public places, create 
security risks. Similarly, individual practices such as employees connecting their mobile 
devices to unregulated networks result in security threats which include data leakage (Bello 
et al., 2015). The individual practices would have been stopped but most organizations have 
adopted this practice because of the profound benefits they derived from BYOD (Bello et al., 
2015).  
 
Furthermore, it was revealed that BYOD security threats could be considered under three 
major domains, namely technical, social and mobility domains (Ofusori et al., 2018). 
Technical security threats include phishing, keystroke logging, rogue devices, jailbreaking, 
data interception, network exploitation and unregulated public networks (Bello et.al, 2015). 
Social security threats include malicious insiders, data privacy violations, data ownership 
violations, user policy violations and disgruntled employees (Shumate & Ketel, 2014). 
Finally, mobility security threats include lost or stolen devices, e-waste, sharing mobile 
devices, and WiFi eavesdropping (Juniper Network, 2011; Karen, 2015).  
 
The literature revealed the existing security measures as they relate to each domain (i.e. 
technical, social and mobility). For the technical domain, the existing mitigating measures 
include password authentication, encryption, firewalls, anti-virus/malware software, anti-
phishing, hardware tokens, encrypted cookies and Windows Defender (Bello et.al, 2015).  
The mitigating measures for social include training on the acceptable use of an ICT policy, 
training on information security and enforcement of security policies (Shumate & Ketel, 
2014). Similarly, the mitigating measures for mobility include mobile device management, 
intrusion detection services and tracking devices (Wang et al., 2014).  A review of these 
existing security measures indicates they are effective for mobile security but are not 
sufficient as they all have their limitations (Bello et al., 2015).  Hence, it is vital for 
organizations to understand and address the implications caused by unknown devices 
entering the organizational environment (Twinomurinzi & Mawela, 2014). 
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The study also identified related security frameworks from the literature. These frameworks 
come in various degrees of complexity and are used to build an information security 
programme to reduce vulnerabilities and manage risks. This includes ISO/IEC 2700 series 
(Granneman, 2013), PCI DSS (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2012), COBIT (ISACA, 2011), 
NIST SP 800 series (NIST, 2012), CISCO security control framework and IBM security 
framework (Buecker et al., 2010). Following the review of these frameworks, the limitations 
identified are a deterrent to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2016).  
 
In addition, a review of the application of relevant theories was carried out in the study. From 
the review and analysis of the existing theories, it is clear that there is no single theory or 
model that sufficiently explains the variables (constructs) surrounding the BYOD 
phenomenon and its interrelationship with organization and individual practices (Yang et al., 
2013). Hence, the researcher combined the three theories, namely organization theory, 
mobility theory and socio-technical theory so as to hypothesise the conceptual framework 
for the Nigerian banking sector which will eventually add to the body of knowledge.   
 
It is obvious from the literature that not much research has been carried out to investigate or 
explain these domains (i.e. technical, social and mobility) surrounding the BYOD 
phenomenon and its interrelationship with organization and individual practices. 
Furthermore, a security framework that takes into account the peculiarity of the study context 
and one that also highlights security awareness indicators was lacking. As a result of these 
gaps, this study explains the link between individual and organization practices in exploring 
BYOD security threats with a view to developing a security framework.  
 
9.3 Findings from threat identification  
The threat identification phase of the study identified the security threats associated with the 
technical, social and mobility domains. To achieve this objective, the explanatory sequential 
mixed-methods approach was followed. In this case, the quantitative approach was first used 
to explore individual practices in identifying BYOD security threats. Thereafter, the 
influence of these security threats on the Nigerian banking sector was investigated. The 
qualitative technique was then used to elicit more information regarding organization 
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practices in exploring BYOD security threats. The major findings from the threat 
identification are presented as follows:  
 
9.3.1 General practices 
Using descriptive analysis of the categorized four types of mobile devices (smartphones, 
laptops, tablets and other devices), the study generally revealed that the majority of the 
respondents have used smartphones and laptops for both work and personal purposes. These 
were measured based on ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers. Again, for each type of mobile device, the 
chi-square goodness-of-fit was used to test whether any of the response options are selected 
significantly more or less often than the others. It was found that a significant number of the 
respondents indicated that they use smartphones and laptops for work and personal usage. 
This finding was considered significant as it clearly showed that both smartphones and 
laptops are used for both work and personal purpose. 
 
9.3.2 Technical security threats 
It can be recalled that a bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a 
significant relationship between technical practices and BYOD security threats (section 
5.4.3). The four major technical practices that were considered for quantitative study were 
firstly, “allowing software on device to manage login credentials” (section 5.4.3.1); 
secondly, “saving work documents from laptop to a free cloud storage” (section 5.4.3.2); 
thirdly, “updating mobile device on public network” (section 5.4.3.3) and lastly, “not 
adhering to security measures” (section 5.4.3.4). It was revealed that these technical 
practices have given rise to the following security threats; data leakage, data ownership 
violation WiFi eavesdropping, unauthorized location tracking, phishing, viruses, malware 
and jailbreaking. Furthermore, the qualitative study for the ICT department personnel 
identifies “keystroke logger” and “rogue device” as a technical security threat (section 
5.5.1.1).  
 
On the other hand, the qualitative study for the executive managers acknowledged three 
major organization practices that lead to three technical security threats. Firstly, “there is no 
definite policy guiding the use of BYODs” (section 5.5.2.1); secondly, “the organization 
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provides laptops to individuals’ for official purpose as well as allowing employees to 
personally acquire their own mobile but the organization does not monitor nor maintain this 
device” (section 5.5.2.1); and lastly, “the organization does not have a specific operating 
system approved to be used” (section 5.5.2.1). For each of these practices it was found that 
security threats such as malware, phishing, jailbreaking and data leakage are inevitable (Bello 
et al., 2015). This confirms four out of the other security threats identified for the quantitative 
study. 
 
9.3.3 Social security threats 
 A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant relationship 
between social practices and BYOD security threats (section 5.4.4). Three major social 
practices were considered for the quantitative study: Firstly, “Clicking on links, 
advertisement and videos/audios” (section 5.4.4.1); secondly, “attaching customer bank 
statement to e-mail/instant messages” (section 5.4.4.2); and lastly, “sharing of password 
with colleagues or friends/family” (section 5.4.4.3). These three major social practices have 
given rise to the following security threats: data leakage, spamming, jailbreaking, malware, 
viruses, spyware and WiFi eavesdropping. 
 
However, the qualitative findings for ICT department personnel differed slightly from one of 
the quantitative findings, namely “the banks do not allow employees to use social media” 
(section 5.5.1.2). This is in contrast with the quantitative findings on social media (section 
5.4.4.1) where individuals (i.e. employees) acknowledged that they click on links, 
advertisement and videos and audios on social media. However, Aula (2010) asserts that 
organizations’ information that is made available on the social media can be stolen and used 
to commit security breaches, referred to as “data privacy violation”. In addition, the 
qualitative findings regarding the ICT department personnel have revealed that “backups are 
allowed on laptops as well as the bank’s server” (section 5.5.1.2). This is line with the 
quantitative results (section 5.4.3.3) whereby employees admitted saving work documents 
on laptops before uploading them to a free cloud storage.  However, while the portability of 
these mobile devices allows continuous access to work-related functions and personal 
information from any location, it also leads to incidences of theft or loss (Karen, 2015). 
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Similarly, the interviews conducted with ICT department personnel reveal “employees’ non-
compliance to security policies” (section 5.5.1.2) which has resulted in “loss of confidential 
information”.  
 
On the other hand, the qualitative study for the executive managers acknowledged three 
major organization practices that lead to social security threats. Firstly, “there is no specified 
interval for reviewing security policies” (section 5.5.2.2); secondly, “disgruntled employees 
are only being monitored by their action” (section 5.5.2.2); and lastly, “there is budget shortages 
in developing a security framework” (section 5.5.2.2). For each of these practices the study 
found the following security threats, namely obsolete security policies, disgruntled 
employees and budget shortages for a security framework. 
 
9.3.4 Mobility security threats 
 A bivariate analysis was carried out to determine whether there is a significant relationship 
between the mobility practices and BYOD security threats (section 5.4.5). For the 
quantitative study, three major mobility practices were considered; firstly, “methods used to 
prepare mobile device for disposal” (section 5.4.5.1); secondly, “methods employees used 
to dispose obsolete/faulty devices” (section 5.4.5.2); and lastly, “sharing mobile devices with 
colleagues and friends/family” (section 5.4.5.3). These practices have given rise to the 
following security threats, namely WiFi eavesdropping, data leakage, viruses and phishing. 
However, contrary to the quantitative findings on the sharing of mobile devices (section 
5.4.5.3) where employees admitted they share mobile devices, the interviews conducted with 
the ICT department personnel have revealed that “employees’ are not allowed to share their 
mobile devices” (section 5.5.1.3). Furthermore, qualitative findings have revealed that there 
have been cases of  “lost/stolen devices” that were reported but not recovered (5.5.1.3). 
Additionally, the findings revealed that the banks were unable to address security issues 
caused by lost or stolen devices (section 5.5.1.3). Lastly, the qualitative findings from the 
ICT department personnel revealed that “employees are allowed to dispose of their faulty or 
obsolete devices by themselves” (section 5.5.1.3). These findings are in agreement with the 
qualitative findings from the executive managers, namely that “there is no policy guiding 
employees’ disposal of mobile devices” (section 5.5.2.3). 
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9.3.5 The influence of technical, social and mobility security  
 The study adopted the threat classification technique in exploring the influence of technical, 
social and mobility security threats on the Nigerian banking sector (section 7.2). It was 
revealed that the classified security threats gave rise to four other security threats domains 
which include ‘socio-technical’, ‘e-commuting’, ‘pervasive’ and ‘lack of awareness’. This 
led to sorting out the security threats that are peculiar to either one, two and three domains 
respectively based on research findings as well as the literature. The outcome of the 
classification shows that technical, social and mobility domains can be regarded as low risk 
(LR) domains because the security threats are only peculiar to a particular domain; they  do 
not affect more than one domain at a time  (Yang & Yao, 2009). On the other hand, 
‘sociotechnical’, ‘pervasive’ and ‘e-commuting’ domains can be regarded as medium risk 
(MR) domains because the security threats are only peculiar to two domains and can bring 
down the two domains at the same time if the right security measures are not put in place 
(Ghosh et al., 2013).  
 
However, ‘lack of awareness’ is considered as a high risk (HR) domain because it affects the 
three domains at the same time which can be very harmful to the organization (Ghosh et al., 
2013). Kathleen (2015) argues that a lack of awareness is a major factor contributing to most 
security threats. Hence, LR are security threats that are harmful but not to the same extent as 
the other two risks, namely MR and HR (Ghosh et al., 2013) while MR are security threats 
that are harmful but not to the same extent as the HR but are more harmful than LR.  
However, an HR security threat is considered the most harmful because it affects the three 
domains at the same time and can bring the organization down at once. This risk levels 
informs the type of security framework that was developed. 
 
9.3.6 Existing security measures  
 This study identified the security measures put in place such as firewalls, antivirus software,, 
antispyware, proxy servers and intrusion detection systems (section 5.5.1.1) which are 
effective for mobile security but are not sufficient and may not address employees’ and 
organizations’ lack of awareness. Furthermore, the findings reveal areas that need more 
security focus which include the banks’ network systems and customer databases (section 
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5.5.1.1). This also emphasises the fact that the existing security measures are not sufficient, 
hence giving rise to the development of a security framework. The developed 3-D security 
framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in Nigeria was evaluated and the findings 
are summarized in section 9.4. 
 
9.4 Findings from the framework evaluation 
It was revealed from the descriptive analysis that the appropriateness of the 3-D security 
framework aligns with the policies and strategies of the bank. Additionally, it could enhance 
the effectiveness of the bank data security and could contribute towards the efficiency of the 
bank operations. Similarly, in evaluating the adequacy of the security framework it was 
revealed that it could address all the technical, social and mobility threats identified from the 
study. Furthermore, the feasibility evaluation of the security framework indicates that it is 
cost effective, it can be implemented in a short period of time and it can be implemented with 
the available resources. Likewise, the flexibility evaluation of the security framework shows 
that it could be easily adopted with changing policies and could be used for mitigating 
security threats within or across different branches of the bank. Again, evaluating the 
intention to use the security framework reveals that the bank is willing to use the security 
framework as it is and also to adopt the framework immediately. Also, it was revealed that 
using the framework by the employees will be easy. Additionally, the thematic analysis 
corroborates the descriptive analysis as the participants affirm their satisfaction with the 
security framework. This implies that there is a degree of uptake in terms of implementation.  
 
However, the security framework was revised based on some recommendations from the 
participants to incorporate their suggestions (Figure 8.16). 
 
9.5 Contribution to body of knowledge 
Firstly, the study provides a contribution to literature by explaining the link between 
individual and organization practices in exploring BYOD security threats under three major 
domains, namely technical, social and mobility. Although there is considerable research on 
BYOD trends, to the researcher’s knowledge there has been no study of BYOD in the specific 
context of the Nigerian banking sector.  
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Secondly, another contribution relates to the theoretical and methodological approaches used 
in the study. The combination and adaptation of the organization theories, socio-technical 
theory and mobilities theory has been used uniquely to hypothesise the conceptual framework 
for the Nigerian banking sector which eventually adds to the body of knowledge.  
 
The third major contribution is the development of a 3-D security framework for BYOD-
enabled banking institutions in Nigeria that will help the banking sector to mitigate BYOD 
security threats in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In addition, the security framework 
provides a basis on which banks in developing countries can enhance their security while 
supporting their employees in using their personal devices in executing their duties as 
employees of the bank. Hence, the security framework is an innovative contribution within 
the context of information security for the BYOD phenomenon in the Nigerian banking 
sector.  
 
Lastly, the study enlightens individuals (employees) and organizations on the different 
security threats caused by using personally owned devices and also highlights the importance 
of educating employees who are constantly using personal devices to access corporate data.  
 
9.6 Limitations of the study 
It is important to note that the solutions for security breaches will keep changing because 
cybercriminal are adaptive and given time, will usually find ways to by-pass such security 
solutions. However, this research has identified some limitations which can be considered 
for future research.  
 
Firstly, the security framework developed in this study is exclusively for Nigerian banking 
sector and it only considers individual and organizations practices and does not include the 
third party in tackling threats arising from technical, social and mobility domains. The 
developed security framework is applicable to Nigeria because of the following reasons: 
firstly, threats were identified through data collected from the Nigerian banks, hence the 
result cannot generalized. Secondly, the banking technology used in Nigeria is not the same 
as the other countries. Lastly, the framework evaluation for acceptance was done by the 
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bank’s officials in Nigeria; hence, the framework may not be applicable to other African 
banks. However, to be able to generalize the result, the researcher has made a 
recommendation for future research to extend it samples to other banking institution in 
different countries.   
 
Secondly, the resources available for each bank is not the same. This limitation was identified 
from the framework evaluation (Figure 8.9) where three participants disagreed that the 
framework could be implemented with the available resources. This implies that the available 
resources at hand are insufficient for the implementation of the security framework. 
According to Downer and Bhattacharya (2015), it is imperative to implement security 
measures to protect all devices’ hardware and software as well as maintaining secure and 
stable connections for all devices connected to the network. This is because extra resources 
are needed to maintain the required level of security (Lindström & Hanken, 2018). Hence 
this limitation is noted for recommendation. 
 
A third limitation of this study was discovered from the framework evaluation (Figure 8.10) 
where three participants disagreed that the framework could be adopted with the changing of 
policies. In addition, another three participants (Figure 8.12) also disagreed that the 
framework could be adopted for mitigating security threats across different banks. This is 
because of the inconsistency in terms of ICT policy across the banks (Downer & 
Bhattacharya, 2015). Hence a separate ICT policy guideline is required for each bank: this 
was not considered in this research. 
 
Fourthly, two participants from the framework evaluation phase (Figure 8.7) disagreed that 
the framework could be cost effective. In addition, another two participants (Figure 8.8) also 
disagreed that the framework could be implemented within a short period of time. This is as 
a result of budget constraints which were identified by the respondents in section 5.5.2.2.  
According to Hong (2013), every organization needs to have adequate budget set apart for 
security framework implementation at any point in time. Hence this limitation is noted for 
recommendation. 
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Fifthly, the scope of the research is limited to BYOD, hence smart cards which include credit 
and debits cards were not considered. This limitation was based on the responses received 
from the participants in section 8.3.1 where a respondent suggested credit card encryption. 
 
Lastly, this research does not focus on employees’ privacy, or that of customers or account 
holders, hence there is a need for further research that focuses on employees’ privacy as well 
as that of customers and account holders. 
.  
9.7 Recommendations  
In general, this study recommends a periodic review of the framework for effective security. 
This is because with the emerging trends of technology, the possibilities of new mobile 
devices may emerge, and the pattern of usage may change.  
 
9.7.1 Recommendations for employees 
Based on the research findings, this study recommends the following for the bank employees:  
Firstly, this study recommends that employees comply with security policies and guidelines 
laid down by the organization. This is in line with the research findings that revealed that 
employees do not comply with security policies (section 5.5.1.2). Compliance with security 
policies will help to guide against security breaches (Disterer & Kliner, 2013). 
 
Secondly, employees should endeavour to monitor third party device usage. This 
recommendation is based on the research findings that confirm that most employees share 
their mobile devices with colleagues, friends or family (section 5.4.5.3). “Sharing of mobile 
device can lead to cases of lost or stolen devices, which endangers the device as the security 
can be compromised” (Karen, 2015). 
 
Thirdly, it is recommended that employees promptly notify the appropriate authorities (e.g. 
ICT department) of any case of lost or stolen devices. This recommendation is based on the 
research findings that revealed that there are cases of lost or stolen devices (section 5.5.1.3). 
Reporting such cases will help the organization to take prompt action to avoid security 
breaches (Karen, 2015). 
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Fourthly, employees should endeavour to notify the appropriate authorities of their obsolete 
or faulty devices before disposal. This recommendation is in line with the research findings 
that revealed that “employees have no right to dispose of mobile devices given to them by 
the organization, except if the organization allows them to do so” (section 5.5.2.3).  
 
Fifthly, employees should always maintain regular data backups on the server. This 
recommendation is in line with the study findings that revealed “saving work documents 
from laptop to a free cloud storage” leads to “data leakage” (section 5.4.3.3). 
 
Lastly, it is recommended that employees maintain an effective organizational cybersecurity 
culture by making information security considerations an integral part of their job, attitude, 
habits and conduct in their day-to- day activities (Enisa, 2017). “Organizational cybersecurity 
culture helps to shape the security thinking of all employees, thus improving resilience 
against all cyber threats” (Enisa, 2017). 
 
9.7.2 Recommendations for ICT department personnel 
This study recommends the following for the ICT departments’ personnel based on the 
research findings: 
 
Firstly, it is recommended that the ICT department personnel register every personal mobile 
device as well as the owner of the device in the organization’s database; this includes device 
identification (e.g. International Mobile Equipment Identity [IMEI]), device ownership and 
the operating system (Twinomurinzi & Mawale, 2014). This recommendation is given based 
on the research findings that confirm that employees are allowed to acquire their own mobile 
devices (section 5.5.2.1) as well as rogue devices connecting to the organization network 
(section 5.5.1.1).  
 
Secondly, this study recommends a service-oriented approach (SOA) for the ICT department 
as an additional security measure for mobile device management (Valilai & Houshmand, 
2013). The SOA automatically downloads all the security measures when an employee’s 
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‘approved device’ is connected to the organization network and makes it active on the 
employee’s device (Valilai & Houshmand, 2013).  
 
Thirdly, this study recommends the setting up of security alerts. This will help the ICT 
department to be aware of what is happening on the network (Green & Basil, 2013), for 
example, “get an alert whenever employees download unapproved application or mobile 
device sign-in or logout” (Green & Basil, 2013). This recommendation was given based on 
a study that identified data leakage and rogue devices as two of the security threats (section 
5.4.3.1 and 5.5.1.1). 
 
Fourthly, it is recommended that the ICT department employ the use of mobile device 
management to restrict application usage by providing a list of approved applications and 
disallowing the installation of unapproved applications. It can also be used to ensure that 
employees enable the security measures provided by denying a sign-in attempt if a security 
measure has not been enabled (Ortbach, Brockmann & Stieglitz, 2014). This 
recommendation was given based on the research findings that revealed that some employees 
do not use some of the security measures (section 5.4.3.4).  
 
Fifthly, it is the responsibility of the ICT department’s personnel to ensure that they are 
updated with the latest scientific knowledge on the safe management of mobile device waste 
by undertaking more training in e-waste management (keys, 2013). This recommendation is 
given based on the research findings that identified obsolete or faulty devices and lost or 
stolen devices as two of the security threats (section 5.4.5.2 and 5.5.2.3).  
 
Sixthly, it is recommended that organizations use persuasive technology to create awareness 
and training for employees regarding information security, which can help employees to 
change their behaviour. Persuasive technology can be used to change attitudes by conveying 
social presence and persuasion (Qudaih et al., 2014). For example, dialogue boxes can be 
used to persuade users to update software, to stop visiting malicious web sites, and to renew 
passwords.  This recommendation is given based on the research findings that identified 
employees’ non-compliance as one of the security threats (section 5.5.1.2).  
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Seventhly, this study recommends a separate ICT policy guideline for each bank; this is a 
factor that was not considered in this study. According to Downer and Bhattacharya (2015), 
there is inconsistency in terms of ICT policy across the banks (Downer & Bhattacharya, 
2015). 
 
Lastly, the study recommends an effective cybersecurity culture to be introduced and 
nurtured within the wider organizational culture in collaboration with employees, rather than 
imposed, if the value of cybersecurity is to be accepted by all members (Enisa, 2017). 
 
9.7.3 Recommendations for executive managers 
This study recommends the following for the executive managers of the bank based on 
research findings: 
 
The study recommends that executive managers develop ICT policy guidelines that support 
BYOD. In addition, this policy should be reviewed at regular intervals. According to 
Vanderlinde et al. (2012), an ICT policy plays an important role in leveraging security threats 
that may emerge as a result of using BYODs. However, based on the research findings, it is 
obvious that the existing ICT policy does not support the BYOD trend because the policies 
were developed prior to the emergence of BYOD (The Ministry Of Communication 
Technology, 2012). This recommendation was given based on the research findings that 
identify obsolete security policies as one of the security threats (section 5.5.2.2).  
 
Secondly, it is recommended that adequate budget and resources are allocated for security 
framework implementation. This recommendation is in line with the research findings that 
identified budget constraints as one of the limitations for framework development (section 
5.5.2.2). According to Hong (2013), every organization needs to have adequate budget set 
aside for security framework implementation at any point in time.  
 
Thirdly, the study recommends a well-defined disciplinary procedure in case of breach of 
organizational IT policies. This policy will outline the process that will be used to discipline 
any employee that fails to comply with or maintain the required standards (Bulgurcu et al., 
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2010). This recommendation is based on the research findings that identified “lack of 
regulations guiding employees’ interaction” (e.g. disgruntled employees) as one of the 
security threats (section 5.5.2.2). This disciplinary procedure is to ensure that employees are 
acquainted with the guiding principle that governs their conduct (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
 
Lastly, the study suggests that the executive managers organize periodic security training for 
employees. The primary goal of organizations in conducting information security training is 
to give adequate knowledge which will eventually change individuals’ attitudes towards 
information security (Downer & Bhattacharya, 2015). This will ensure awareness of risks 
and convey information on how to maintain good practices. 
 
9.7.4 Recommendation for future research 
Based on the limitations of the study, the following areas of research are therefore suggested 
for further studies:   
 
Further study can be done to include third party support in addition to individual and 
organization practices in tackling threats arising from technical, social and mobility domains. 
 
Future research should extend its samples to other banking institutions in different countries 
in order to generalise results based on large samples. Furthermore, the scope of BYOD should 
be extended to include smart cards (credit and debit cards). This recommendation is based 
on the responses received from the respondents in section 8.3.1 where a respondent suggested 
credit card encryption. 
 
In addition, further research should focus on employees’ privacy while using their mobile 
devices in a BYOD-enabled environment. According to Deasy et al. (2018), employees are 
concerned with the issue of data privacy because their personal information is at the disposal 
of their employer. Privacy invasion arises when an employer tries to access employees’ 
devices and such action can result in lawsuits when not handled properly (Lebek et al., 2013). 
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Lastly, the framework developed in this study may be further explored to include customers 
and account holders. This is because while customer and account holders are using their 
mobile devices to surf the Internet, hackers can easily steal their login credentials and use the 
credentials to access the bank’s server without their knowledge (Ofusori et al., 2018). 
 
9.8 Summary 
This study explored individual and organizational practices in identifying BYOD security 
threats under three major domains, namely technical, social and mobility domains. In 
addition, threat classification was used to explore the influence of these security threats on 
the banking sector. Three risk levels emerged as a result of this classification which include 
low risk, medium risk and high risk. This led to the development of a three-dimensional 
security framework for BYOD-enabled banking institutions in Nigeria. Hence, all the 
objectives of the study were achieved. 
 
Furthermore, this study combined three theories, namely organization, socio-technical and 
mobility theory so as to hypothesise the conceptual framework for the Nigerian banking 
sector which will eventually add to the body of knowledge.  Additionally, the research onion 
informs the research process and procedures used in this study. Research onion was used to 
explain different research methodologies before adopting the most suitable one for this study. 
In addition, the developed three-dimensional security framework for BYOD-enabled banking 
institutions in Nigeria was sent out for evaluation and the result of the evaluation suggests 
that it is implementable. Hence, by implication, the continuity of BYODs in the Nigerian 
banking sector is guaranteed.  
 
Finally, since this study is limited to Nigerian banks; all other banks in other countries are 
excluded. This also means that the results cannot be generalized to other banks outside 
Nigeria. Hence, it is recommended that future research should extend its samples to other 
banking institutions in different countries in order to generalise results based on large 
samples. 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THREAT IDENTIFICATION 
  
UKZN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (HSSREC) 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27 621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +27 33 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27 312608350 
Greetings, 
 
My name is Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori a Doctoral student in Information System & Technology at University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa (lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk).  
 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves investigating the security threats associated with BYOT 
trends in the financial institutions, specifically with regards to vulnerabilities and threats against portable mobile 
technology used by employees of the Nigeria banking sector. The aim and purpose of this research is to develop 
a security framework that could protect the bank from security threats associated with mobile devices such as 
smartphones, laptop, and tablets. This study collects data from 360 participants employed in four commercial 
banks in Lagos State, Nigeria. The questionnaire will be distributed to all employees of the selected bank 
branches in Lagos State. It requires at most 20minutes of your time to complete this questionnaire.  
  
I hope that the study will be of great benefit to the selected banks as it will provide a basis through which the 
banks can enhance security while encouraging the employees to use their mobile devices in executing their 
official duties. In addition, I hope the study will contribute towards policy development discourses to 
extrapolate new ways of curbing vulnerabilities and threats associated mobile devices.  
 
In the event of any problems or concerns or questions you may contact the researcher at 
lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, contact 
details as follows:  
 
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Private Bag X 54001  
Durban 4000 KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609 
E-mail: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za    
 
Your participation in the study is voluntary and by participating, you are granting the researcher permission to 
use your responses. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time with no negative 
consequence. There will be no monetary gain from participating in the study. Your anonymity will be 
maintained by the researcher and the School of Management, I.T. & Governance and your responses will not 
be used for other purpose out of this study. All data, both electronic and hard copy will be securely stored during 
the period of study and archived for 5 years. After this time, all data will be destroyed 
 
Sincerely 
 
Miss Ofusori Lizzy Oluwatoyin. 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa 
School of Management, IT and Governance 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
I have read the informed consent letter shown above and hereby confirm that I understand the content of this 
document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participate in the research project. 
 
 
I declare that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact the 
researcher at lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
I hereby provide consent to participate in the questionnaire:  YES / NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                            Date 
 
 
Instruction to respondents  
• Please sign the letter of informed consent, giving me permission to use your responses. 
• Please be honest in your responses. 
• Please tick the appropriate option 
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This questionnaire is concerned about collecting data to design a security framework for banking sector in 
Lagos State, Nigeria in support of Bring your own technology (BYOT). BYOT is a trend that allows employees 
to bring their personal mobile devices to the work place. They have the freedom to use mobile devices (such as 
laptops, tablets or smartphones) for work related purpose.   
Given below are the descriptions of different types of known threats 
• Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of malicious attack of a website where unauthorized 
commands are transmitted from a user that the website trusts. 
• Data breach can be defined as a form of security breach in which confidential data is stolen by an 
unauthorized individual. 
• Data interception is the obstruction of data transmission to and from the device and remotely altering 
the messages 
• Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to 
its intended users, such as suspending or interrupting services of a host connected to the internet. 
• Eavesdropping attack is an unauthorized interception of a private communication such as phone call, 
instant messaging or videoconference 
• Identity theft occurs when an individual pretends to be another person in order to retrieve vital 
information 
• Location tracking occurs when a software application is installed on user’s mobile device in order to 
obtain the device or data location 
• Malware/spyware attack can be described as any software used to disrupt computer operations, 
gather sensitive information, or gain access to private computer systems 
• Man in the middle attack happens when attackers position himself/herself as a relay/proxy into a 
communication between parties or system 
• Phishing can be described as an attempt to obtain sensitive information such as credit card details, 
usernames and passwords often for malicious reasons. 
• Spamming can be described as a fraudulent practice of sending e-mails purporting to be from 
reputable companies in order to induce individuals to reveal personal information, such as passwords 
and credit card numbers online. 
• Virus attack can be described as a malicious software that are downloaded and it replicates by making 
copies of itself 
• Worm: It is a software that can copy itself from one PC to another without human interaction. A worm 
can send copies of itself to every contact in your e-mail or contact address books. 
Finally, this questionnaire also aims at exploring any new threats that may emanate from regular work practice. 
The respondent are requested to contribute about any new threats by describing sufficiently in the appropriate 
space provided (others (specify)……..) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION A: Demographic Data 
1. Gender 
Male Female 
  
 
2. Marital Status 
Single Married Divorced/Separated Widowed 
    
 
3. Age group 
Up to 20 years 21-25years 26-30years 31-35years 36-40years >40years 
      
 
4. Department 
 
5. Educational Qualification 
School Cert. National Diploma 
Higher National 
Diploma/ 
Bachelor of 
Science 
Master Degree PhD 
     
 
 
6. Employment Status 
 
 
 
 
Employees Executives 
Operations Marketing 
Human 
Resource 
Customer 
service 
Others 
(specify) 
ICT 
Executive 
Managers 
       
Contract/Temporal Probation Permanent 
Outsourced (3rd 
party) 
Others (specify) 
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7. Work Experience 
Up to 5years 6-10years 11-15years 16-20years >20years 
     
 
Section B: General practice 
This section focuses on the general practices of banks’ employees in relation to using mobile devices 
Note: The mobile devices referred to in this questionnaire include those owned by yourself or by the bank 
Q1. Which of the following mobile device(s) do you to use and for what purpose? Please tick all that apply 
 
  Work 
purposes 
only 
Personal 
purposes 
only 
Work and 
personal 
purposes 
Do not 
use 
1.1 Smartphone(s)     
1.2 Laptop(s)     
1.3 Tablet(s)     
1.4 Other devices 
(specify)____________ 
    
 
 
Q2. From which of the following places does the bank allow you to use each mobile device for work purposes?  
        
  
Q3. For how long have you been using each mobile device?  
  Up to 6 
months 
Up to 1year 
Up to 
2years 
Up to 
3years 
More than 
3years 
3.1 Smartphone(s)      
3.2 Laptop(s)      
3.3 Tablet(s)      
3.4 Other devices       
 
Section C: Technical 
Q4. Indicate whether you use the following methods to connect each mobile device to the internet 
 
 
 
 
  Smartphone(s) Laptop(s) Tablet(s) Other 
devices 
2.1 Home     
2.2 Office     
2.3 Public place (e.g. hotel, 
airport) 
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Q5. Which of the following practices do you use to configure each mobile device to connect to wireless 
network? 
 Practice Smartphone(
s) 
Laptop(s) Tablet(s) Other 
devices 
5.1 Manually     
 5.2 Automatically     
  
Q6. Do you save your login credentials on any of your devices?  
Yes No 
 
  
  
Q7. If answer to Q6 is Yes, how do you manage the saved details on each device 
 
 
Q8. For each device, indicate the type of applications (apps) you install (Tick all that apply) 
  Smartphone(s) Laptop(s) Tablet(s) Other 
devices 
8.1 Instant messaging (eg 
WhatsApp) 
    
8.2 Social media (e.g. Facebook)     
8.3 News/magazines (e.g. Weather)     
8.4 Entertainment (e.g. Video, 
game) 
    
8.5 Travel related (Google map, 
GPS  
    
8.6 Mobile banking     
 Connection methods Smartphone(
s) 
Laptop(s) Tablet(s) Other 
devices 
4.1 Office wireless connection     
4.2 Home wireless connection     
4.3 Office wired connection     
4.4 Home wired connection     
4.5 Mobile router or USB modem     
4.6 Mobile network     
  Smartphone(s) Laptop(s) Tablet(s) 
 
Other devices 
7.1 I allow browsers to save 
the login credentials 
    
7.2 I allow security software 
on my device to manage 
the credentials 
    
7.3 I write them in text files 
and save on the device 
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8.7 Security software (Anti-virus)     
8.8 Video conference (e.g. Skype)     
8.9 Storage drive (e.g. Google 
drive) 
    
8.10 Shopping (e.g. eBay)     
8.11 E-mail (e.g. yahoo mail, Gmail)     
8.12 Others     
 
 
Q9. Do you update any of your mobile devices operating system and applications regularly?  
Yes No 
 
  
 
 
 
Q10. If the answer to Q9 is No, what are your reasons for not updating your mobile device(s)? 
  Yes No 
10.1 I do not receive update notifications    
10.2 I do not pay attention to update notifications   
10.3 
The manufacturer of the operating system no longer supports the device 
and has stopped sending update notifications 
  
 
Q11. If the answer to Q9. is Yes, from which network do you update your mobile device(s)? 
  Always Sometimes Never 
11.1 Office network    
11.2 Home network    
11.3 Public network (e.g. restaurant, airport)    
11.4 Mobile network    
 
 
Q12. For each device, indicate where you save work documents 
  Smartphone(s) Laptop(s) Tablet(s) Other 
devices 
12.1 Office owned server     
12.2 Office hired cloud storage     
12.3 Personal hired cloud storage     
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12.4 
A free cloud storage (eg 
dropbox) 
    
12.5 
Personal owned devices (e.g. 
external drive, laptop) 
    
12.6 Internal memory of the device     
 
 
Q13. Do any of your mobile devices come with preinstalled security software (e.g. Antivirus)?  
Yes No Don’t know 
   
 
Q14. If the answer to Q13 is Yes, do you use the preinstalled security software on any device?  
Yes No 
  
 
Q15. Indicate whether the following security measures are in use for any of your mobile devices 
  
Yes No 
Not 
sure 
15.1 Password authentication    
15.2 Biometric authentication    
15.3 Anti-virus    
15.4 Anti-Malware    
15.5 Firewall    
15.6 Encryption    
15.7 Proxy server    
15.8 Hardware token    
 
 
 
Q16. In your experience, are you aware of the following incidences in your bank? 
  Yes No 
16.1 Transfer of money from a dormant account to personal account   
16.2 Transfer of money from a general ledger account to a fictitious account   
16.3 The use of a customer identity to create a credit card 
 
  
16.4 The use of customers’ bank cards retained by the ATM machine for cash 
withdrawal by employees’ 
  
16.5 Customers’ bank cards (debit or credit card) cloned by employees   
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16.6 Employees’ setting up online banking for customers without their 
knowledge 
  
16.7 Employees credentials stolen by hackers and used to access the bank’s 
network 
  
Section D: Social 
 
Q17. Indicate your usage of the following social interactive networks 
  Work 
purposes 
only 
Personal 
purposes 
only 
Work and 
personal 
purposes 
Do not 
use 
17.1 Instant messaging (e.g.  WhatsApp, 
BBM) 
    
17.2 Social media (Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn) 
    
17.3 Video conference (e.g. Skype)     
17.4 E-mail (e.g. yahoo mail, Gmail)     
17.5 Entertainment (e.g. video, music, 
game) 
    
17.6 Shopping (e.g. eBay)     
17.7 Mobile banking     
17.8 Travel related (e.g. Google map, GPS, 
Uber) 
    
 
 
Q18. From the messages you receive on the social media listed in Q17, do you ever click on any of the 
following? (Tick all that apply) 
 
  Yes No 
18.1 Links (e.g. shortened links)   
18.2 Images (e.g. pictures)   
18.3 Advertisement   
18.4 Videos/Audios   
18.5 Games   
 
 
Q19. What type of confidential document(s) do you attach to e-mails or instant messages? (Tick all that apply) 
 
  Yes No 
19.1 Customers bank statement   
19.2 Customers credentials details (e.g. phone numbers)   
19.3 Employees expense report   
19.4 Customer deposit slip   
19.5 Payroll documents   
19.6 Auditor’s report   
19.7 Minutes of meetings   
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19.8 Bank financial statements   
19.9 General ledger   
 
 
Q20. In your experience, are you aware of the following incidences in your bank? (Tick all that apply) 
 
  Yes No 
20.1 Unauthorized access to the bank’s network by an employee who no longer 
works for the bank  
 
  
20.2 
Stealing of co-employee login credentials by an employee who logs in with 
the credentials, visiting questionable websites in order to discredit the co-
employee  
  
20.3 A contract employee revealing confidential information (e.g. bank financial 
statement) to an outsider in return for some money/reward 
  
20.4 Misuse of data by an outsourced employee  
 
  
 
 
Q21. For each of the following security threats, please indicate your level of awareness 
 
  
I know about it 
Heard about it, 
but don’t know 
what it’s all 
about 
Never heard 
about it 
21.1 Cross-Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF) 
   
21.2 Data interception    
21.3 Denial of service (DoS)    
21.4 Eavesdropping    
21.5 Hacking    
21.6 Location tracking    
21.7 Malware/spyware/virus/worm    
21.8 Phishing    
 
 
Q22. If you know about the security threats listed in Q21, indicate what precautions you took to avoid or curb 
them (Tick all that apply) 
 
   Precautions 
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22.1 Cross-Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF) 
            
22.2 Data interception             
22.3 Denial of service 
(DoS) 
            
22.4 Eavesdropping             
22.5 Hacking             
22.6 Location tracking             
22.7 Malware/spyware/vir
us/worm 
            
22.8 Phishing             
 
Q23. With whom do you share your password? (Tick all that apply) 
 
23.1 Colleague(s) 23.2 Family /Friend(s) 23.3 Nobody 
   
 
Section E: Mobility  
 
Q24. Indicate whether you use the following methods to prepare your mobile device(s) for disposal 
  
Yes No 
Not 
sure 
24.1 Permanently delete data from the recycle bin to get rid of 
critical information 
   
24.2 Format the storage devices to get rid of critical information     
24.3 Replace the hard drive of the device to get rid of the critical 
information 
   
24.4 Reset the devices to factory default settings to get rid of the 
critical information 
   
 
 
Q25. Indicate whether you use the following methods to dispose of your obsolete/faulty device(s) 
  Yes No Not sure 
25.1 Put it up for sale    
25.2 Give it to family/friends    
25.3 Throw away the faulty device    
25.4 Destroy the faulty device    
 
Q26. With whom do you normally share your mobile device(s)? (Tick all that apply) 
 
26.1 Colleague(s) 26.2 Family/Friend(s) 26.3 Nobody 
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Q27. Do you use a pre-owned mobile device(s)? 
Yes No 
  
 
Section F: Security threats 
 
Q28 Please indicate whether you have ever experienced any the following security threats on your mobile 
device 
 
  
Yes No 
Not 
sure 
28.1 
Unauthorized modification of confidential information (e.g. 
customer’s bank statement) 
   
28.2 Unauthorized login into your storage account (e.g. Office server, 
Google) ))drive) 
   
28.3 
Unauthorized access to your social interactive network (e.g. 
Facebook, WhatsApp, BBM, WeChat) 
   
28.4 Unauthorized access to your bank account 
 
   
28.5 
Unauthorized interception of private communication such as a 
phone call, instant message e.t.c. 
   
28.6 Unavailable network during the cause of interaction 
 
   
28.7 
Personal information on your mobile device such as private photo, 
login credentials were used without your knowledge 
   
28.8 Data leakage (Confidential data were sold out to the bank’s 
competitors) 
   
28.9 Malicious messages were sent to your contact list without your 
knowledge 
   
28.10 
Confidential information were deleted without your knowledge 
(e.g. customer credential details)  
   
28.11 Software keeps making copies of itself on your device 
 
   
28.12 You saw a number in your dialing list that you haven’t dialed 
 
   
28.13 
You received messages that you have won a prize and should call 
a number to redeem the prize 
   
28.14 
You received messages that you have won a prize and should click 
a link to redeem the prize 
   
28.15 
You received e-mail request to update your personal information 
(e.g.  login credentials) 
   
28.16 
You received an access request to device resources as part of terms 
& conditions to install 
   
                            Thank you for participating 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW FOR ICT DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL 
(THREAT IDENTIFICATION) 
                                                          
UKZN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (HSSREC) 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350  
Greetings, 
 
My name is Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori a Doctoral student in Information System & Technology at University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa (lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk).  
 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves investigating the security threats associated with BYOT 
trends in the financial institutions, specifically with regards to vulnerabilities and threats against portable mobile 
technology used by employees of the Nigeria banking sector. The aim and purpose of this research is to develop 
a security framework that could protect the bank from security threats associated with mobile devices such as 
smartphones, laptop, and tablets. The study is expected to include 8 respondents (2 each) from the four 
participating banks in Lagos State, Nigeria. The interview will be carried out with the IT Personnel across the 
selected banks in Lagos State. The duration of your participation is expected to be 20minutes.  
 
The interview will be recorded and I hope that the study will be of great benefit to the selected banks as it 
will provide a basis through which the banks can enhance security while encouraging the employees to use their 
mobile devices in executing their duties. In addition, I hope the study will contribute towards policy 
development discourses to extrapolate new ways of curbing vulnerabilities and threats associated mobile 
devices.  
 
In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you may contact the researcher at lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk 
or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, contact details as follows:  
 
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Private Bag X 54001  
Durban 4000 KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609 
E-mail: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za    
 
Your participation in the study is voluntary and by participating, you are granting the researcher permission to 
use your responses. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time with no negative 
consequence. There will be no monetary gain from participating in the study. Your anonymity will be 
maintained by the researcher and the School of Management, I.T. & Governance and your responses will not 
be used for other purpose out of this study. All data, both electronic and hard copy will be securely stored during 
the study and archived for 5 years. After this time, all data will be destroyed 
 
Sincerely 
 
Miss Ofusori Lizzy Oluwatoyin. 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa 
School of Management, IT and Governance 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350 
 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
I have read the informed consent letter shown above and hereby confirm that I understand the content of this 
document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
I have been informed of the audio record of the interview. 
 
I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact the 
researcher at lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
 
 
I hereby provide consent to participate in the Audio-record interview  YES / NO 
 
 
 
  
 
____________________         ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                                Date 
 
 
Instructions: 
• Please sign the letter of informed consent, giving me permission to use your responses. 
• Please be honest in your responses. 
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SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING SECTOR IN LAGOS STATE OF NIGERIA 
Short explanation on technical terms for reference 
BYOT (Bring your own Technology) is a trend that allows employees to bring their personal mobile devices 
to the work place. They have the freedom to use mobile devices (such as laptops, tablets or smartphones) for 
work related purpose.  
Technical System: In this study the technical system represents all categories of BYOT hardware and software 
technology used for work related purpose. 
Social System: The social system refers to employees’ attitude, value/norms and their level of security 
awareness to the security threats posed by their mobile devices.  
 
Mobility System: Mobility system refers to how employees or clients perform banking while travelling via 
their portable devices such as laptops, tablets or smartphones.  
 
Interview questions for IT personnel 
Technical 
1. What type of internet connection does the bank uses?  
2. How does the bank connect to other branches of the bank? 
3. Who maintains the network?  
4. Do you register users’ mobile devices in your database for knowledge? 
5. Do you restrict the number of registration for mobile devices? 
6. Do you keep database of users’ activities on the network? 
7. Is the database accessible to other branches of the bank? 
8. How do you manage employees’ authentication to operational services? e.g client account 
9. Do you allow employees personal devices (laptops, smartphones, and tablets) to access operational 
service? 
10. What are the existing security measures used to secure the bank’s network? 
11. Have you experienced or received any security threats regarding employees’ mobile device? Please 
share 
12. How are these security threats mitigated? 
13. What are the difficulties you experienced in mitigating these security threats? Please share 
14. Which aspect of the bank security will you like to focus more? 
 
Social 
15. How do you manage/control employees’ access to social media (e.g. facebook, twitter, WhatsApp) for 
both official and personal purpose? Please elaborate on each purpose 
16. Where does the employees’ backup mobile device data that contains work documents? 
17. What are the security threats faced due to non-compliance to security policies by employees 
 
Mobility 
18. Do you allow employees’ to share mobile device used for official purpose with others (e.g. 
family/friends/colleagues)? 
19. Do you allow employees’ to use pre-owned mobile devices? 
20. How do you address security threats arising from employees’ sharing their mobile devices with 
family/friends/colleagues? 
21. How do you address security issues related to using pre-owned mobile device by employees? 
22. Are you aware of lost/stolen mobile devices by employees (reported, unreported, recovered or 
unrecovered)? 
23. How do you address security issues that can be caused by lost/stolen device? 
24. How do you address security threats arising from employees’ disposing their mobile devices? 
25. How do you address security threats arising from employees’ connecting mobile devices to public 
network to respond to bank’s messages? 
 
Thank you for participating 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW FOR EXECUTIVE MANAGERS 
(THREAT IDENTIFICATION) 
    
                                                          
UKZN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (HSSREC) 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350  
Greetings, 
 
My name is Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori a Doctoral student in Information System & Technology at University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa (lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk).  
 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves investigating the security threats associated with BYOT 
trends in the financial institutions, specifically with regards to vulnerabilities and threats against portable mobile 
technology used by employees of the Nigeria banking sector. The aim and purpose of this research is to develop 
a security framework that could protect the bank from security threats associated with mobile devices such as 
smartphones, laptop, and tablets. The study is expected to include 4 respondents (1 each) from the four 
participating banks in Lagos State, Nigeria. The interview will be carried out with the Executive Managers  
across the selected banks in Lagos State. The duration of your participation is expected to be 20minutes.  
 
The interview will be recorded and I hope that the study will be of great benefit to the selected banks as it 
will provide a basis through which the bank can enhance security while encouraging the employees to use their 
mobile devices in executing their duties. In addition, I hope the study will contribute towards policy 
development discourses to extrapolate new ways of curbing vulnerabilities and threats associated mobile 
devices.  
 
In the event of any problems or concerns or questions you may contact the researcher at 
lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, contact 
details as follows:  
 
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Private Bag X 54001  
Durban 4000 KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609 
E-mail: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za  
 
Your participation in the study is voluntary and by participating, you are granting the researcher permission to 
use your responses. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time with no negative 
consequence. There will be no monetary gain from participating in the study. Your anonymity will be 
maintained by the researcher and the School of Management, I.T. & Governance and your responses will not 
be used for other purpose out of this study. All data, both electronic and hard copy will be securely stored during 
the study and archived for 5 years. After this time, all data will be destroyed 
 
Sincerely 
Miss Ofusori Lizzy Oluwatoyin. 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa 
School of Management, IT and Governance 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  DR. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
I have read the informed consent letter shown above and hereby confirm that I understand the content of this 
document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
I have been informed of the audio record of the interview. 
 
I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact the 
researcher at lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
 
 
I hereby provide consent to participate in the Audio-record interview  YES / NO 
 
 
 
  
 
____________________         ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                                Date 
 
 
Instructions: 
• Please sign the letter of informed consent, giving me permission to use your responses. 
• Please be honest in your responses. 
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SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING SECTOR IN LAGOS STATE OF NIGERIA 
Short explanation on technical terms for reference 
BYOT (Bring your own Technology) is a trend that allows employees to bring their personal mobile devices 
to the work place. They have the freedom to use mobile devices (such as laptops, tablets or smartphones) for 
work related purpose.  
Technical System: In this study the technical system represents all categories of BYOT hardware and software 
technology used for work related purpose. 
 
Social System: The social system refers to employees’ attitude, value/norms and their level of security 
awareness to the security threats posed by their mobile devices.  
 
 
Mobility System: Mobility system refers to how employees or clients perform banking while travelling via 
their portable devices such as laptops, tablets or smartphones.  
 
Interview questions for Executive Managers 
Technical 
1. Do you have a definite policy that support the use of BYOT devices (e.g. smartphones, laptops, tablets) 
in handling official duties? 
2. What are your policies about using mobile device with respect to the following 
a. Acquisition (How do employees acquire their mobile devices) 
b. Monitoring (App usage, regular update, office e-mail usage, location tracking) 
c. Maintenance (e.g. does the bank accept to repair employees personal device?) 
3. Do you have any specific operating system for mobile devices used by employees? 
4. What are the procedures that regulate access of employees’ mobile device to the bank’s infrastructure 
(e.g. server)? 
5. Are there limit to what employees’ personal device can do on the network?  
6. Are there ways you monitor employees’ personal device on the network? Please share 
 
Social 
7. Do you provide security awareness programs (e.g. training) that emphasize bank’s policy and 
procedures? 
8. How do you ensure that employees’ comply with the security policies? 
9. How often do you review your security policies 
10. What is the regulation that guides the interaction with the following types of employees’ with the 
bank’s infrastructure? 
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a. Previous employee  b. Disgruntled employee c. Temporary/contract employee 
d. Outsourced employees’ 
11. Do you have any budget constraint in developing a security framework? 
 
Mobility 
12. How do you handle employees’ lost/stolen devices 
13. How do you handle faulty mobile devices? 
14. What are the procedures that guides employees’ disposal of mobile devices 
15. Are there rules that guides employees’ sharing mobile devices? Please share 
16. Are you willing to share threats related data to secure banking system with other banks? 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
 
APPENDIX E: EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
   
UKZN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (HSSREC) 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27 621623285 
Supervisor:  Dr. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +27 33 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27 312608350 
Greetings, 
 
My name is Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, a Doctoral student in Information System & Technology at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa (lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk).  
 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves investigating the security threats associated with BYOD 
trends in the financial institutions, specifically with regards to vulnerabilities and threats against portable mobile 
technology used by employees of the Nigerian banking sector. 
 
The data you have already contributed to this study through an interview process has been used to develop a 
proposed security framework. In order to assess the suitability of using the framework in your banks, the 
researcher has come up with some evaluation questions that can accomplish this objective. It requires no more 
than 10 minutes of your time to complete this questionnaire. 
 
I hope that the study will be of great benefit to the selected banks as it will provide a basis  which the banks can 
enhance security while encouraging the employees to use their mobile devices in executing their official duties. 
In addition, I hope the study will contribute towards policy development discourses to extrapolate new ways of 
curbing vulnerabilities and threats associated with mobile devices.  
 
In the event of any problems, concerns or questions you may have, please feel free to contact the researcher at 
lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, contact 
details as follows:  
 
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Private Bag X 54001  
Durban 4000 KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609 
E-mail: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za    
 
Your participation in the study is voluntary and by participating, you are granting the researcher permission to 
use your responses. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time with no negative 
consequences. There will be no monetary incentive to participate in the study. Your anonymity will be assured 
by the researcher and the School of Management, I.T. & Governance and your responses will not be used for 
purposes other than for that of this study. All data, both electronic and hard copy will be securely stored during 
the period of study and archived for 5 years. After this time, all data will be destroyed 
 
Sincerely 
 
Miss Ofusori Lizzy Oluwatoyin. 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa 
School of Management, IT and Governance 
 
Researcher: Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori, +27621623285 
Supervisor:  Dr.. Prabhakar Rontala Subramaniam, +2733 260 5643 
Research Office: Mariette Synman, +27312608350 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
I have read the informed consent letter and hereby confirm that I understand the content of this document and 
the nature of the research project, and I consent to participate in this project. 
 
 
I declare that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact the 
researcher at lizzyofusori@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
 
 
I hereby indicate my willingness to participate in answering the questionnaire:    YES / NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                            Date 
 
 
Instruction to respondents  
• Please sign the letter of informed consent, giving me permission to use your responses. 
• Please be honest in your responses. 
• Please tick the appropriate options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 257 
 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS: These questions require of you to mark the option that best suits your 
opinion with an ‘X’, in accordance to the scale provided. The following rating scale applies to questions 1 to 4 
only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate how you would rate the proposed framework in relation to the following criteria. The 
framework:  
1 Appropriateness  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.1 Is aligned with the policies and strategies of the bank       
1.2 Enhances the effectiveness of the bank’s data security.       
1.3 Could contribute towards the efficiency of bank 
operations 
      
2 Adequacy 
2.1 Could address all the technical threats identified.       
2.2 Could address all the social threats identified.       
2.3 Could address all the mobility threats identified.       
3 Feasibility  
3.1 Could be cost-effective       
3.2 Could be implemented within a short period of time       
3.3 Could be implemented with the available resources of the 
bank. 
      
4 Flexibility 
4.1 Could be easily adopted with changing policies.       
4.2 Could be adopted for mitigating security threats within 
different branches of the bank. 
      
4.3 Could be adopted for mitigating security threats across 
different banks. 
      
 
 
 
 
Rating scale:  
Strongly Disagree: 1  
Disagree:   2  
Slightly disagree: 3  
Slightly Agree:  4  
Agree:   5 
Strongly Agree:  6 
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5. Intention to use 
Please indicate the willingness of your bank to use the framework.  
  As it is With changes 
5.1 Willing to implement the framework    
 
 
  Difficult Easy 
5.3 Use of framework by bank employees’ could be   
NB: ‘Difficult’requires extensive training, while ‘Easy’requires little or no training 
 
 
6. Suggestions for Improvement 
6.1 If your response to 5.1 is ‘with changes’, what changes you suggest? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
6.2 If your response to 5.2 is ‘near future’, provide reasons 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
6.3 If your response to 5.3 is ‘difficult’, provide suggestions for improvement. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
6.4 Recommend consideration of the threats and solutions that are not considered in the framework. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Immediately Near future 
5.2 Willing to adopt the framework    
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APPENDIX F: STATISTICIAN LETTER 
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APPENDIX G: DECLARATION OF EDITING AND TRANSLATION 
SERVICES 
 
